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This dissertation examines the attempts of the African National Congress 
to establish a diplomatic relationship with the United States of America 
from 1945-1987. By exploring critical stages in the history of the 
movement, I will argue that the ANC responded in a positive manner to 
adverse and trying circumstances and events. The ANC far from being a 
victim was an agency of change. This was evident through its changing 
strategy of moving the freedom struggle to the international stage. This 
was undertaken as a mechanism to ensure its long term survival. 
 
Embarking on this strategy exposed Africa‟s oldest liberation movement 
to the intricacies and intrigues that characterised international diplomacy 
which in turn was governed by global developments such as the Cold 
War and the positioning of the Soviet Union within this. Starting on this 
road meant confronting the policies of different US administrations from 
Kennedy to Reagan.  All of these administrations positioned their 
international policies, including their Africa policy within the context of 
international global developments such as the Cold War.  
 
A related and pertinent area that will be examined will be that of African 
diplomacy. My goal in examining this area will be to demonstrate that the 
ANC had no influence on African diplomatic developments on the 
continent. This reluctant recognition of this strengthened the imperative 
for a relationship with a powerful global player such as the USA. 
  
By dwelling at some length on the Reagan years, I argue that in spite of 
the intensity of repression in South Africa and the hostility of the Reagan 
administration, ironically this was “the” time of opportunity for the ANC. 
The 1980s witnessed the realisation of the movement‟s goals of securing 
the recognition of the USA. Many political dynamics characterising the 
USA‟s political landscape during this time, as well as that of the Soviet 
Union will be explored to demonstrate how the ANC succeeded in its 
endeavours by the late 1980s. 
  
Throughout this era, the USA Solidarity network played a critical role in 
shaping USA state policy towards the African National Congress and 
South Africa, resulting in recognition being granted to the ANC. The role 
of this Network, particularly on the East Atlantic Coast, will be 
interrogated with the aim of demonstrating how the power of this group 
had grown in the USA.  
 
The thesis also explores the complex historiographical tensions associated 
with a study of this nature, including the type of historical knowledge 
produced in the wake of democracy in South Africa in 1994.  The study 
explores both the content and the politics of archival evidence gathered 
in and outside of South Africa. 
 
The major finding of this thesis is that the ANC‟s relationship with the 
USA was contested and contingent.  The ANC appeared by 2003 to have 
had a long and distinguished relationship with the USA.  This thesis 
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This study has its origins in many debates that took place between myself 
and other Southern African experts who participated in Leonard 
Thompson‟s Southern Africa Research Programme at Yale University in 
the early 1990s.  I remember the dinners that followed these programmes 
during which everyone would share their views on the South African 
dilemma and how the USA should react. I also recall certain very tense 
evenings as the Yale programme attracted a cross section of academics, 
including individuals from the right of the spectrum and even one 
individual whom we suspected of reporting our views to the South 
African intelligence authorities. This resulted in many heated discussions, 
all which guided any future academic endeavour I was planning to 
undertake. 
 
What was obvious by the time I finally began this work was that the 
activities and strategies of the African National Congress of South Africa 
from its inception, were all important components of a remarkable 
historical record of the organisation‟s contribution towards liberation 
politics and the subsequent birth of a democratic South Africa. The 
centrality of the ANC to the history of the freedom struggle clearly made 
its contribution a necessary component of historical scrutiny and 
assessment. A study of the ANC comprised an intrinsic part of 
understanding our society and of understanding how transition came 
about. But what was also essential to such an examination was a scrutiny 
of the network of foreign relationships that were sustained by the 
movement during the underground period. Therefore in undertaking this 
dissertation I expected to research this area with specific interest in a 
study of how the ANC navigated perilous terrain in its attempts to 
establish a diplomatic relationship with the United States of America.    
 
Yet when I began work on this dissertation, studies documenting the 
liberation struggle of the ANC were conspicuous by their absence in this 
country. A number of reasons existed to account for these perceptions. 
Firstly, resources that hitherto existed in South Africa condemned the 
role of liberation movements and its members into virtual extinction. 
Secondly, organisations such as the ANC did not disclose in any public 
fashion, their role in the struggle. After 1994, the climate which 
necessitated the need for such secrecy disappeared, with the result that 
documents related to the ANC‟s own work, became freely available 
 
With the signing of Executive Orders 145687 and 145688 in 1994 by 
former USA President William Clinton, previously classified records were 
declassified. The list of available records included all un-reviewed World 
War 11 records, post 1945 collections (including files relating to the Cold 
War) and National Security Files. These newly released documents 
contained vital information documenting US policy towards international 
liberation movements during the post World War 11 years, especially in 
xviii 
 
regard to her relations with the eastern Bloc countries-and how they 
influenced her policy and perceptions towards South Africa and the 
ANC. 
 
In view of the availability of unique and previously unavailable files, 
documentary, oral and other media data, a host of areas related to South 
Africa‟s freedom struggle were ready for scrutiny. This attracted my 
interest even further. Having spent all those years in the USA, my interest 
in the area of ANC/USA was guided by an enthusiasm to correct 
misconceptions and the official rhetoric that existed in regards to this 
relationship, thus contributing to the literature and debates on the 
political history of liberation movements in South Africa and globally. 
But from a more sentimental perspective, the attempts of the ANC to 
establish a relationship with the most powerful global player, was a 
poignant story, characterised by a host of contradictions and ambiguities 
that needed to be explored. 
 
Given the international dimension that pervades my study; three principal 
theories framed my research. They included the following; firstly that the 
history of South Africa is equally the history of whites as it is of blacks, 
secondly that the role of „human agency‟ in the shaping of South Africa is 
vital and thirdly that the historical forces prevalent in the period were 
instrumental in determining the course of events under review. 
 
The greatest contribution of my study will be found in its attempt to 
chart a course for the future of post apartheid South African foreign 
relations with the USA. For I hold the view that how South Africa 
develops in the future relates to what has transpired in the past. What has 
happened to the ANC and USA in the approximately five decades before 
1994, clearly impacts upon future developments in the South Africa/USA 
relationship and on the future of all South Africans, within a global 
context. Though this dissertation, I expect to add to academic debates on 
international politics and in so doing, I hope that I will be able to make a 













ME THE OPPRESSED MAN 
 
 
Let me make myself clear, 
I‟m not against you as a whiteman, 
But against you as the oppressor, 
Me, the oppressed man. 
 
You attacked me, 
Whilst in Angola, 
You assassinated me, 
Whilst in Matola, 
You killed me, 
Whilst in Maseru, 
You murdered me, 
Whilst in Swaziland, 
Me, the oppressed man. 
Whether here or abroad, 
 You shall no more celebrate my flesh,  
Neither shall you touch me again, 
Me, the oppressed man. 
 
I‟m the soul that escaped from the destroyed life, 
To fill the gap left by our martyrs, 
Coming back with fire, 
And yet more fire, 
For freedom is my inner being, 








                                                 





Image 1: Painting by Benedict Dikobe Martins entitled Apartheid Kills (1974). 2 
                                                 
2 Benedict Martins was an activist who was sent to prison on Robben Island where he remained from 
1983-1990, under the Internal Security Act. He studied art and used it to as a medium of resistance. In his 
painting Apartheid Kills, the snake symbolises the stranglehold of apartheid. Dirkie Offringer. Walking 
Tall without Fear:  24 Artists from the Struggle era (Johannesburg. Jacklyn Publishers, 2007). Courtesy of 
the Ifa Lethu Foundation 





















                                                 
1 Courtesy ANC Archives. 






Documents are the primary sources of history; they are the means by which later generations 
draw close to historical events and enter into thoughts, fears and hopes of the past.2 
 
Research for this dissertation began in 1998 and continued into 2008. It has been a very long 
journey marked by changing perceptions and the relentless yet critical drive to pick up data, 
in any form, along the way and to understand the complex issues at stake in the African 
National Congress‟s attempts to develop a relationship with the United States of America. 
But during this time three events that spoke volumes about how the relationship between 
the US (United States) State and the African National Congress (ANC) had undergone a vast 
transformation, had occurred. They included the 85th birthday celebrations of former South 
African President Nelson Mandela in 2003, the tragedy that befell the United States of 
America (USA) in 2001 and the awarding of the Congressional Medal of Honor to then 
South African President Mandela in 1998. 
 
On the 18 July 2003, Mandela celebrated his 85th birthday amidst great pomp and ceremony 
at the Sandton Convention Centre in Johannesburg, South Africa. Present at the birthday 
celebration were many wealthy Americans representing the most powerful segments of 
American society. These included Mr. Rockefeller and former President Bill Clinton, as guest 
of honour. As I watched the many foreign dignitaries rush to eagerly clasp the hand of 
Nelson Mandela and listened to Mr. Clinton‟s poignant reflections on the personal nature of 
his relationship with our former President, I became mesmerized by the glamour of the 
evening. Yet it was my partner who pondered rather emotionally and spontaneously the 
historic resonances of the moment, alluding to my study of the ANC and the USA, which 
could draw significantly from such an occasion. A few days later I discovered that this 
moment was also not lost on reporter Humphey Tyler, but for different reasons. Tyler 
provided a rather candid assessment of this event by reminding us that while this occasion 
paid tribute to Mandela, it was not too many years ago that the US State Department 
described Mr. Mandela as being the leader of an organization that was not just a „terrorist 
organisation‟, but also „one of the most notorious terrorist groups‟ in the world.”3  What 
                                                 
2 John F. Kennedy (19 January 1961) in Ronald E. Whealan. Historical Materials in the Johan Fitzgerald 
Kennedy Library (Boston. John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, 1993 .i.    
3 The Daily News (11 August 2003). 






Tyler could not then predict was that Mandela‟s name was to remain on the USA‟s terror 
watch until July 2008 when he turned 90 years.4    
 
This description of Mandela as a „terrorist‟ was used at a time when the South African 
apartheid state, then at its most objectionable, was considered a friend and “favoured ally” of 
the United States of America. Hence this occasion of the birthday celebration is symbolic as 
it illustrates the long and difficult journey taken by the African National Congress, together 
with its allies in the United States, from the 1950s, in bringing us to this point of the 
relationship between the movement and the US state. That the ANC‟s attempts to develop a 
relationship with the USA state and to gain the necessary recognition finally paid off was 
epitomized by the close friendship between Clinton, a former US President and Mandela, an 
African liberation leader in 2003. 
 
Just two years before, on 11 September 2001, a great tragedy had befallen the people of the 
United States of America as they became victims of global terrorism. Four commercial 
jetliners crashed into American landmarks and on American soil, killing thousands of people. 
This day was described by then Catholic Pontiff, Pope John Paul as “a dark day in the 
history of humanity.”5 Thabo Mbeki, then the South Africa President, viewed this atrocity 
“with a deep sense of shame which should engulf all of mankind.”6 In an edited extract from 
an article appearing in ANC Today, the movement‟s online newspaper, the South African 
President had the following to say: 
 
All human beings everywhere, including us, will surely be engulfed by a deep sense of shame 
that human society is still capable of producing people who can deliberately plan and execute 
a crime as heinous as that perpetrated in the United States earlier this week. We must say 
that as a civilised people we condemn this act of terrorism unreservedly and will do 
everything we can to ensure that our society does not give birth to this ugly and repugnant 
formations that committed willful mass murder in New York and Washington.7 
                                                 
4 Sunday Tribune (29 June 2008). On 27 June 2008, the US Senate approved legislation to remove Mandela and 
other ANC leaders from the US government‟s terror watch list. This arose through the intervention of 
Condoleeza Rice, US Secretary of State, who in April initiated the process by calling upon the Senate 
committee to remove these restrictions acknowledging them as “a rather embarrassing matter…” 
5 The Sunday Times (16 September 2001). 
6 ANC Today (14 September 2001). 
7 ANC Today (14 September 2001). 







In using these examples, I want to be perfectly clear that I am not trying to be nostalgic or to 
poignantly reflect on the relationship between the ANC and USA. Instead I am being 
realistic about how international developments have caused perceptions and views to change 
amongst world and religious leaders so that they begin to provide evidence of what was 
different before this time. This will also strengthen my argument that forty five years ago it 
would have been unthinkable, that a leader of the African National Congress (ANC) and an 
ex- “terrorist”-in his capacity as President of a free and democratic Republic of South 
Africa- would be sympathising with the President and peoples of the United States of 
America for falling victim to international terrorism. Indeed, this shows that the ANC had 
come a long way as an international player as it transformed hostile perceptions of it as a 
pariah “terrorist” organization, to glorious praise now occupying a stable niche in the 
community of nations. 
 
On the 23 September 1998, President Nelson Mandela became the first African recipient of 
the US Congressional Gold Medal on Capitol Hill, Washington. This was the highest honour 
that the US could give to anyone and it was presented by the President of the USA. Yet 
looking back over the turbulent history that characterised ANC/USA relations over the past 
eight decades, this significant gesture on the part of the US government would have been 
unthinkable. All of these events bear testimony to the developments that characterized the 
long journey involved in reaching this point. 
 
I need to emphasise that all of the above did not arise out of any degree of generosity on the 
part of the US State but grew out of the constant engagement of the African National 
Congress since its formation in 1912, with USA stakeholders, to develop a foreign policy 
with the United States of America.8  This strategy was adopted when, for reasons that will be 
interrogated later, attempts by the ANC to function as a successful liberation organization 
within South Africa became distressing and difficult. For its continued survival the 
movement recognized the importance of moving the battle to the global arena. This will be 
demonstrated extensively in Chapter One. But the question that begs to be answered is that 
                                                 
8 The ANC realized the importance of developing relationships with many countries. But for the purposes of 
my study, I will only focus on its attempts to develop foreign relations with the USA. 






which tries to shed light on when the contours of such a relationship began to take shape-an 
area also addressed in my opening chapter. But through the themes of the other chapters I 
have set out to explore how the ANC worked to shape and influence views in the United 
States of America, particularly in regards to the State apparatus, with the result that it secured 




As many personal legacies inform my work and shape my study and I find it necessary to 
make this admission at the outset. Instead of making any apologies for this, I will rather 
boldly admit that these legacies have provided critical learning curves and these clearly 
position me to be aware of possible distortions along the way. Precisely because I am aware 
of these other dynamics, I have endeavoured to ensure that my judgements and integrity 
have not been compromised in any way. Before proceeding, I need to explain how these 
personal legacies shaped my work and the views that are reflected in this study.   
 
In 1993, at the invitation of the ANC, I returned to South Africa after almost a decade in the 
United States of America to help the organization set up its archive.9  I had left South Africa 
in the mid-1980s to escape the repressive political climate. While in the USA, I spent much 
of my graduate study training as a public historian. But I was able to blend this training with 
political work for the African National Congress in the form of anti-apartheid activism with 
anti-apartheid movements especially on the east coast of the USA. This will expanded upon 
later in the chapter. Therefore when I embarked on this study, I set out to answer certain key 
questions, many of which emanated from my experiences in the United States of America 
and which shaped my thought processes upon my return to the country many years later. 
These questions included the following: how important were the ANC‟s foreign relations for 
its survival as a liberation organisation; how big and influential was the ANC in the USA; 
how important was the link between the movement and civil society in promoting the work 
of the ANC; to what extent did American policy help shape ANC policy towards the US;  
was there any evidence of clandestine manoevering between the ANC and representatives of 
                                                 
9 The invitation to return came during my stint as a Fellow at Yale University. 






the US government and finally was Reagan‟s policy of Constructive engagement successful 
in isolating the ANC.    
 
 Having left the country and my family at the height of apartheid repression created many 
emotional dilemmas for me.10  But returning to South Africa at a time when the political 
scene was about to undergo its most exciting transformation yet was a wondrous period 
indeed for many exiles and activists. The country was about to embark on its maiden journey 
to a truly democratic state. For an activist such as myself, the opportunity to return to the 
country of my birth and to be allowed to caste my first vote in a democratic South Africa 
was dream that we harboured for many decades. No persuasion was required. 
 
A year after my return, South Africa held its first free elections in the country on 27th April 
1994. The President of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela, was elected as the 
State President of the new Democracy. In the USA, the state department hailed this 
transition as a miracle, accomplished without civil war and violence. Further, policymakers 
saw this as a successful lesson that could be replicated in other conflict riddled areas of the 
globe. The reaction of policymakers in Washington was well documented by former 
American Ambassador to South Africa, Princeton Lyman in his study Partner to History: The 
US Role in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy. Lyman was the Ambassador during South 
Africa‟s critical negotiation process and hence documented what he considered to be the 
USA‟s role in this process.11 
 
For the activists of the anti-apartheid organizations and other solidarity organisations, the 
birth of this democracy was considered a victory not just for South Africa‟s oppressed 
majority, but also for the African National Congress and for the solidarity organizations 
themselves. This was the unanimous view that was echoed through all interviews undertaken 
with US activists for this project. Their efforts to shape US state policy and hence isolate the 
                                                 
10 Through the intervention of the University of Connecticut, I succeeded in enrolling in a graduate programme 
at the university which offered me a home and financial and emotional support for many years. The 
institution ultimately formed an educational partnership with the ANC in 1999. 
11 See Princeton N. Lyman. Partner to History:  The US role in South Africa‟s transition to Democracy 
(Washington DC. Institute of Peace Press. 2002). 384.   The Personal papers of Princeton Lyman, which 
document his role in the negotiation process, were deposited with the Ifa Lethu Foundation in South Africa 
in 2007. They were not consulted for this study as they are currently in the processing stage.  






apartheid state had paid off. The joint efforts which resulted from the successful alliance of 
the ANC with these organisations paid off.12 
 
That my work was cut out for me as clear. This was evident from the political environment 
in which I found myself and the many public pleas made by prominent ANC leadership 
figures and the key figures in the ANC Archives project on the importance of capturing the 
histories of countries and societies undergoing transformation. These included then ANC 
President Nelson Mandela and Dr. Frene Ginwala, who was Head of the ANC‟s Research 
Unit after her post exile return and later was appointed as the Chair of the ANC Archives 
Committee and then the first Speaker of the National Assembly in the country‟s first 
democratic Parliament. These pleas included the call of  Mandela, by now the President of 
the Republic of South Africa,  who in his  message to the Conference On the beginning of the 
Armed struggle in South Africa, held on 1 December 1995, pleaded with South Africans to 
“paint a true multi-dimensional picture of the noble and selfless efforts of our patriots to 
make South Africa the modern miracle we are all proud of today”13 Continuing in the same 
vein, Ginwala added her voice on the on the need to capture our marginalized history when 
she candidly pointed out that attempts to capture social memory “will help to provide our 
voice and necessary perspectives on events and developments, without which there can be 
no reconciliation, no reconstruction and no national unity.”14  
 
I feel the importance of alluding to such perspectives for it was this environment that   
strengthened my belief on the need to have South Africans involved in this process of 
capturing South Africa‟s past and this recognition planted the seed for this study which I 
decided to undertake on the relationship between the ANC and USA. 
 
                                                 
12 Interviews with activists such as Salih Booker of the African Action Group (Washington, 5 December 2002), 
William Minter of the Africa Focus Group (Washington, 20 November 2002), and Richard Knight New 
York, 11 December 2002), provided evidence of the views of civil society on the democratic elections  in 
South Africa. Folder 4. For a full list of interviewees see Appendix 1. 
13 Message from President Mandela, 1 December 1995, University of the Western Cape, Nelson Mandela 
Papers, Folder 130, Conference Speeches, ANC Archives, University of Fort Hare.  
14 Frene Ginwala‟s statement at the official opening of the ANC Archives at the University of Fort Hare on 17 
March 1996. As the Archivist of the ANC, I was involved in the planning of this event. Hence I was present 
at the opening of the Archives where this statement was presented. As copies of Ginwala‟s speech was 
circulated at the event, I was able to obtain a copy for my personal files. Folder 1.  






But whether as an activist historian, an archivist for the African National Congress or as an  
agent of history, I believed that I was well placed to involve myself in this process of 
historical production which would include the creation of data, research material and the 
writing of liberation history. But this undertaking meant navigating the critical issue of the 
type of history that I was expected to produce in the absence of records documenting the 
liberation struggle, in a new democracy.   
 
 
The Archival and Historical Scenes: Controlling Knowledge Production in a Post 
Apartheid South Africa 
Having made that claim which many may wish to contest, I consider it necessary at this 
point to move away from my writing challenges and to briefly assess the historical and 
archival scenes in the early years of South Africa‟s democracy. This also requires that I 
carefully work my role into this in relation to the views of scholars and archivists such as 
Carolyn Hamilton, David W. Cohen, Verne Harris and Jacques Derrida, thus urging me to 
draw on a huge emerging field of historical scholarship.    
 
That archives and history were areas of contestation and turmoil required no proof. But 
evidence was provided by the numerous serious debates which took place among historians, 
social historians and heritage professionals in these years. We were all required to undertake 
an introspective analysis of our trades and such introspection also helped shaped my work 
and my perceptions. For I  again feel the need to remind the reader that as the ANC‟s 
Archivist I was required to be the producer of knowledge of the ANC‟s struggle and in later 
years I was going to find myself in the enviable position of interpreting the knowledge I 
helped create. It was this tension that I would be required to balance delicately in my study. 
 
When I returned to South Africa, I found that the Archive and History had become sites of 
deep political and intellectual struggle, while the sword of democles dangled dangerously 
over the issue of who controlled knowledge production in South Africa. The issue of „power‟ 
began to increasingly rear its complex head. For the committed post apartheid archivist, the 
profession was now laden with many risks. Of particular concern was the risk associated 






with the heavy dependence on selection of material for preservation. Yet in an attempt to 
showcase the value of their trade, archivists have too often and readily promoted the slogan 
“Archives hold the memory of a Nation.”15 
 
For noted archival professionals such as Verne Harris who have navigated the profession 
through the oppressive apartheid years, into the new democracy and through 
transformation, such assertions were shortsighted and failed to make allowance for the roles 
of libraries and museums, memories and other related repositories. But at the same time, 
Harris has also rightly argued that while this slogan may not be an accurate portrayal of their 
work, archivists are indeed “active shapers of social memory.”16  
 
Another prominent South African archivist, Michele Pickover was candid in pointing to a 
further problem of the archival profession in the country in those early years. She accused 
archivists of only collecting research material “once the pervading shift in social/ideological 
values has taken place-that is, when it is safe to do so.”17 Aside from initiatives such as those 
by the Mayibuye Centre and the South African History Archives (SAHA), there were no 
other noteworthy attempts in the early 1990s to collect material on the country‟s freedom 
struggle. While the resistance groups inside South Africa were producing a variety of 
material, for obvious reasons they were being destroyed or lost.   
 
The profession also came under scrutiny by the post modernists who argued that good 
history could only be written by connecting the written documents to the wider arena  of 
„Living Heritage‟ which was seen to include public memory in the form of music, dance, oral 
history, monuments, art and art objects-in essence what is collectively known as material 
culture. I found such contentions valuable as they clearly gave space to context and content 
and thus allowed us to provide an inclusive record of South Africa‟s past.    
                                                 
15 Verne Harris: “Redefining Archives in South Africa:  Public Archives and Society in transition:  1990-1996”, 
at   The Future of the Past: The Production of History in a Changing South Africa.. University of Western Cape, July 
1996. Verne Harris was an Archivist at the National Archives of South Africa and played an important role in 
the early conceptualisations of the ANC Archive. He has also been credited with helping transform the 
archival profession in South Africa. He currently heads the Nelson Mandela Centre for Popular Memory. 
16 Harris: “Redefining Archives in South Africa:  Public Archives and Society in transition:  1990-1996. 
17 Michele Pickover. “I want, I want, I want:  Accessing and Controlling the Past in South Africa in the 1990s,” 
Paper presented at the Future of the Past Conference, July 1996. Michele Pickover, the Head of Historical Papers 
at Wits University injected activism into the archival profession. 






But another paradigm was furnished by the deconstructionists who maintained that given 
the unique nature of the events and issues covered by the archiving process, this latter order 
was a complex one. The attraction of this „deconstructionist paradigm‟ could be discerned in 
its accommodation of issues such as contestation which were considered as vital areas for 
the archive. Harris has also appropriately pointed to the value of the deconstructionist‟s 
model when he explained that deconstruction “lets the stranger in,” and in so doing, enables 
one to open oneself to what is the „other.‟18 Such strategies make it feasible to contest less 
contested western frameworks, and to confront the challenges posed by indigenous 
knowledge systems which include memory and orality. In turn this would ensure success 
firstly in the process of deconstructing dominant beliefs and secondly of building archival 
engagements which find relevance and application in a post apartheid society which has 
emerged from centuries marked by oppression of colonialism or apartheid. I found myself 
very comfortable with the views of this group. This model found appeal in my work and 
hence shaped my decision to look upon my work as an archivist as being far more complex 
than that of a mere record-keeper.   
 
As the ANC‟s archivist and at the same time, as one embarking on historical interrogation of 
the relationship between the ANC and the United States, a country from which I had just 
returned and one that offered me a home for many difficulty years, I tried to protect my 
integrity by ensuring that I did not become a prisoner of my own selection criteria nor of 
that of the organization that I served.19 I was also exposed to the wisdom of the post 
modernists and deconstructionists and progressive South African archivists-as alluded to in 
my previous discussion. Since the collection and generation of archival research material is 
usually considered to be self regulating and peculiar, and archivists are often accused of 
„trying to play god‟ or of contributing to historical research known to find favour with 
certain ideological trends, I was considerably cautious in my approaches to recording South 
Africa‟s past.  Moreover, as a historian striving for integrity, my role in recreating South 
                                                 
18 Verne Harris:  “Nascence, Renaissance and the Archive in South Africa.” SASA National Conference, 11-13 
September 2000. 6. 
19 My graduate study in Public History resulted in a certification programme for Archival management as well. 
This meant that I had acquired formal tertiary training in a programme not available for Black South Africans 
in the country. Having such a specialized skilled and having later acquired further work experience as a 
consultant at Yale University to its South African political collections, made me a suitable candidate to take 
custodianship of the country‟s national treasure-the ANC Archives.  






Africa‟s freedom struggle,  required a continuous self analysis, evaluation and criticism-a 
process which gave me a sense of assurance and confidence with which to take on the 
extraordinary challenges.       
 
South Africa celebrated her decade of freedom a few years ago. But writing during this time 
in our country‟s history has clearly altered many of my perceptions and arguments since I 
started out on this journey many years ago. For this time represents another political 
moment in my life as a collector of information and as a producer of history, and one that 
enables me to add another layer to my historical analysis of the relationship between the 
ANC and the USA. I vividly recall participating  in a timeous conference entitled “The 
Future of the Past:  The Production of History in a Changing South Africa”, which was held 
at the University of the Western Cape in July of 1996, and where similar dilemmas endured 
scrutiny through the many papers presented and discussions that took place.   
 
Academic disciplines were thrown into turmoil on the issue of historical production at that 
particular time in a post apartheid society. It was David Cohen who appropriately 
endeavoured to grapple with such experiences by alluding to the complexities presented by 
“time and temporalities in the production of history.”20 I was also struck by the many 
discussions on the issue of power relations in the production of history and related 
consensus on the need for struggle histories of South Africa to be produced-thus serving the 
interests of the majority. For me, these competing senses of time continued to present a 
major challenge to my work. Further to this was the challenge presented by the growing 
recognition of the role of activist historians in the nation building process and in the 





                                                 
20 D.W. Cohen, “Silences of the Living:  Orations of the Dead: Further Thoughts on the Production of 
History‟, paper presented at the Conference on “The Future of the Past:  The Production of History in a Changing 
South Africa”, University of Western Cape, 10-12 July 1996.  






The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Production of a Nation 
Building History 
Such a nation building history allowed for the voices of the „ordinary people‟ to be heard.   
This was clearly reflected through the archive of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC), “a body which represented the fruit of protracted negotiations between politicians 
that culminated in the Promotion of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995.” 
This Act established a “commission which was to provide, as complete a picture as possible, 
of the nature, causes and extent of gross human rights violations of human rights, 
committed between 1 March 1960 and 5 December 1993.”21 The TRC was thus charged, in 
the first instance, with awakening the new democracy‟s memory of its protracted birth pangs 
during the apartheid era. It was to hold public hearings throughout the country in which the 
victims and perpetrators of human rights abuses could tell their stories. Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu was appointed the Chairperson of the Commission. 
 
This commission was more successful than other truth commissions such as those in Chile 
and Argentina, and has often served as a model of effective conflict resolution. The value of 
the archive generated by this commission justifies dwelling at some length on the work of 
this body.22 Serving as a public confessional  made up only a part of the TRC‟s duty, the 
others included determining the fate and whereabouts of victims of violations; the granting 
of amnesty to persons who made full disclosures of all the relevant facts related to acts 
committed; affording victims an opportunity to relate to the violations they suffered; the 
adoption of measures aimed at  granting of reparations to, and the rehabilitation and the 
restoration of human and civil dignity to these victims; reporting to the nation about such 
                                                 
21 http://www.belvoir.com.au/uploads/amajuba_notesfinal.pdf. 
22 See Jorge Correa. “Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations:  The Chilean Case after Dictatorship.” The 
Notre Dame Law Review. Volume 67, Issue 5 (1992); Mark Elsalaco. “Truth Commissions for Chile and El 
Salvador:  A Report and Assessment” in  Human Rights Quarterly. Volume 16 (1994). Antjie Krog. Country 
of My Skull:  Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the new South Africa (Random House. 
Johannesburg, 1998); Kader Asmal and Ronald Suresh Roberts. Reconciliation Through Truth:  A Reckoning 
of Apartheid‟s Criminal Governance (Cape Town. David Philip, 1998).  I was able to establish the 
effectiveness of the different truth commissions through my involvement as South Africa‟s representative on 
the United Nation‟s Expert‟s Group on Security Archives during 1995-1996. The input provided by the 
Chilean Representative, Alejandro Gonzalez Poblete and the Brazilian representative, Eliana Mendoca, for the 
final report strengthened my view on the success of the South African truth Commission. Working 
documents and drafts for the commission are in my possession and can be located in Folder 3.    






violations, the granting of reparations and most importantly the recommendation of 
measures to prevent human rights violations in the future.23 
 
To those like Professor Njabulo Ndebele, who was present when the first round of 
the TRC hearings took place in East London, there were many ironies to be 
registered. He referred to a quote that Archbishop Desmond Tutu made on the day 
the hearings began. “The country has taken the right course,” Tutu added, “in the 
process of healing to hear these stories. Very few of us can be the same today as we 
were on Monday.”24 
  
This was the first time that I (like Professor Ndebele) remember the TRC testimonies being 
referred to as „stories‟. And within months after the hearings began, the facts of human 
rights abuses began emerging. So victims and perpetrators came to the commission to tell 
their stories. Each victim‟s statement was subject to factual scrutiny. 
 
It is interesting that the stories of the TRC exposed not only previously silenced voices, but 
also methods employed in silencing them. That is why the revelation of these methods 
received so much attention. Who can forget those testimonies of victims? I remember as do 
many South Africans. For example, Professor Najabulo alluded to his memories of stories of 
how peoples‟ hands were cut off and put into jars; how women were forced to watch their 
partners being tortured, how a father watched in horror while security police raped his 
daughter.25  I recalled the details as well and could go on and on. 
 
The importance of the TRC was that through the act which brought it into being, everyone 
and anyone, regardless of previous social status was subject to the subpoena to relate all they 
knew. Hence the archive that grew out of this commission carried the voices of the ordinary 
                                                 
23 Father Michael Lapsley. “Confronting the Past and Creating the Future: The Road to truth, Healing and 
Forgiveness.” (4 May 1998). Public Lecture presented at the New York School for Social Research.  
24 Njabulo Ndebele, “Memory, Metaphor and the Triumph of Narrative” in Sarah Nuttal and Carli Coetzee 
(ed.).  Negotiating the Past:  The Making of Memory in South Africa (New York. Oxford University Press, 
1998). 21. 
25 Ndebele. “Memory, Metaphor and the Triumph of Narrative.” 22 






but vital people as well as those of the leaders, thus ensuring for example, that the lives of 
family members of leaders did not disappear. 
 
The first five volumes of the TRC report were published in 1998 and in 2003 the completed 
report of the TRC was presented to the President. From the different processes, it was clear 
that the Commission did have many problems, which included the limitations of 
investigations to post 1960 crimes, the emphasis on reconciliation which encouraged victims 
to „forget the past‟, the difficulty in fully exploring the complicity of South Africa‟s corporate 
sector, the commission‟s superficial treatment of women, youth and regional destabilization 
and the failure to prosecute the worst perpetrators of gross human rights violations.26 
Moreover when the report of the TRC was released in October 1998, it did not attract much 
support. In fact, Janet Cherry, in her study on whether the TRC was wrong about the ANC, 
pointed out quite candidly that “nobody liked it.”27 To be more precise, she added “none of 
the main protagonists in the South African conflict liked the findings it made about them.”28   
This was specially conveyed during the special sitting of Parliament held on 25 February 
1997 to debate the TRC report. This debate turned out to be emotionally charged and at 
times ridiculous. For example, one IFP Member of Parliament, Mr. MA Mncwango, called 
for the report to be “consigned to the dustbin of history.” Even the then Deputy President 
of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, conveyed the complaints of his party by identifying “one of 
the central matters at issue” and that was “the erroneous determination of various actions of 
our liberation movement as gross violation of human rights, including the general 
implication that any and all military activity which results in the loss of civilian lives 
constitutes a gross violation of human rights.”29 But despite its shortcomings, the TRC 
managed to effect a national reconciliation for South Africa. 
 
                                                 
26 For an analysis of the various problems see D. Posel and G. Simpson (eds.). Commissioning the Past:  
Understanding South Africa‟s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Johannesburg. Wits University Press, 
2002); Martin Meredith.  Coming to Terms:  South Africa‟s Search for the Truth (New York. Public Affairs, 
1999); Terry Bell and Dumisa Ntsebeza.  Unfinished Business (Cape Town Verso Books. 2001). 
27 Janet Cherry.  “Just War and „Just Means:  Was the TRC wrong about the ANC?” in Transformation. Vol. 
42(2000). 9. 
28 Cherry:  “Just War and „Just Means.‟.9. 
29 Joint Sitting of Both Houses of Parliament, 5 February to 26 March. Hansard,  Republic of South Africa 
(1999) 






Ordinary South Africans came forward to testify to the realities of life under apartheid. This 
is what makes this area so different, as the various reports, films and interviews allow us to 
comprehend the consequences of the apartheid states actions and the resulting trauma 
suffered by individuals. The personal stories and testimonies are important in demonstrating 
the conflicting demands of truth and justice with the political needs for stability and due 
process and how a new democratic state tried to reconcile them. 
 
That the TRC generated a massive archive of “the ordinary people‟s voices” is undeniable. 
And that this archive should be widely accessible so that we may be able to seek to 
understand its significance is undeniable. But this process was fraught with many challenges. 
The TRC Archive is far from open, remains scattered and frustrates researchers in their 
attempts to access this material. According to Verne Harris, the former Director of the 
South African History Archive, in 2001 the latter was denied access in terms of the 
Promotion to Access for Information Act (PAIA) to a range of National Archives Records 
about the TRC on the grounds that the records were security classified.30 
 
The movement of the major part of the TRC Archive to the National Archives in Pretoria 
was undertaken with the involvement of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) because of 
security considerations and because of the need for security classification. Even more 
alarming, Harris points out, is the “uncertainty surrounding 34 boxes of „sensitive‟ TRC 
records removed from TRC offices in 1999 and placed in the custody of the Department of 
Justice.” It has been subsequently learned that these records are with NIA and will be 
returned to the Department of Justice in due course. It was further learned that the records 
are actually in the custody of the President‟s office. It has also been alleged that many TRC 
staff members removed organizational records when they departed. And in the case of 
Security Police Files, there is evidence that records seen by the TRC are now lost. This was 
aggravated by the attempts of one political party to withhold records from the TRC.  In this 
case, staff of the party were instructed to deny the existence of such records.31 Other parties 
such as the New National Party succeeded in pushing for a deletion of certain findings from 
                                                 
30 Harris. “Telling Truths about the TRC Archive”. 
http://www.saha.org.za/publications/FOIP_5_2_Harris.pdf. 17 April 2002. 
31 Harris. “Telling Truths about the TRC Archive.”   






the TRC report while the Inkatha Freedom Party sought the legal route to challenge 
evidence related to its involvement in gross human rights violations. 
    
 While the main concern for me was, and remains, the safety and accessible of such records, 
a range of questions arise:  Why do such records have to be concealed and why do so many 
state agencies have to be involved? These remain a puzzle to many researchers as well. The 
fact that records of a process devoted to a cathartic healing of a traumatised  nation should 
be concealed or made inaccessible is unacceptable and provides a frightening reminder of 
the strategies employed by the apartheid state to classify, conceal or destroy information.    
 
Are we trying to conceal the voices and stories of the „ordinary people‟? All these dilemmas 
presented by the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the many challenges 
presented by the scattered archive that it generated, shaped my perceptions of the nation 
building process and the production of knowledge so necessary for such a process to 
succeed. Were we producing knowledge to merely forget about it?   
 
During a visit to South Africa in 1998, Jacque Derrida, the eminent French philosopher, 
suggested that the TRC should be understood as an „exercise in forgetting‟32  While many 
considered this pronouncement ridiculous or even „blasphemous‟, he was really making a 
very philosophical point that archiving, while understood to imply the process of 
remembering, is really designed to temporarily forget until we need to remember again. He 
went further to point out that when we note something on a piece of paper and place it in a 
pocket, we are really implementing the archival process so that we can forget about the 
information temporarily, but retrieve it when we need it. He was therefore suggesting that 
remembering and forgetting are not two different processes, but that one is informed by the 
other. Remembering is informed by forgetting. 
 
So much of the TRC‟s work was determined by the process of selection. It had a narrow 
focus, it allowed only one tenth of the victims who came forward, to tell their stories, and it 
was hampered by internal problems and by political pressure. Many of the hearings were 
                                                 
32 Harris. “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission:  An Exercise in Forgetting.” 
http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewarticle/11441. 3 November 2002.  






conducted in camera, and eventually materials generated by and used by the TRC became 
scattered or were concealed. All of these issues, argued Verne Harris, were “dimensions of 
forgetting.” But then the work of the commission was guided by the principle of healing, of 
encouraging South Africans to tell their stories, so that their pain and hatred could be 
forgotten. 
 
But as a result of the challenges presented by the process of selection, by the scattered nature 
of archives of the TRC, by the difficulties of gaining access to such materials and by the 
application of political pressure it may well be that while the TRC was implemented to help 
deal with the past, evidence points to a different scenario.  And this is that the state would 
really prefer to see this process come to an end so it can get on with business as usual-in 
other words that the work of the commission should be forgotten. Or perhaps it would 
prefer that only selected work of the commission should be remembered. But then one has 
to remember Derrida‟s warning that “what we think we have forgotten may come back 
through a number of ways, unpredictable ways.”33 This warning has informed my attempts 
to produce knowledge of a crucial period of my country‟s history. 
 
  
Communicating Knowledge of the Past in a Post Apartheid South Africa 
All of the above presented responsibilities and risks in communicating knowledge of the past 
in relation to this area of study, especially through the discovery of non-elite sources. This 
demonstrated that the ending of apartheid affected every sector of South Africa. This 
included our community of historians who found themselves exposed to new trends in 
South African historiography, new foci of attention, new interests and issues and new 
debates, displacing revisionist scholarship that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as a reaction 
against pre-existing expositions and exchanges.    
 
This was illustrated by concerns raised at the History Workshop Conference held at the 
University of Witwatersrand in July 1994 and entitled „Democracy:  Popular Precedents, 
Popular Practice, Popular Culture.‟ Addressing the final plenary session of the conference, 
                                                 
33 Harris. “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission:  An Exercise in Forgetting.” 






Professor Shula Marks conveyed her concern at the dwindling focus by conference delegates 
on historical topics. As papers appeared to have concentrated on the problems facing a post 
apartheid government, she felt compelled to appeal to delegates not to neglect historical 
research.34  A further sign of crisis in the realm of radical historiography was even noted 
outside of South Africa. In August of the same year, the twentieth anniversary conference of 
the Journal of Southern African Studies was held at the University of York. Commenting on the 
conference deliberations, Paul Rich drew attention to what he believed was “a general crisis 
of nerve among the academic left in Southern African Studies, and its slowness to come to 
terms with the Post Cold War World.”35 For Tim Nuttal and John Wright, the reason for 
this crisis was that: 
 
South African historians were, we can now see with hindsight…caught up in the deep and 
narrow groove of „struggle history‟  This point is not intended as a criticism of anti-apartheid 
historians…Given the political imperatives of the time, it is difficult to see how they could 
have done history otherwise…But the degree to which academic historians of all shades of 
opinion became involved in fighting political battles on the terrain of their discipline meant 
that when the political climate suddenly began to change, as happened from 1990, many of 
them, on the right and left alike, were left without clear academic agendas.36 
 
So while from about the mid 1990s it was clear that the new South Africa needed a „new 
history‟, an even more complex dilemma arose over the type of new history that was needed. 
Even for those of us and the rest of the exile community returning to a free South Africa, 
the dilemma appeared more serious. As someone determined to communicate knowledge of 
the past and of the struggle, of which thousands of us were so much a part, I found myself 
at the crossroads. But given my knowledge of USA/ANC relations, much of which was 
gained from experiences in both entities and my access to new archival sources, including 
alternate media such as memory and material culture, I believed I was well placed to 
participate in attempts to produce a history of a proud struggle for freedom. While I 
considered my attempts as visionary, I could not see myself striking off in new directions.  
                                                 
34 Alan Cobley.  “Does Social History have a future? The Ending of Apartheid and the Recent Trends in South 
African Historiography.” Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol. 27. No. 3. 617.  
35 Paul Rich:  “Is South African Radical History Becoming Irrelevant.” South African Historical Journal 
(November 1994). 191-197. 
36 Tim Nuttal and John Wright. “Exploring History with a Capital H.” Current Writing, 10, 2 (1998). 38. 






Rather I saw myself as one who could successfully build on the achievements of the 
revisionist‟s tradition of historiography. 
 
I could not break with that critical and rich tradition of historical inquiry. Hence I moved 
gently towards the path set by social historians by juxtaposing the role of people in exile with 
archives and public history. This ensured that the rich tradition of archival research would 
not be ruined, but instead would be allowed to engage successfully with material culture, and 
in so doing, lead to more fresh approaches to writing the new history of South Africa. This 
self reflective process was important to me in my attempts to unravel the relationship 
between the two countries I lived in, while at the same time ensuring that this should 
contribute to the domains of reconciliation and nation building in South Africa. I also 
considered it important to ensure that history was given its rightful place in a country which 
marginalized the history of the majority of its inhabitants. 
 
When I started out to explore this relationship between Africa‟s oldest political movement 
and one of the most influential players on the global stage, I did not expect to unearth the 
data that I did nor did I expect to reach the conclusions which I do in this study. But, as I 
indicated earlier on, the competing senses of time, together with my professional and 
personal growth shaped my arguments and contributed to many dilemmas. Coming from the 
intellectual activist background, living as a ANC sympathizer in USA for many years, 
returning to act as the custodian of the ANC Archives and of the many Mandela gifts- all a 
national treasure- and at the same time, embarking on this project to produce an authentic 
history presented an enormous dilemma for me.  But this also informed many of my 
arguments. Surely no apology needs to be made for this. Yet I consider it vital to acquaint 
readers of this work with this political link which I have tried to sincerely shed for the 
purposes of contributing to critical scholarship of the struggle-based intellectual tradition, 











Early Perceptions and Influences 
But setting out on this journey way back with idealistic views and perceptions was unwise on 
my part. Examples of such views included that which led me to believe that the African 
National Congress, the liberation movement to which I had been affiliated for so many 
years, had not only been extremely influential in the United States of America, but that it had 
been solely responsible for swinging support in that country for the liberation cause in South 
Africa. A further view was that the ANC and the anti-apartheid network worked well 
together and that liberation movement was necessary for the survival of the solidarity 
network. But as I will demonstrate in a later chapter, evidence was to prove otherwise-that 
these two entities, by working in concert, were influential in swinging support. But the ANC 
had hitherto not awarded the necessary credit to this critical segment of USA society, this 
giving credence to my discovery of the complexities that characterized this relationship. But 
then I looked at the ANC, a political movement from a different time, as a South African 
activist living in the USA.   
 
This was not unusual because I will contend that during these years I viewed events in the 
US from a perspective that was shaped through my presence at the many anti-apartheid 
rallies on the East Coast in cities such as New Haven, Hartford, Washington and Boston and 
on university campuses of Connecticut, Southern Connecticut, Harvard, Yale, Wesleyan, 
Boston and Princeton. The mood at these rallies was always euphoric and the relationship 
between the US activists and South Africa exiles appeared friendly, with both groups viewing 
the US government in a similar manner. 
 
That the ANC always viewed itself as the orchestrator of public and state opinion in the 
USA was evident through the speeches of its many visiting leaders and those already resident 
in the country. I vividly recall the many related discussions held at the home of Professor 
Bernard Magubane, an exile but resident in the USA since the 1970s, and during my time at 
the University of Connecticut (UCONN) an anthropology professor at the University.37  
This home became a gathering point for many South African students, exiles and activists 
                                                 
37 Professor Magubane took me into his home during my years at UCONN and offered me the comforts of 
normal family life of which I was deprived during my time in the USA. For this and all that he and his family 
had done for me, I shall be eternally grateful.  






living in the USA, as well a compulsory drop-in venue for many prominent ANC leaders 
visiting the country. It was here that I began to learn, engage and robustly debate with others 
the issue of the real power of the ANC and its influence in the world including the USA. It 
was here in the 1980s that I began to increasingly view the movement as extremely 
influential in the USA.  
  
But what will always remain imprinted in my memory is the visit of Pallo Jordan to Yale 
University in 1992 during which he made a powerful plea to the university to throw its 
weight behind the South African struggle. In a moving speech he conveyed the power of the 
ANC to influence opinion in the USA in previous years. I must confess that being present at 
this event resulted in my experiencing such a sense of pride in being firstly a South African 
and secondly in being a member of the African National Congress.38 But my recent research 
supports a view that differs from that presented by ANC leaders and members such as Pallo 
Jordan. While I will argue in my study that the ANC did take on a powerful global player in 
its attempts to isolate the South African state, my evidence supports the view that the 
movement cannot claim full credit for its successes in this area.  This is so because the 
relationship between the ANC and the USA activists and movements was a symbiotic one. 
  
My involvement in South African related activities occurred through my presence at these 
rallies and through work with the entities such as the ANC‟s foreign office in Washington,  
the Washington Office on Africa, American Committee on Africa, American Friends Service 
Committee and Lawyers for Civil Rights. Further as a participant in the Southern African 
Research Programme (SARP) at Yale University, I was afforded the unique opportunity to 
interact with and meet many prominent US activist academics who led such demonstrations 
or who tried to capture the South African dilemma in their writings. These included Thomas 
Karis, Gail Gerhart, Leonard Thompson, Irina Filatova, Enuga Reddy and Bernard 
Magubane. Individuals such as Reddy, Karis and Gerhart were to play an important part in 
shaping my views and career direction. More significantly, much of the primary research 
used in my study was generously provided by these same individuals who always took the 
                                                 
38 I was unsuccessful in trying to obtain a copy of this speech. Pallo Jordan explained that he spoke from 
personal notes. My reflections on this visit come from my recollections of his address at which I was present.   






time from their busy schedules to send me, upon my return to SA, research from their 
private collections, or to answer critical questions on this area. 
 
The press coverage in the USA of events in South Africa during my time in that country, 
though not extensive in my view, appeared pessimistic. In view of the increased instances of 
police brutality in South Africa and the greater level of unrest,  followed by a resulting in 
crease in the number of solidarity rallies, it appeared that the pressure for change needed to 
be stepped up. Although I recall more visits in the late 1980s from the ANC‟s headquarters 
in Lusaka by leaders such as the then ANC President Oliver Reginald Tambo, Thabo Mbeki, 
then Head of the ANC‟s Department of International Affairs, and Pallo Jordan, there was 
no indication that freedom was around the corner. The news that FW de Klerk had been 
appointed as the President to succeed PW Botha added to our gloom for the reason that he 
previously held office as Minister of Defense for the South African regime. So it was with 
shock and unpreparedness that we received news of the unbanning of the ANC and the 
release of Nelson Mandela 1990.  
 
 
The ANC Archive Project and the Control of Information 
As alluded to earlier on, I finally returned to South Africa in 1993 to participate in South 
Africa‟s first democratic elections and to take up the position of Archivist for the ANC, thus 
adding another layer to the exploration of that relationship between the ANC and the USA. 
I became involved in an ANC project whose goal was to set up the official archive of the 
party, and in so doing, allowing South Africans to reclaim their past. As pointed out by 
Ginwala, “an insidious part of colonial rule was that the majority of the people of South 
Africa were ignored when it came to the acknowledgement and recording of history.” In so 
doing she was actually reiterating the concern of the country‟s majority that their actions, 
views and values, if featured at all by the state, were put forward as a negative reaction to 
legitimate authority.   
 
Therefore part of the new South Africa was to reclaim our past as pointed out by the many 
speakers the Western Cape Conference on „The Future of the Past‟. For the ANC, part of 






the change had to be to correct this situation. By setting up this archive, the ANC was 
assisting the process of laying the basis on which South Africans as a people could correct 
the situation.39 The African National Congress, through its pronouncements in public and in 
the media communicated its belief that it had a responsibility to all South African peoples to 
preserve a permanent record of its activities which were really the foundation of a new 
Southern African culture. And it was given these circumstances that the movement 
committed itself to the sourcing, retrieval and preservation of its documentary history 
through the creation of an archive. Other than the ANC, no liberation movement had tried 
to preserve its records, even in the arduous circumstances in which it had to conduct its 
struggle for freedom.40 
 
As the leading organization in the struggle to end racial discrimination and oppression in 
general and to dismantle apartheid in particular, the ANC developed a strong network of 
organizations both inside and outside South Africa. The ANC foreign offices interacted with 
local organizations and had informal ties with foreign government agencies in the struggle to 
overthrow the racist government. As a result the archives project included the assembling of 
records from these 33 foreign offices from where exiled leaders had been working as well as 
from private collections of individuals who worked against the apartheid regime within the 
borders of South Africa. 
 
By virtue of an Agreement of Deposit signed by ANC President Mandela in 1992, the 
University Of Fort Hare became the official repository of the Archives of the African 
National Congress-thus giving birth to the ANC Archives Project.41  As the alma mater of 
Mandela, Fort Hare was considered by the former president to be an appropriate choice. 
                                                 
39 See ANC Vision Document which set out the party‟s Vision for its Archives and was drafted by the ANC 
Archives Committee in 1995. Input for this document came from all members of the ANC Archives 
Committee, and was approved by the National Executive Committee of which the Archives Committee was a 
sub-committee. Folder 2.    
40 Attempts to set up the Biko Archive were only realised in 1998 when the Biko Foundation was established in 
Johannesburg. Attempts by SWAPO of Namibia to set up an Archive only began in 1999 when the party 
began the process of trying to locate its materials from abroad. As the ANC Archivist, and through the 
assistance of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), a German funding agency, I was approached by the party to 
provide guidance on necessary processes and policies. The COSATU Archives were set up in 2004.   
41 See Message from ANC President Nelson Mandela in ANC Archives Launch Brochure entitled Inside ANC 
Archives. This was a commemorative edition published for this event. A copy is in the author‟s possession. 
Folder 2. 






The institution was a place of learning and research and occupied a significant position in the 
struggle history of the Southern and East African regions for national emancipation. During 
the 84 years of its existence, it had seen large numbers of African intellectuals, including 
those coming from countries like Uganda grace its hallways. This was not lost on Thabo 
Mbeki, then Deputy-President when he opened the Archive in 1996. He pointed out rather 
appropriately that: 
 
The record of the struggle, in which the South African section of the African National 
Congress has been engaged for 84 years, has come to stay at what is incontestably its natural 
home, the alma mater of many to whose leadership we owe the emancipation of many of the 
peoples of our continent42 
 
But it was not surprising that this decision of the ANC to deposit its records at the 
University Of Fort Hare should have met with much criticism from many quarters. Given 
the value and uniqueness of the ANC Archives, the collection became a much sought after 
commodity by many competing institutions who believed that Fort Hare did not have the 
necessary infrastructure, resources and experience to house this collection. Many went 
further to take on the roles of prophets of doom predicting that the collection would be lost, 
stolen or suffer deterioration at the University. The power of the Archive was certainly 
recognized by many interested stakeholders, including centres within previously advantaged 
institutions.  
 
Contrary to these predictions, over the last decade the collection has grown to 1500 boxes of 
unprocessed materials with 244 linear meters of processed collections at the University Of 
Fort Hare. As Head of the ANC Archives Unit which was staffed by 12 archivists, the 
collection always daunted yet excited us. After all, the official ANC records and the private 
materials made the ANC collection one of the most significant archives dealing with the 
South African freedom struggle. Its composition of correspondence between party leaders, 
                                                 
42 Thabo Mbeki, in his Speech made at the official opening of the ANC Archives at the University of Fort 
Hare, 17 March 1996. Again as I was present at the event, I received a copy of the distributed speech before 
the event. Nelson Mandela was expected to launch the Archive, but in view of the personal crisis suffered by 
him during this time, he communicated his apologies to the ANC and to the University of Fort Hare and 
designated his deputy to carry out this official task. Also available at 
http://www.anc.rg.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/1996/sp960317.html.  






minutes of committee meetings, financial records, records of efforts to develop support 
outside South Africa and to bring international pressure against apartheid-efforts which I 
involved myself in the USA- and its graphic and audio-visual collections clearly justified our 
perception of our work. The collection also includes the records of the ANC camps and 
activities of its armed wing, Mkhonto we Sizwe (MK), records of the Solomon Mahlangu 
Freedom College and the private papers of leaders and activists such as Nelson Mandela, 
Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, Frene Ginwala and Lionel Forman.43    
 
As an activist, intellectual and now record keeper of the ANC‟s past, the attempts to build 
the archives had for me two important goals. One, by preserving and reconstructing our  
country‟ s history, we were able to open the path for a more balanced and inclusive history 
of our country and secondly we were facilitating that process of the writing of South African 
history in a manner that recognized the role of the oppressed majority in the history of their 
country. More importantly though, these archives could help to provide the voice of the 
country‟s oppressed and a necessary perspective on events and developments, without which 
there could be no reconciliation, no reconstruction and no national unity. My later role as a 
researcher meant that I was to be included in this process of trying to reconstruct our 
country‟s past in a more balanced manner and of helping to give recognition to the 
unrecognized or to the previously voiceless sections of our population. But for Mbeki, the 
archive was required to say to all “who have ears to hear that they should not hear a still 
past, but must respond to the living reality that the archive is.”44 
  
I would confidently promote the view that the movement‟s struggle to remove the 
oppressive South African government is an important historical record of its contribution to 
the birth of a free South Africa. Of significance also was the progression of the struggle to 
an international level.  Evidence for the progression of the struggle to the USA will be 
                                                 
43 The Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO) was opened by the ANC in Tanzania in 1976 to 
accommodate the young activists who fled the country during and after the 1976 uprising in Soweto. This 
college was an important mechanism of the exile period which devoted itself to developing an alternative 
educational structure to that of the Bantu Education system implemented by the apartheid state. The land for 
this college was donated by the Tanzanian government in Mazimbu. See “Education for Liberation:  The 
Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College; 10 Years 1979-1989” and “Education for Liberation:  Overcoming 
Apartheid at the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College”, brochure produced by the ANC Department of 
Information in the United Kingdom. (5 January 1989). Folder 2.    
44 Mbeki at the opening of Archives. 






provided by my work on this area. This was perceived from the ANC‟s strategy of advancing 
the ideal of non-racialism internationally and also from the role it played in the development 
of international human rights law and international action against racism. 
 
While my description of the processes involved in setting up the archive of the ANC may 
appear to be a united and exciting endeavour, the hidden dynamics told a different story to 
which I was privy through my work and through the directives received.  As a result of the 
interventions of Dr. Frene Ginwala, then Head of the ANC‟s Research Unit and later the 
Speaker in the first democratic parliament of South Africa, then ANC President Nelson 
Mandela, and the National Executive Committee of the ANC, it was decided that the setting 
up of the Archive of the party was a necessity.  This was formalized, as explained earlier on, 
in 1992. These discussions regarding the setting up of an archive had taken place while the 
ANC was still in exile strengthening my view that other than the ANC, no liberation 
movement in the world had tried to preserve its records during its struggle years or while in 
exile. For those intellectuals in the ANC, like Ginwala, this initiative was strategic since 
promoting the history of the liberation struggle was “a vital component in building the 
necessary understanding for healing the nation.”45 So the vision was in place.   
 
What I found more significant was the ANC‟s emphasis on accountability and transparency, 
principles it tried to carry through, sometimes unsuccessfully, into its governing of South 
Africa after 1994. During the many public speeches made about the importance of the ANC 
Archives, Ginwala, took great pains to emphasise the importance to the ANC of accounting 
to its people inside the country for its 84 years of exile and struggle activity. The Archives of 
the ANC were expected to provide the proof of accountability. That such a body of 
evidence existed and led to the creation of an archive served to substantiate my  argument in 
this study that Africans were activists and hence agents of  change. This makes me averse to 
any historical interpretation labeling South Africa‟s majority, especially those engaged in any 
form of resistance activity, as victims. As the creator of the Archive for the party, as an 
activist myself and as a member of the organization, I was well positioned to reach this 
conclusion.   
                                                 
45 Draft “Vision Document”. In possession of author in capacity as member of drafting committee. Folder 2.  






All policy documents and recommendations of the Archives committee were sent to the 
NEC for approval. That the ANC‟s highest decision making body was involved in this 
process served to show the importance that the movement attached to such an initiative. 
Also the decision to locate this project initially in the Research department and later with the 
Presidency and finally with the Secretary-general‟s office was evidence that the ANC began 
to realize the power this archive may be able to wield. But from my experience and 
engagement with many of ANC members the greatest challenge that I as well as Ginwala 
and Mandela confronted was that which necessitated an explanation to the majority within 
the National Working Committee and the National Executive Committee of what 
constituted an archive and why archival documents may be considered a valuable commodity 
for the future of the movement. In view of the ignorance that prevailed amongst those non-
intellectual segments of the party, power struggles on who controlled the ANC Archive or 
whether the Archive should be as transparent and accessible as many academics would 
prefer, did not exist until 1999.      
  
Hence by the time the ANC Oral History Project was conceived, the situation had changed 
within the ANC, with Archival policy documents requiring greater scrutiny within the NEC. 
That pressure was mounting on Ginwala was clear as decision making took longer and 
judgement calls by the Chair of the committee were far fewer. Far greater control was 
exercised on the ANC Archives. At this point I recalled the earlier days of the archives when 
University Of Witwatersrand academic Gail Gerhart drew my attention to a document she 
found during the course of her research in the collection deposited at the University Of Fort 
Hare in 1996. Her view as an academic was that given the „contentious‟ nature of its content, 
the document should have been classified for restricted access. But upon discussion with 
stakeholders at the ANC, I was advised that in the interests of transparency and 
accountability the „contentious‟ document should remain open for free access.46  As the 
access policy was drafted with input from international experts such as those from the 
                                                 
46 This document comprised part of the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College Collection (SOMAFCO). 
SOMAFCO was opened by the ANC in Tanzania in 1979 to cater for the exiles fleeing South Africa in the 
aftermath of the Soweto Uprising. The document was a disciplinary report on a high level ANC activist who 
was previously a student of SOMAFCO and was subject to a disciplinary hearing at the College. During the 
time of Professor Gerhart‟s research of the ANC Archives at the University of Fort Hare, that individual was 
holding high political office in the South African Government.  






United Nations as well as those from the Archival community, the NEC justified its decision 




The ANC Oral History Project 
The political dynamics linked to the Archives Project became more evident when the ANC 
launched its Oral History project. As Coordinator of the Archives Project, I recognized the 
value of complementing the archival collection with an oral history of those living activists 
who played an important part of the struggle. In motivating to the Archives Committee for 
their approval to initiate such a project, I alluded to the need to tap into the memories of 
leading personalities who fought both inside and outside of South Africa for freedom of 
South Africa‟s majority. Many had either retired, or were about to retire from active politics 
or passed on. Regrettably the latter group includes those such as Joe Slovo, Joe Modise, and 
Alfred Nzo. Hence there was an urgency to do this as the central role that they played in the 
struggle was not documented in the materials that were repatriated into the country or 
collected at the Archival facility at Luthuli House, the headquarters of the ANC in 
Johannesburg or at the University Of Fort Hare. We found that these records did not 
constitute the entire history of the freedom struggle because of the repressive nature of the 
racist government that pursued a systematic policy of eliminating opposition. Many 
important chapters of the story only existed in the memories of those who participated in 
this largely underground movement. 
 
While the archival collection constituted the official history of the party, what appeared to be  
missing were the voices of activists and their families. In effect, there appeared to be silence 
on this score, which for any historian signifies danger for there is power in silences, 
compelling us to ask „whose history is being written.‟47 For me then, this seemed to hark 
back to the dilemmas of scholars trying to document the apartheid years. Hence the Oral 
History Project which developed, while assisting in the archiving the history of the African 
                                                 
47 See my earlier discussion on the work of the TRC and the previously silence voices. 






National Congress, also aimed at addressing these other dilemmas to which I have just 
alluded. 
 
As National Coordinator of the ANC‟s Oral History Project as well, I learned that there had 
been many oral histories devoted to the struggle, such as Wolfie Kodesh‟s interviews 
conducted with ANC leadership personalities in 1994 and located at the Mayibuye Centre. 
But the ANC‟s project was intended to provide the movement with an opportunity to 
develop its own history and to share it with others interested in comparative studies. It was 
also conducted from a different temporal perspective. While the Kodesh interviews were 
undertaken in the heat of controversy from the strain of exile, the ANC‟s project was 
offered from the perspective of the post apartheid era and thus turned out to be valuable in 
this respect for comparative purposes. A study the interviews undertaken for the ANC 
Project clearly support my view.48  
 
The process of selecting interviewees for the project again involved the NEC which 
furnished its approval or rejection of the list submitted by the Archives Committee. This 
committee also played an important role in furnishing names of individuals that the 
movement considered necessary for an interview. Perhaps the most challenging point of this 
project was convincing those identified as prospective interviewees to agree to be 
interviewed. Even a letter of authorization letter from the Secretary-General, Mr. Kgalema 
Motlanthe seldom facilitated the process. The reason for this could be attributed to the 
culture of suspicion inherited from the apartheid era. 
 
 
Documenting the ANC/USA Relationship 
Looking at the ANC during this crucial time that I began to record the history of the 
movement, documentary sources began to emerge which had some bearing on my topic. 
                                                 
48 These interviews with 200 ANC personalities can be accessed at the ANC‟s repository at the University of 
Fort Hare. The collection was only transferred from the ANC Headquarters at Luthuli House to the 
University of Fort Hare in 2006/7. Hence they remain unprocessed. But in view of their value and rich data, 
they are made available to researchers. 






These sources, such as personal collections of Enuga Reddy, the ANC Archives, the records 
of interviews and conversation, confidential documents, media reports and memoirs 
provided a lucid view of the interactions between the movement and the solidarity groups, 
of the strategies employed by both to resist efforts on the part of the US government to 
bolster the apartheid state, as well as to build support for the South African struggle in the 
USA. At the same time, I found evidence illustrating the difficulties which the ANC faced in 
undertaking its work in this country and of the many failures it encountered.49 
 
From the oral history interviews conducted by the ANC for its project, interviewees were 
unanimous that it was their efforts that helped advance the work of the solidarity groups in 
the USA. However from my interviews conducted with American activists, what emerged 
was an interesting perspective of their roles in anti-apartheid activity in the USA. Evidence 
emerging from these different sources excited the archival and scholarly side in me as it 
seemed as though these different sources began to speak to one another in a rather complex 
manner. 
  
While living in the USA I did not see this. The ANC appeared more powerful than it really 
was. But from the sources and from the interviews, it was clear that the progressive element 
in the USA had it in their interests to perpetuate such a perception. Moreover, it had become 
even clearer why the ANC joined the corporate world after being unbanned, while at the 
same time, abandoning the anti-apartheid organizations. To many within these organizations, 
including myself, this act was indicative of pure selfishness. But in view of the data now 
available, evidence has come to light vindicating the ANC for what was then considered 
poor strategy on the movement‟s part. All of this has helped to explain the complexities of 
the ANC as a powerful organization in the USA and illustrates what happens to political 
parties operating in the fashion that the ANC did. Moreover it provided clarity necessary for 
me to understand what happened twelve years ago.  
 
                                                 
49 This was clear in the correspondence between the ANC in Lusaka and its offices in New York and 
Washington as well as in reports of the Anti-Apartheid groups. This collection was not consulted in its 
entirety as the processing had not been completed. 






 In 2004 I became involved in another related activity aimed at documenting the 
international dimensions of the freedom struggle. In that year South Africa celebrated her 
decade of freedom. As part of the national celebrations I acted as Chair for a conference 
devoted to documenting the role of international anti-apartheid movements in South 
Africa‟s freedom struggle. In so doing, we attempted to remind South Africans that the 
victory of 1994 belonged not just to them but to the thousands of international activists and 
the organizations they led in solidarity with us. 
 
The conference will be explored in some detail in the final chapter of my study where I will 
also explore the tensions that were clearly evident between the activists in the USA and 
those in the ANC. The reason for my decision to allude to this conference in the 
introduction is done so in order to point out that this event turned out to be a further area 
of contention between various stakeholders and players including the ANC which applied 
intense pressure through it many office bearers to persuade me to abandon the decision to 
host this conference. I have since learned that such actions were driven by unfoundered fear 
on the part of the movement to prevent criticism of the ANC‟s decade of governance of the 
country. Hence participation by the ANC was limited to only three senior ANC Ministers- 
Kader Asmal, then Minister of Education, Ebrahim Ebrahim, then representative of the 
Office of the Deputy-President and Aziz Pahad, then Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
The early decision of the ANC to open their archives to ensure transparency and 
accountability seemed to have slowly disappeared by the end of the first decade. 
 
Although I have been part of the process of creating evidence for posterity, which would 
otherwise not have been possible without the creation of the ANC Archives, it is undeniable 
that what has come to light now in terms of the relationship between the ANC and the USA 
differs considerably from what a scholar may have concluded about this relationship a 
decade ago. In terms of my personal involvement and experiences, I am convinced that 
where we are in time affects our perspective on evidence. 
  
Many South African and American activists will surely differ with my interpretations of 
evidence, as will the African National Congress. But as explained, I have been part of  a 






process of creating evidence for posterity. This means that I have been placed in the enviable 
position of enjoying many advantages and privileges, not available to most scholars. But I 
have also been placed in the rather difficult position of trying to blend claims of objectivity 




The ANC as Agents of Change 
Between 1999 and 2008, President Thabo Mbeki often alluded to the importance of nation 
building as a prerequisite for a strong South African democracy. But such an agenda requires 
the implementation of mechanisms designed to build national pride. One such mechanism 
would surely be history as it assists the process of restoring a nation‟s pride. But looking at 
the historiography of the last 40 years, it would be unwise to depend on such history to build 
national pride or pride in a nation‟s past.50 This view has influenced the arguments I have 
presented in my thesis.  
 
 While bodies such as the History Workshop have attempted to popularise history, to 
counter distortions of history and to create a new class of African intelligentsia, the history 
that was eventually conveyed to the majority, or the research that they produced in the 1970s 
and 1980s, was not meaningful enough to capture the attention of, or empower the 
majority.51 
 
                                                 
50Much of the history written in South Africa over the last 40 year served to perpetuate the myths and horrors 
of apartheid.  This meant that blacks were always portrayed as “savage” or “passive”. A critique of this view 
was powerfully summarised by Belinda Bozzoli.  See Belinda Bozzoli. “Intellectuals, Audiences and histories:  
South African Experiences, 1978-1988.” Radical History Review 46/7 1990. 238.  Liberal historians such as 
Leonard Thompson, writing in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s failed to decolonise their frames of reference and 
did little to highlight the extent of colonial and apartheid repression, focusing instead on Afrikaners who were 
„pitied‟ or their „backwardness and racism‟ condoned. Radical historians such as Stanley Trapido, Shula Marks, 
Harold Wolpe and Martin Legassik reacted against this.  Hence in their efforts to decolonize the country‟s 
history, attempted revisionist interpretations in the late 1970s and late 1980s. But this was not enough to assist 
in advancing the work of the liberation organizations in the politically turbulent years. 
51 The “History Workshop” was formed in 1978 at the University of Witwatersrand in an attempt to connect 
new historiographical interpretations with the needs of the new voices of South Africa such as those of the 
trade unions, teachers, students and others. The fact that they followed a middle course did not augur well for 
them.  






In a free South Africa today there is a flood of publications devoted to presenting a balanced 
view of the country‟s history. But it is my observation that this history continues to be 
conveyed by historians who persist in presenting the African as a victim rather than an agent 
of change. This also reminds me of a presentation made by Mbeki, as a representative of the 
African National Congress at a conference in Ottawa, Canada in 1978 where he presented 
the movement‟s views of how it expected its years of struggle to be judged by history. He 
asserted that in a free South Africa, “we would have placed ourselves in the position of 
makers of history and policy and no longer be mere objects of that history.”52 But thirty 
years later historians have still failed to manage such expectations well even though there 
exists today a large body of evidence to point to these very Africans as being dynamic agents 
of change. To redress this area of weakness of South African historiography I would call for 
the  development of a cadre of African historians who either having lived through the  
struggle era or having had loved ones involved in the struggle, present history on an 
academic level where the focus could be on the issue of agency. While the need for this type 
of historian is being rapidly acknowledged, greater effort is required to introduce measures 
to fast track this process. 
 
In the 1950s Professor Z. K. Matthews, who was the first graduate of the Fort Hare Native 
College communicated his frustration at being exposed to the colonial version of South 
African History. But what for him appeared to be even worse was the marginalisation of the 
role of Africans in this history.  
 
Our history, as we had absorbed it from the tales and talk of our elders, bore no resemblance to South 
African history as it had been written by European scholar…The European insisted that we accept his 
version of the past and what is more, if we wanted to get ahead   
educationally, even to pass examinations in the subject as he presented it. It was one thing to accept 
willingly and even eagerly the white man‟s world of literature and science. It was quite another to 
accept his picture of how we came to occupy the places in life now assigned to us.53 
 
                                                 
52
 Thabo Mbeki. “Domestic and Foreign Policies of a new South Africa,” in Review of African Political 
Economy.  Vol. 5. Issue 11, January 1978. 10. 
53 Memoir by Monica Wilson.  Freedom for my People:  The Autobiography of ZK Mathews:  Southern Africa 
1901-1968 (David Philip. Cape Town, 1983). 58 






Scholars may well take issue with this arguing that this was said in a different time in our 
country‟s history. Yet I am again reminded of the year 1977 when I was enrolled as a student 
in the history department of the apartheid created Indian university, the University of 
Durban-Westville. While there I questioned the type of South African history that was 
taught to students and sought to present my views of the role of Africans in my term 
assignments.  I was warned to adhere to the faculty-held views. Any deviation, I was warned, 
would result in my failing the course. Even more strange was the view that „Indians were not 
allowed to think.‟54 
 
But I must caution against the view that there were no outstanding black writers in the 
country. Writers such as A. C. Jordan, Alfred, Z. Ngani, Sibusiso Nyembezi, Soloman 
Tshekisho Plaatje, Jordan Ngubane, Albert Luthuli, S. M. Molema, Dr. Alfred Bitini Xuma, 
Govan Mbeki, Francis Meli and Lewis Nkosi, produced works that clearly merit mention as 
being worthy of the genre of literature needed to address the needs of a transformed society, 
but regrettably they appear to have been marginalised or lost in the post apartheid efforts to 
narrate the new history of the country.55 
 
There were countless Africans who gave their lives for the freedom we enjoy today. As 
members of liberation organisations such as the African National Congress, they became 
                                                 
54 The University of Durban-Westville was established in 1972 in Durban, South Africa, as a successor to the 
University College for Indians at Salisbury Island (formerly an army barracks) which was established in 1960. 
This institution grew out of the 1959 University Act which legislated for the implementation of separate 
development at tertiary level. Hence this was one of the universities born. Others included the Universities of 
the Western Cape, Turfloop, and Zululand. 
55 Many of these writers either held office in the ANC or played a role in the early development of the 
organisation. Plaatje wrote extensively as a journalist while Molema who qualified as a medical doctor in 
Glasgow was more of the historian. The former was remembered for his study of the devastating effects of 
the 1913 Native land Act in Native Life in South Africa and for his historic epic Mhudi while the latter for his 
posthumously published work, Montshiwa.  Then there was Albert Luthuli who became President of the 
ANC in 1952 whose autobiography Let my People Go, succeeded in documenting the various ANC 
campaigns and tactics more than actually shedding much light on Luthuli‟s role as President of the movement. 
Jordan Ngubane, one of the founders of the ANC Youth League, wrote An African Explains Apartheid 
during exile in 1961 in which he attacked the influence of the communists on African organizations.  Before 
his imprisonment as an MK leader, Govan Mbeki completed his historical study of Transkeien resistance in 
The Peasant‟s Revolt. While many mistakenly consider Francis Meli‟s South Africa belongs to us:  A History 
of the ANC, to be an officially commissioned history of the movement, this was not the case. Meli, although 
previously an editor of Sechaba and a member of the ANC‟s National Executive Committee, wrote this in his 
private capacity.  Then there were the early African literature writers (1950s-1960s ) who produced a fair 
amount of excellent protest literature. These include A.C. Jordan known for his stirring work, The Wrath of 
the Ancestors; Sibusiso Nyembezi who produced NyeMntanami! Mntanami;  and the Drum generation of 
writers like Lewis Nkosi, who was the author of many essay collections including Home and Exile.  






critical agents responsible for changing the history of South Africa. This history of the power 
of the African and their role in the freedom struggle needs to be communicated to the 
majority so they may view their past with pride and in so doing play a role in strengthening 
our new democracy. The lack of scholarly attention on the ANC‟s foreign policy led to an 
inadequate account of its critical role in helping establish a climate that made the 
international isolation of SA possible, thus paving the way for the county‟s freedom. I would 
argue that through the work of individuals and their creation of a network of international 
exchanges and changing tactics, we can concur that the ANC, while not passive or  
submissive,  was proactive enough to respond to changing circumstances to challenge the 
apartheid state. 
 
When I think about the African National Congress as an agency of change, I am always 
reminded about the words of then ANC President Albert Luthuli who, in his acceptance of 
the Nobel Peace Prize on 11 December 1961, articulated the issue of the resilience and 
determination of the ANC and its people when he referred to the “unconquerable spirit” 
which characterised South Africa‟s oppressed and of “their striving with incredible 
determination and fortitude for the right to live as free men.”56 Such „fortitude‟ clearly drove 
the „struggle‟ and was evident even in their attempts to develop international policies while 
simultaneously fighting the state on the domestic front. 
 
To answer the questions I initially ask and to support my arguments I have organized my 
research into four areas which are covered by five different chapters. But as I re-read them I 
realize that the preoccupation remains twofold: firstly, the tension created by my wearing 
two hats, that of the archivist versus the interpreter of the material I have created and 
secondly, that the ANC was not a passive or unchanging organization. Far from being a 




                                                 
56 Audio-Recording of the Speech of Albert Luthuli made during his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize in 
Sweden in December 1961. Luthuli Biographical Collection, B/Luthuli. Documentation Centre, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Westville Campus.  







Like all dissertations, the data for this study is drawn from numerous sources. But what gives 
this study a somewhat unique dimension is the complexity created by issues of time and 
space, the historical milieu, my personal involvement and experiences, changing perceptions 
and finally the sometimes unconventional manner of acquiring sources. These have further 
contributed to a rather philosophical manner of data construction in my attempts to examine 
a transatlantic relationship which remained at the mercy of global developments.   
 
Conducting research on Africa‟s oldest liberation organization began in a different and 
difficult time when the history of the ANC was hardly documented. Locating sources on the 
history of the movement was a Herculean endeavour as the official ANC Archive only 
opened in 1996, with only the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College Collection 
(SOMAFCO) processed for research. At the time we estimated that the repatriated 
collections from abroad, numbering almost seven million documents, would have been 
processed and catalogued in a period of ten years, by which time, I expected to complete my 
study. Also, as I learned from my years abroad, through my interaction with American and 
South African activists living in USA and from my work at Yale University, sources on the 
work of the movement and on events in South Africa during the struggle-era were strewn 
across the globe or in personal hands.57  This, together with the issues which I referred to 
earlier on, complicated the research and data construction process. Given this, I have been 
particularly cautious to critically assess sources and to test for historical errors. This process 
was vital to ensure that a constant vigilance was brought to bear in my interpretation of the 
sources.   
 
The majority of the sources used for this study are archival based and are drawn from 
archives in South Africa and the United States of America and include organizational records 
such as those belonging to the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) and the African 
National Congress;  Presidential collections such that of  John F. Kennedy Papers; Official 
                                                 
57 How they landed in private hands is a story that needs to be told. Suffice to say in this study, many 
documents and collections were handed to individuals in the USA and other countries for safekeeping by 
South African activists and freedom fighters who saw this as the only means of saving their material from 
falling into the hands of South African‟s security apparatus. 






State Records such as those of the US State department and the South African Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Safety and Security;  Personal Papers which include those of  
Mr.Enuga Reddy in the USA and  Albert Luthuli, Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela in 
South Africa; old interviews and conversations that I had undertaken as well as interviews 
compiled by others such as the ANC; memoirs such as those of chief Albert Luthuli, ZK. 
Mathews, Sol Plaatjie, Nelson Mandela and the most recent publications of Ahmed 
Kathrada, Phyllis Naidoo and Mac Maharaj; newspapers from the period under review as 
well as more current newspapers that reflect on the events related to my period of study; 
unpublished dissertations; official organizational and other websites; and finally confidential 
material not available in archives and in the public domain.  
 
A number of national and international scholarly works, including journal articles- focusing 
on global developments, USA and international policy, African developments and African 
resistance and South African politics- whose research, arguments and conclusions have given 
me the comparative and abstract space to position my own dilemmas and analyses, have 
been meaningful components of my data compilation for this study. 
 
While the conference held in Durban in 2004 was intended to document the role of the 
international solidarity movement in South Africa‟s freedom struggle as well as  the ANC‟s 
attempts to develop global relationships, there has been growing interest in this area by 
scholars in the last two decades.  However the interest has not been as vigorous as would 
have been expected, given the significance of these groups in their contribution to the 
attempts of South Africa‟s majority to secure freedom. As this study acknowledges the value 
of other global solidarity attempts such as those in Africa, Asia, Western and Eastern 
Europe, Canada, the Far East, New Zealand, Australia and South America,  it is not the 
scope of this study to interrogate the international terrain.58  
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 Such interest is reflected in the following sample literature. Daniel R. Kempton. Soviet Strategy Toward 
Southern Africa:  The National Liberation Connection (New York. Praeger, 1989), Donald Culverson. 
Contesting Aparthied:  US Activism 1960-1987 (Colorado. Westview Press, 1999), Enuga Reddy. India and 
South Africa:  A Collection of Papers (Durban. University of Durban-Westvill, 1991), George W. Shepherd. 
Anti-Apartheid:  Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa (Westport. 
Greenwood Press, 1977), Hakan Thorn. “Solidarity against Borders :  The Transnational Anti-Apartheid 
Movement.” In Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary Non-Profit Organisations Vol. 17. No. 4, 
December 2006 (Online Publication), Linda Freeman. The Ambigious Champion: Canada and South Africa in 







In my first chapter I explore certain critical stages in the history of the African National 
Congress, Africa‟s oldest liberation organization between 1945 and 1976. By doing this, I will 
be allowed the space to argue that the ANC responded to crises in a proactive manner 
instead of just throwing in the towel. This was done by exploring alternative strategies and 
internal discourses that included interrogating the development of an international policy- 
which was tailor made to suit different countries and different relationships. Such discourses 
grew out of the experiences gained through early contacts developed between individuals in 
the United States of America and the ANC. All these early contacts did undoubtedly lay the 
foundation for later formal links.   
 
What I found encouraging in this early research was that the ANC, although formed in 1912, 
was by 1970 able to formulate a thoroughly researched and well constructed draft foreign 
policy document aimed at implementing a new solution to its struggle-that of isolating the 
apartheid state internationally. Moving the struggle to the international battleground was 
considered vital for the movement‟s survival by the late 1960s and early 1970s. This decision 
will be interrogated with much intensity. Though well formulated and researched, I will 
demonstrate that the implementation of the principles and actions outlined in the document 
proved far too challenging. This was particularly the case in the USA-the area of this study‟s 
focus. But then I learned through the interviews undertaken with comrades in the ANC and 
activists in the USA that the notion of building a relationship with the most powerful global 
player was not going to be an easy one. Hence neither I nor other scholars can accuse the 
movement of naivete. In constructing this chapter I acknowledged that these early attempts 
provided the ANC with a fresh canvas upon which to craft their new policies including an 
international one. This reminds me of a further instance when the ANC was provided with a 
similar opportunity. This happened in 1993 when it was presented with another blank canvas 
upon which to craft South Africa‟s first democratic constitution-from scratch as it is often 
said. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Trudeau and Mulroney Years (University of Toronto Press, 1997), Penny O‟ Donnell. Australians Against 
Racism:  Testimony from the Anti-Aparthied Movement in Australia (Annandale, NSW. Pluto Press, 1995)  
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Chapter two is critical to my study and is united by the question that probes how different 
American administrations from Kennedy to Kissinger under Nixon reacted to African issues 
and African liberations organizations, particularly the ANC, within the context of apartheid. 
This chapter grounds my arguments by demonstrating that these administrations were as 
Christopher Coker pointed out “trapped by the ambiguities of their own position”-all of 
which shaped the ANC‟s actions and changing strategies. But a study of the administrations 
of this period cannot be undertaken without viewing their actions within the cold war lens. 
In this regard, I demonstrated how global events complicated the ANC‟s efforts at 
developing this relationship. Hence I took the liberty of scrutinizing this area as well. This 
discussion is critical in providing an understanding of the difficulties the ANC encountered 
in trying to secure the serious interest of the American state. In fact I am going to be 
dramatic and suggest that this was a formidable endeavour which only achieved success 
when George Shultz met Tambo in 1987. 
  
Even the historiography of this area is complex as they fit into three categories: 1) scholars 
who have looked at the relationship within the cold war lens: 2) those who looked at 
international policy in the region as apologists for the apartheid state and 3) the third group 
which moved away from the traditional approach to take into account the different 
constituencies influencing the relationship. Also the ANC only opened its official Mission in 
the USA in the 1980s-thus demonstrating the difficulties of securing support for its actions 
against South Africa. I want to be perfectly clear at the outset that while this chapter does 
not attempt a comprehensive study of American Policy per se, this overview is necessary in 
demonstrating the effectiveness of civil society in changing American Policy towards the 
liberations movements such as the ANC. In effect it strategically paves the way for the next 
two chapters, while helping the reader to understand why the ANC persevered and 
succeeded in its attempts to develop a relationship with the American state, in spite of the 
support provided by the American administrations to the apartheid state. Again I suggest 
here that this was a strategic decision to keep the lines of communication open, a decision 
that ultimately yielded the necessary result for all disenfranchised South Africans. 
 






In Chapter Three, I move strategically away from the USA to what I would consider „home 
ground‟ for the ANC--the continent of Africa. My intention in looking at regional 
developments will be to demonstrate that given the scenes being played out on the African 
continent it become all the more imperative for the ANC to pursue links with a hostile yet 
powerful United States of America. Challenges presented on the African continent 
exacerbated the organisation‟s attempts to advance the liberation struggle and the isolation 
of the apartheid state. Simply put, the ANC was compelled to react to what it considered, 
but did not openly admit, was African betrayal. In this regard I would even go further to 
acknowledge that the ANC‟s reactions and guarded responses set the trend for a post 
apartheid apologist African policy which would see silent diplomacy and lack of criticism as 
being the order of the day.  
 
My prognosis here will be that the ANC had no influence on African diplomacy-resulting in 
a long and lengthy battle with the African states until 1990. While a very firm prognosis, I 
will strengthen this by focusing on South Africa‟s new outward looking policy for the region 
and the African responses to this. These responses were derived through the many regional 
meetings that took place between 1969 and 1975. This also provides a cogent justification 
for looking at what American involvement was in this region in this time, for such 
involvement allows me to raise more explicit questions of where the USA placed the ANC 
and its struggle within its Africa policy initiatives. It also leads to an understanding of the 
direction in which the relationship between the African liberation organization and this 
global player were proceeding.  
 
In Chapter Four, I continue with the interrogation of US policy towards the ANC and its 
attempts to satisfy the will of South Africa‟s oppressed majority. But the focus here would be 
on the Carter and Reagan years. Particular emphasis is paid to the Carter administration 
because this was the only administration that began by placing South Africa and the 
liberation struggle high on its agenda. But my main argument would be that this was an 
administration laced with ironies. By exploring certain events and actions of particular 
individuals, I will demonstrate the hypocrisy of the so called „liberal era.” Given the 
supposedly „liberal nature‟ of the Carter era and its eventual swing to the right, I believe it 






critical to add the ANC voices to the issue of liberalism within the context of the Carter era. 
But here I faced many challenges in this endeavour as the ANC remained silent on this 
administration, even though it may have suffered much disillusionment. A related challenge 
to be addressed in this Chapter again relates to sources and evidence. My research has 
yielded the following result which carries a great degree of irony with it-that very little ANC 
primary evidence exists for the period during and just after the Carter era.   
 
In regards to the Reagan years, I will present the following argument: that although it was 
the most depressing time for the ANC domestically and internationally, it was also an era of 
opportunities.  It was an era that not only witnessed the ANC getting its foot in the door in 
regards to securing recognition from the USA State, but also one in which many other 
opportunities manifested themselves in forms such as the educational traffic across the 
Atlantic. How the ANC‟s relationship with the Soviet Union suffered during this time, as a 
result of new domestic developments within the latter, forms an indispensable element of 
this period of study. The fact that these opportunities within the USA began presenting 
themselves at a time that cracks began to develop in the ANC/Soviet relationship as a result 
of Perestroika, will be thoroughly explored.  
 
While the earlier Chapters have alluded to the early official and unofficial contacts that 
existed between   the ANC and North American  pressure groups and anti-apartheid 
organizations since the early 1940s, Chapter Five demonstrates  how the influence of the 
organizations and individuals who were involved grew steadily, culminating in a level of 
involvement in the 1980s that was unprecedented. I will present evidence to prove that such 
pressure became a force to be reckoned with in Washington and hence began to shape state 
department policy in a manner that was destined to prove advantageous to South Africa‟s 
liberation struggle. The intention would be to prove beyond any shadow of doubt that the 
ANC could not have won the heart and soul of the American nation without the work of the 
solidarity groups. But at the outset, while dwelling in this Chapter on the role of the 
Solidarity groups in the USA, I would caution against any perception that this was the most 
influential solidarity group operating globally.   This was not so.  Global anti-apartheid 
activity stretched across many countries including the United Kingdom, the Nordic 






Countries, African Countries, New Zealand, Australia, Germany, Mexico, Spain and Japan to 
name a few.  But these will not be examined in my study. 
 
While the previous chapter focused on the various administrations in the USA, minimal 
attention was paid to the Reagan administration. This was deliberate so that this chapter 
could focus  on those years , thus allowing me to argue that the relationship between the 
Reagan administration and the apartheid state was strengthened through military intelligence  
links between the two-all of which was exposed to the public and the world through the 
work of the anti-apartheid groups like Transafrica. Emphasis will be placed on the Durban 
Conference of 2004 to illustrate the tensions that existed between the different groups and 
the ANC, and which was evident during the discussions in 2004 – a decade of freedom 
indeed.   








C h a p t e r  O n e  
________________________________________________ 
 
DOMESTIC POLITICS, A BLANK CANVAS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN 





This opening chapter, which marks the starting point for my thesis, sets the scene for the main arguments 
of this study. The strategy I have embarked on is to focus on key developments in the ANC during the 
period from 1945-1976. These guided the movement on the chosen path towards the development of an 
international policy, with specific reference to the United States of America, after 1969. Through the 
body of evidence available to me , I will demonstrate that by moving the battle to the international arena, 
the movement was not only responding in a positive manner to ensure its survival, but it also 
demonstrated its unstinting determination to secure political power for the majority. In interrogating the 
implications and repercussions of this move, I will be using evidence drawn from extensive secondary as 
well as primary  sources-all of which support my arguments and conclusions, and in so doing demonstrate 
the challenges experienced in regards to data for the pre-1960 period. The Soweto uprising of 1976 will 
also merit scrutiny, but only to illustrate how the domestic scene disappeared then reappeared in ANC 
policy planning. The Chapter focuses on the domestic scene in South Africa, the ANC’s response to the 
oppressive nature  of this scene, the early forging of personal contacts between individuals in the ANC 
and the USA-all which provided the foundation for a formal relationship with the latter, which was to 
come only 18 years later. In relation to this I also locate my arguments within the context of the African 
diaspora, with specific focus on the role of Black Internationalism in the development of the ANC/USA 
relationship and in the resultant mobilisation against apartheid. While the African continent begins to 
take on a new and important role in the international scene in the 1960s, which would impact on 
African countries’ responses to apartheid and on the ANC’s attempts to develop a relationship with the 
USA, these processes are not scrutinised in this opening chapter.  By 1968 positions were being taken by 
non-aligned states in Africa and the west.  Though the Chapter focuses on the USA, there were 
developments in other parts of the world.  Soweto recalibrated ANC relationships with these parts of the 
world and with East Africa in particular.  Ripple effects were also felt in other parts of the world. This 
chapter demonstrates how the ANC was willing to use political adversaries. Although the movement was 







not ideologically in tune with all forces, no entity was setting up to destroy it. This meant that the ANC 






The African National Congress was Africa‟s oldest liberation movement. It was also an 
African movement and as such, this brought greater challenges in trying to secure 
recognition of the world‟s most influential player-the USA.1 Albert Luthuli recognised 
these challenges of being an „African player‟ and referred to them during his acceptance 
address of the Nobel Peace Prize – during which he pointed to the „woes and 
tribulations‟ of the African continent. But for him, the 1960s represented a time of 
optimism for he saw that time as “Africa‟s Age-the dawn of her fulfilment.” He believed 
that “Africa was a vital subject matter in the world today, a focal point of world interest 
and concern.” Hence he concluded by asking a very pertinent question, “could it not be 
that history has delayed her rebirth for a purpose.”2 I will argue that such optimism was 
short sighted for the African continent merited little international interest until well into 
the 1970s. This argument also helps locate the ANC/USA relationship within this 




At the outset I would like to draw attention to the difficulties of obtaining data for the 
pre-1960 years. Given the issues of time and distance, I have been compelled to rely 
largely on secondary evidence for this period. These include studies undertaken by 
scholars such as Steven Gish, Peter Walshe, Brian Willan, Mary Benson, Thomas Karis, 
Gwendolen Carter and Edward Feit.3 They also include autobiographies as well as works 
                                                 
1 When I use the term „African‟ to describe the ANC, I am actually referring to it as being a movement 
with roots on the African continent. 
2 Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech. Luthuli collection, B/Luthuli. Documentation Centre. UKZN.  
3 Steven D. Gish. Alfred B. Xuma:  African American, South African (Washington. New York University 
Press.2000); Peter Walshe. The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa (Berkeley. University of 
California Press, 1971); Brian Willan. Sol Plaatje: A Biography (Johannesburg. Ravan Press, 1984); Mary 
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of those involved in the struggle inside South Africa and internationally. Included in this 
category of secondary studies are the works of Sol Plaatjie, Adelaide Tambo, Ruth First, 
Fathima Meer, Albert Luthuli, Bernard Magubane and George Houser.4 But extremely 
useful primary data for the early years was obtained from dissertations of historians and 
political scientists which include those by John Douglas Nelson, Penny von Eschen, and 
Elena Dorabji and from the papers made available by Mr. E.S. Reddy.5  For the later 
years I have relied on evidence obtained from archival materials such as the ANC‟s own 
records which included the Mission Office records, ANC National Executive Committee 
Documents and media reports from the USA. Also useful were the Foreign Office Files 
of the South African government and the House of Assembly Debates. Critical policy 
and discussion documents were furnished by anonymous donors and remain in the 
possession of the author. 
  
In engaging with the above sources, it becomes necessary to remind the reader of the 
premises that underpin my arguments in this entire study, namely, my dilemmas of 
interpreting data that I have created or generated and the issue of the African National 
Congress as an agent of change in South Africa. I will concentrate on critical stages in the 
history of the African National Congress with the intention of demonstrating how the 
movement responded to crises and challenges presented by the state and by internal 
strife-with specific focus on its attempts to develop an international policy which paved 
the way for a relationship with the United States of America. 
 
Further complexities have also been created by recent academic studies which are divided 
over the ANC‟s attempts to mobilise support internationally as a strategy of moving the 
                                                                                                                                            
1882-1964 Volume 1 Protest and Hope 1882-1934 (Stanford. Hoover Institution Press, 1972); Edward 
Feit. The Dynamics of the African National Congress (London. Oxford University Press, 1962).  
4 Sol Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa (London. P. S. King, 1916), Adelaide Tambo. Preparing for 
Power:  Oliver Tambo Speaks (London. Heinemann, 1987), Albert Luthuli. Let My People Go (London. 
Collins, 1961), George Houser. No One Can Stop the Rain (New York. The Pilgrim Press, 1989).Bernard 
Makhosezwe Magubane. The Ties That Bind: African American Consciousness of Africa (New Jersey. 
African World Press, 1987), Ruth First(ed.). Nelson Mandela:  No Easy Walk to Freedom (New York. 
Basic Books, 1965). Fathima Meer.  Higher than Hope: The Authorised Biography of Nelson Mandela 
(New York. Harper and Row, 1990).    
5 John Douglas Nelson. “Some External Aspects of Internal Conflict within South Africa:  A Study of the 
Place of International Activities in the Development of the African National Congress”, Unpublished 
Ph.D Dissertation (George Washington University, 1975), Penny Marie Von Eschen. “African Americans 
and Anti-colonialism, 1937-1957: the Rise and fall of the Politics of the African Diaspora”, Unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation(Columbia University, 1994), Elena Venturini Dorabji. “South African National 
Congress:  Change from Non-Violence to Sabotage between 1952 and 1964”, Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation (University of California, 23 May 1979).  







struggle to a different level.  One group views the movement‟s attempts at negotiating 
international partnerships as being critical to the success of the liberation struggle, while 
the other takes issue with the ANC for neglecting the domestic networks.  The former 
includes Scott Thomas whose views find appeal in my arguments throughout this 
dissertation, Kenneth Mokoena and Thabo Mbeki  while the latter include Raymond 
Suttner, Nhlanla Nedebele and Noor Nieftagodien and finally, Dale McKinley who 




Instead of analysing the ANC, its structures and functions in any depth, this chapter will, 
by way of introduction, attempt to unravel the nature and effectiveness of the 
organisation and its strategies from the 1950s. This will allow me the opportunity to 
provide an assessment of the reasons advanced by the ANC to move its concentration 
from the domestic to the international arena. I will therefore argue that the development 
of a relationship with the US State and Civil society did not happen rapidly for there was 
no international policy in place before 1969. 
Given that the ANC was, in the early years, an emerging liberation movement, which was 
placed at the nexus of a myriad of hostile and conflicting forces, the development of an 
international policy was not accomplished easily. It was a long and arduous process 
influenced by the hostile domestic environment and complicated by an ignorant foreign 
terrain, with the result that a restructuring of the movement at different stages became 
necessary.7  This was marked by turning points and milestones in the ANC‟s 
development and strategies.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Scott Thomas. The Diplomacy of Liberation:  The Foreign Relations of the African National Congress 
Since 1960 (London. Taurus Academic Studies, 1996); Kenneth Mokoena. South Africa and the United 
States.  The Decalssified History (New York. The New Press, 1993); Thabo Mbeki. “Domestic and 
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The Road to Democracy. Vol 3. (Pretoria. Zebra Press, 2004), Dale MacKinley. The ANC and the 
Liberation Struggle:  A Critical Political Biography (London. Pluto Press, 1997).    
7 The domestic environment was characterized by acts of resistance such as the Defiance Campaign and 
uprisings such as that at Sharpville, Langa and Soweto, and repressive actions such as arrests, torture and 
detentions leading to the Treason and Rivonia Trials and the banning of the liberation organisations such 
as the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress (PAC). 







International Opportunities: 1948-1960 
For the period from 1948 to 1960, evidence supports my argument that the ANC was 
presented with opportunities to network internationally, albeit in a limited and modest 
capacity. This was so because these were either undertaken by individuals within the 
movement who were keen to develop contacts and personal ties with individuals in the 
USA, or by the movement itself which resorted to loose institutional formations. In view 
of this I would conclude that all of these initiatives did not form part of any tactical 
manoeuvre. At the same time I would posit the view that they preceded and influenced 
the process of formulating the future official international policy of the movement. 
Moreover US State policy in these early years towards anti colonial initiatives and their 
responses to African and Asian nationalism in the 1940s did much to shape future ANC 
views in relation to developing a relationship with the USA. Evidence for this can be 
gleaned from the works of scholars such as Brian Willan, Sol Plaatje, Peter Walshe, John 
Douglas Nelson, George Houser, Mary Benson, Albert Luthuli, Steven Gish and Penny 
Von Eschen.8    
 
Such opportunities to seek international assistance for the plight of South Africa‟s 
oppressed,  and to develop international contacts were provided when members of the 
newly formed South African Native National Congress(SANNC) undertook two visits to 
Britain in 1914. Following the passing of the 1913 Natives land Act, John Dube, 
President of the newly formed SANNC led a deputation to Britain to protest the terms 
of this act, in the event of its being fully implemented.9 But it proved unsuccessful as the 
British government failed to intervene arguing that interference in such areas would 
prove detrimental to British goals of self government within the empire.   
 
The second deputation was undertaken after the conclusion of World War I and with 
greater enthusiasm which emanated from Congress belief that African loyalty during the 
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9 This act was designed to entrench territorial segregation and to strengthen the white farmers. Prior to 
1913, white farmers became extremely alarmed by African acquisition of land. Hence this act was aimed 
at stopping African acquisition to land. By virtue of its implementation, it meant that 1.5. million whites 
were allocated 90% of the land while the African population of 5.5 million got less than 10%. In effect 
then out of a total population of 27 million, Africans possessed 13% of land in South Africa. See Plaatje. 
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war was really indicative of the state‟s willingness to liaise with regular political channels 
within South Africa.10 Also speeches made by Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George 
created the perception that a less hostile environment existed for addressing issues 
dealing with civil rights.11 So the objective of this second delegation was clear-to call for 
the removal of the colour bar.   
 
During a meeting with Prime Minister Lloyd George, Sol Plaatje who was a member of 
the SANNC delegation, made many emotional appeals. In his autobiography of Plaatje, 
Brian Willan provided an account of the former‟s life as a means of drawing attention to 
his political vision and contribution to a free and common society. Willan was of the 
view, and justifiably so, that there has not been much recognition of his life and work for 
“his political career was gradually forgotten… and his manuscripts were lost or 
destroyed.” In regards to his examination of the role of Plaatje in the early attempts to 
seek international assistance, Willan contended that he (Plaatje) “had touched the right 
chords with Lloyd George” who, true to his word, wrote two letters to the then South 
African Prime Minister, General Jan Smuts, communicating his concern at the “deep 
sense of injustice” which was communicated to him by the SANNC deputation. As these 
were confidential letters, written in the form of a personal appeal, it brought no reprieve 
for the country‟s majority.12 In effect then the end result of the second visit of the 
SANNC deputation was no different from the first visit.  
 
But evidence of these visits point to other advantages such as the opportunities to initiate 
contacts with a number of individuals and organizations. For example, Plaatje remained 
in England after the others had returned to South Africa in order to complete work on 
his book and to continue further campaigns in the UK. During that time, he attended the 
Second and Third Pan-African Congress meetings, establishing contacts with other black 
organizations from Africa and the USA.13 Before he returned to South Africa, he also 
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undertook a visit to Canada and the US where he met with W.E. B. Du Bois and with the 
NAACP.14 
 
During the periods 1912 to 1924, further evidence of unofficial contacts being 
established with governments and organizations emerged.15 But as indicated earlier on, 
these contacts were undertaken on an individual basis, and as such it would appear that 
they were not planned or mandated by the ANC. While I would caution against over-
emphasising the value of these contacts because they were undertaken on an individual 
basis, I would simultaneously argue that they assisted in laying the foundation for future 
relationships. This distinction between official and unofficial contacts was an important 
one in demonstrating that the ANC had no official policy in this regard.  A loose 
description was in place as many contacts were undertaken in a personal capacity. 
 
Among the group of individuals who acted on their own were John Dube who attended 
the Pan African Conference in England in1923, Z. R. Mahabane at the International 
Missionary Conference in Belgium and Josiah Gumede at the meeting of the League 
against Imperialism which also met in Belgium in February 1927.16 Gumede, who had 
become President-General of the ANC in 1927, addressed the conference twice and 
“made a deep impression on the assembly” by alerting delegates to the plight of Africans 
and their attempts at resistance to the apartheid state.17 After the Brussels conference, 
Gumede undertook a trip to Germany, where he made presentations to rallies organised 
by the Communist Party before proceeding to Moscow. This visit marked the first 
contact with the government of the Soviet Union, which he described as the “new 
                                                                                                                                            
opportunity to highlight the plight of South Africans, to network with delegates from other colonies and 
to learn to appreciate the value of international links and policy.   
14 Sol Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa. 225.  Exposure to African American individuals and groups 
helped shaped his political outlook upon his return to South Africa and contributed to the development 
of his political views. Through the support of those lie Du Bois and the NAACP Plaatje was able to 
continue his campaigns in the US and to get a hearing at bodies such as the Pan African Congress in 
Europe. In 1946, W.E. B. Du Bois and the NAACP joined the Council on African Affairs in protesting 
Smut‟s annexation of South West Africa-thus continuing to support the African cause in South Africa.  
Hence these early meetings were important in developing a network that would provide assistance in the 
future. 
15 See Benson and the ANC official website at http://www.anc.org.za. (Historical Documents). 
16 Represented at this conference were 174 anti-colonial fighters from all over the world. According to the 
ANC website of historical documents, this was the first instance in history, where representatives of the 
progressive labour movements of the capitalist countries had come together with delegates from the 
labour and national liberation movements. The latter included those who were still under the control of 
colonialism and imperialism.   
17 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/people/gumede_jt.html. 







Jerusalem.”18 These trips to Belgium and to Russia were undertaken in a personal 
capacity to explore fresh sources of assistance for the movement, which arose out of 
frustration at their own miserable situation.19  Regardless of the noble reasons for his 
visit, Gumede was one of those who suffered the effects of party denouncement for such 
actions.  
 
In 1924, he had written to the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society voicing 
his disappointment at the British government for failing to offer any assistance to his 
people. “We are at a loss,” he stated, “We do not know where we are going and what is 
going to be the position of the landless people. Without a voice in parliament we are 
victims of those who have the voice.” It became apparent then that he regarded help 
from the international sector as vital for the work of the ANC. From his initial contact 
with Communist leaders at the Belgium meeting and during his visit to the Soviet Union, 
Gumede indicated that the Communist party was the most logical source to turn to. 
According to him “of all the political parties, the Communist Party is the only one that 
honestly and sincerely fights for the oppressed people.”20 His proposals to explore the 
feasibility of an alliance with the Communist party were not well received by members of 
the ANC National Executive.21  
 
Gumede‟s association with the Communists and the persistent refusal of his colleagues 
to accept an alliance with the Soviet Union resulted in his expulsion from official duties 
after only eighteen months of service. This expulsion provided evidence of ANC 
intervention in cases of non-mandated contacts.  Gumede‟s expulsion was driven not 
only through his recommendation for exploring the feasibility of an alliance with the 
Communist Party, but also by the fact that this was a visit undertaken in a personal 
capacity-and as such was not mandated by the movement. This action was one example 
of the ANC‟s short sightedness and recalcitrance in respect of its attention to the 
international realm. While this conclusion may be indicative of a mixed prognosis on my 
part, given my overarching arguments for the ANC as an agency of change, I need to 
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substantiate by pointing out that in these very early years the ANC lacked the foresight to 
realise the value of the international domain. But that was quick to perceive the wisdom 
of changing strategies after its banning in 1960, is undeniable. 
   
Further opportunities for the ANC to develop international contacts and to become 
involved internationally were provided by the formation of the United Nations in 1945. 
Exposure to organisations and individuals who were sympathetic to the plight of the 
African majority came through the intervention of the Council on African Affairs 
(CAA), a US organisation led by Paul Robeson and Max Yergan, and one responsible for 
drawing attention of African Americans to South Africa.22  
 
Von Eschen in her attempts to document the politics of the African Diaspora in this 
period, focused at some length on relationships developed between African Americans 
and the ANC, with specific reference to the CAA and the ANC, thus providing further 
evidence of the early contacts between US organisations and the ANC and their joint 
work at the UN in 1946 and 1947.  
 
I found her study to be particularly valuable to my endeavours as she successfully 
demonstrated how African Americans became directly involved with the ANC and the 
Joint Passive Resistance Council to oppose discrimination against Indians in South Africa 
and the latter‟s attempts to annex South West Africa.23 What is significant about these 
efforts is the work of the CAA in trying to lobby a somewhat recalcitrant state 
department.  This was done through letters sent to President Truman and to the State 
Department, by generating negative publicity about South Africa through its campaigns 
and press conferences and the hosting of ANC leaders such as Dr. Xuma who was 
travelling to the USA for medical treatment.24 During this visit Dr. Xuma was also 
assisted by the South African Indian Congress who also arranged for him to meet with 
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the Indian delegation to the UN. In terms of the specific brief of the visit, Xuma‟s 
attempts were successful. The General Assembly rejected South Africa‟s request to annex 
South West Africa by a vote of thirty six to zero.25 
 
What is also important about Von Eschen‟s study is the evidence she has provided to 
show how US reaction to issues of race and discrimination made organisations such as 
the CAA and the ANC realise that they were really dealing with a country that could best 
be described as an adversary and not one to be looked upon as a potential ally. The 
reader also needs to be reminded that it was at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944 
that the USA was one of the countries that rejected the resolution proposed by China 
opposing racial discrimination.26 Hence any attempt to seek future assistance from the 
USA by the ANC would prove to be a mammoth endeavour as my study will illustrate. 
 
In addition to Von Eschen‟s study there has been in recent years a growing body of 
literature of diaspora studies.  These have helped locate the relationships that developed 
between African Americans and ANC individuals and which grew exponentially by the 
1980s , within the ambit of African American/Black internationalism against apartheid. 
 
A major contribution to these conversations about diaspora and nations is the study 
undertaken by Nikhil Pal Singh, a work that merits scrutiny for the purposes of my 
endeavour.  Singh crafted a history of the civil rights movement and the role of Martin 
Luther King Jr. in the twentieth century by linking it to the global struggle for social 
justice and racial equality.  In providing a fresh alternative analysis he used evidence to 
strengthen his argument that King had never embraced the struggle as one devoted 
purely to obtaining rights for the Black people of the USA, but as one responsible “for 
achieving a broader transformation of the United States into an equitable society”.  In so 
doing he provided keen insight into how the black struggles in the USA could be 
interpreted as representing a critical component of the “ambiguous legacy of post-World 
War 11 decolonisation”27.  This argument allowed him to discount insular analyses of the 
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civil rights era, instead demonstrating that this was a form of “modern black activism”, 
focusing efforts on wider global issues such as anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.   
 
In relation to contentions in this chapter, what was found to be particularly appealing 
about Singh‟s work was that he was able to successfully prove that such a form of 
activism led to a wide spectrum of black activists and intellectuals from the USA uniting 
their own aspirations with those of global struggles in Ghana, Cuba, Congo, South 
Africa, India and Vietnam.  In addition to this he extensively explored the associated 
roles of others such as Booker T. Washington, Ralph Bunche, Malcolm X and W.E.B. 
Du Bois.  In relation to the South African struggle, Singh alluded to those such as 
Bunche who “pushed young black activists to cast their global vision even wider and to 
propel „the tragic plight of many millions of black people in the Union of South Africa 
under Apartheid‟ into the court of world opinion.”28   These arguments succeeded in 
positioning future support of African- American intellectuals and activists for 
participation in the struggle against Apartheid.  Such participation also played a crucial 
role in the ANC‟s attempts to develop a relationship with the US state.  Without these 
early interventions, which influenced African-American perceptions of the need to 
support global struggles, the battle for the soul of US society would have been far more 
challenging for the ANC.   
    
Since internal matters dominated the concerns of the membership, international 
interaction during this period through the latter years of 1948, appeared limited. Aside 
from Rev. Calata, none of the other leaders appeared to take any interest in cultivating 
the international arena.29 In his address to the Cape African National Congress in 1938, 
he tried to explain why attention should be focused on this area. What is important is 
that he recognised that “our salvation does not depend on our coming together.”30 He 
                                                                                                                                            
study Stephens focuses on the concept of “transnational blackness” by examining the works of intellectuals 
such as Marcus Garney, Claude McKay and C.L.R James.  She demonstrates how these thinkers developed 
concepts related to global racial movements  and black political bodies that surpassed national boundries.  
28 Singh. Black is a Country. 210. 
29 Reverend James Calata, an Anglican Minister from the Cape was the Secretary-General of the ANC. A  
man of vision who was not shy to explore new strategy and tactics to reinvigorate the ANC, he played a 
significant role in bringing Xuma into the ANC fold because he saw the latter as the saviour of the ANC 
and one who held similar views to himself. This was a reference to Mr. Ballinger‟s role at highlighting the 
question of payment of African Mine labourers traveling expenses. This he did at the International 
Labour Conference in Geneva.   
30 “Presidential Address”, by Rev. J. A. Calata, In Karis and Carter. From Protest to Challenge, Vol 2,  136-
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went on to point out that “we have individuals who represent us in international 
conferences overseas.”31  
 
As  established earlier on, ANC activity was introduced at the UN through the CAA and 
the Joint Passive Resistance Committee and it was Dr. Xuma who played an important 
role. While he was present to protest the annexation issue, ANC officials believed that 
Dr. Xuma could use these issues to present its own case. Like Plaatje at the Pan African 
Congresses, Xuma was able to make contact with a number of foreign groups and 
delegations, some of whom were supportive of his efforts. But the reality was that the 
majority of delegates did not offer much in the way of inspiration or motivation. And it 
was Mary Benson, who writing in 1966, pointed out that “it was hard work” especially 
since little was known about South Africa and there was the belief that “General Smuts 
could do no wrong.”32 But fortunately for Xuma and the representatives of the South 
African Indian Congress, assistance came in the form  of  „ammunition‟ provided by the 
South African Government‟s handling of the mines strike, the imprisonment of 1000 
passive resisters and the scandal caused by the African housing shortage.33 
 
Benson‟s work represents an important contribution to early attempts to document the 
freedom struggle and was produced at one of the darkest times in South Africa‟s history 
when such investigations were rare. Her study of how “African Internationalism” 
confronted “white Isolationism” provided a keen insight into the early attempts by the 
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ANC to lobby the UN.  This study also provided the necessary evidence for me to 
conclude that Xuma was successful to an extent, and with the help of CAA activities of 
drawing the international spotlight on the general issue of racism.  Also it was this effort 
that would pave the way for any future consideration of racism, which was flagged as a 
key post-war issue.34 
 
The role of Xuma in establishing early personal contacts has been explored extensively 
by Steven Gish who like Willan writing about Plaatje, was of the view that Xuma‟s 
importance in the history of South Africa has been marginalised. In view of Xumas 
personal and ideological links to the USA which began in 1913, Gish focused at length 
on this area arguing that “Xuma continued to admire the American constitution” and 
alluded to “his long standing admiration for American ideals and institutions” although 
he became interested in the rest of Africa by the 1950s.”35 
   .    
Having argued that up to World War 11 and the early years, the ANC considered the 
international arena to be marginal to their internal activities. Yet at the same time 
examples have been furnished to argue that efforts were made to communicate their 
plight to the rest of the world. But what is noteworthy is the part played by countries 
such as India in communicating the dilemma of South Africa‟s majority to the rest of the 
world, in making racism a world issue at the United Nations and in its unwavering 
solidarity with the African struggle. Although the United Nations was formed as a result 
of the war against Nazi racism, western countries had not become sensitive to racism 
against non-white peoples. For Enuga Sreenwasulu Reddy, the former Director of the 
UN Centre against Apartheid, this was demonstrated by the “colonial wars that followed 
the end of the world war.” This area of India‟s solidarity with the oppressed majority of 
South Africa has been extensively documented by Reddy, who continues to be a most 
valuable resource on this area to this day.36  
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The ANC was presented with another opportunity in international networking in 1945 
when the Pan African Congress was held in Manchester. The benefit of this Congress to 
the ANC was discerned from its participants who represented many African national 
movements. Also significant was the presence of leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, 
Jomo Kenyatta, Kamazu Banda and Wallace Johnson-all of whom were to play a 
significant role on the African continent.37 At the Conference, links were established by 
the ANC with nationalist movements of East and West Africa, movements which shared 
many general similarities with the South African group. Moreover many of the 
resolutions passed at Manchester emphasized themes of importance to anti-colonial 
movements.38   
 
While I would accept that these groups lacked the ability to radically change the political 
systems of their respective countries or that the links developed by the ANC with them, 
did not in any manner increase their effectiveness in opposing the South African 
government,  I believe that downgrading the value of the congress to the ANC would be 
unfair. This is so because it was evident that the ANC‟s presence in Manchester helped 
lay the foundation for the placement of the South African struggle within the ambit of 
the anti-colonialism efforts that developed throughout Africa. 
 
Moving onto the area of personal links, evidence was found to support the view that 
there were bonds in existence between key ANC leaders and the USA. For example, 
Z. K. Matthews received a graduate degree from Yale University, Dr.Alfred Xuma, who 
received part of his medical training in the same country, married Madie Hall, an 
American in the United States. Even Chief Luthuli developed certain bonds with the US 
which he visited in 1948 on a speaking tour, and which was sponsored by the American 
Board and the North American Missionary Conference.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
subsequently been donated to Yale University in the USA, the Nehru Museum in New Delhi and the 
Universities of Witwatersrand and Durban-Westville in South Africa. I met him during my years at Yale 
University while working on his personal papers. Since then his friendship has became very important to 
me especially upon my return to this country.       
37 Nelson. “Some External Aspects of Internal Conflict.”  66 
38 Nelson. “Some External Aspects of Internal Conflict.” 67. 







In his autobiography, Luthuli wrote about this visit which allowed him to increase 
awareness in the USA of the African dilemma.39 This was no fleeting initiative for he 
continued to believe up to his death that the USA could be helpful to the ANC‟s plight. 
The reason for this view was interesting and was gleaned from an interview recorded by 
Studs Turkel with the Chief during his visit to South Africa in 1960. In the interview he 
pointed out that “America can do much to assist our liberation here,” as “you fought to 
free yourselves from Mother England…you are still trying to stand for freedom for all.” 
Even Turkel admitted that he was astounded by this perception given the fact that Chief 
Luthuli was well aware of the USA‟s corporate involvement in South Africa by the 
1960s.40     
 
According to John Douglas Nelson, by the early 1950s the value of focusing on the 
international arena appeared to gain ground although ANC activities in this regard were 
not related to any broader and more coordinated strategy and appeared “to have had an 
ad hoc character.”41 Nevertheless it was clear that they gravitated towards the anti-
colonial movement in Africa and Asia. Nelson, in his study attempted to place the 
development and operation of the ANC from 1912 to 1970, within the context of 
informal diplomacy. By examining its attempts to position itself internationally, he argued 
that up to 1970, the movement was unsuccessful in this endeavour because it was unable 
to demonstrate any degree of success in its internal activities. 
 
Using various theoretical models such as that advanced by George Modelski, John 
Douglas Nelson concluded that “most outside supporters are likely to decline meaningful 
involvement in internal conflicts until a group or a movement has demonstrated its 
ability to be successful.”42 But this conclusion was rather premature and short sighted. 
For while the movement did not have an international policy, its resistance strategies 
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41 Nelson. “Some External Aspects of Internal conflict.” 181. 
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were successful and as such did slowly succeed in drawing the attention of the 
international community to its plight. 
 
 
 Early Influences in Developing an International Policy 
The ANC‟s views of its international attempts were interesting. While it admitted that it 
may not have had any policy in place to develop relations, the movement was at pains to 
point out that it had a foreign policy. This I found clear in its December 1954 “Report to 
the National Executive Committee,” in which it included a section on the „International 
Situation‟, and alluded to “the cardinal points of our foreign policy” which were 
“opposition to war…and opposition to colonialism and white domination.”43 It even 
went further to explain its specific programme. But what is important about this section 
is that the ANC was beginning to develop a set of international foreign policy principles 
which would guide its choice of international allies. 
  
It is true, the struggle will only be fought by Africans themselves under their own 
independent leadership, but they will have to keep a very clear eye open for international 
developments detrimental or advantageous to us. We must look for allies... [and] we 
must ask....the following regarding any potential ally: (1) Is this country or group in the 
imperialist camp or in the anti-imperialist camp? (2) Is this country or group for equality 
or for racial discrimination? (3) Is this group pro-African or anti-African freedom? (4) Is 
this country or group anti-colonialist.44 
  
In a report of the National Executive Committee submitted to its Annual Conference of 
1958,  there were more references to an international policy as the ANC gave a precise 
indication that its foreign policy principles flowed  from the resolutions of the Bandung 
Conference of 1955  The report went further to list the themes of anti-colonialism, 
equality of races, one-man-one-vote, opposition to war and support for nationalist 
movements around the world as major elements guiding their international directives.45 
While Nelson believed that this report was important because it demonstrated that the 
“foreign policy outlook remained unchanged from 1954,” I would argued that its 
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importance lay in its ability to demonstrate that the ANC was already considering a 
framework for its foreign policy.46  
 
While the foreign policy framework of the movement was influenced by many global 
events, the ANC was clear that the Bandung Conference of April 1955, and the 
resolutions that flowed from it, exercised a far greater influence. The conference, which 
was held in Indonesia, and was attended by 29 Asian and African nations,  resolved to 
ask the United Nations to provide more funds for the economic development of Afro-
Asian countries. The conference also resolved to fight until the last remnants of 
colonialism were obliterated from the world. One can therefore understand why the 
ANC would find this forum to be appealing for its foreign policy work. Moreover, this 
gathering provided a significant international point of contact, especially with the Afro-
Asian anti colonialists movements.  
 
 The ANC was represented by Moses Kotane and E. M. Nodge. Also present at the 
meeting was Y. A. Cachalia, the leader of the South African Indian Council (SAIC). 
However Nelson has contended that although these individuals were listed as official 
observers of the ANC and SAIC, their attendance did not have the „official sanction‟ of 
the ANC.76 According to Jordan Ngubane, they attended the Bandung meeting while 
many of the leaders were banned or arrested and that although they had notified Chief 
Luthuli about their attendance, they never sought the approval of the ANC. But whether 
the ANC officially sanctioned this visit or not, is a matter of little significance compared 
to manner in which it officially reported on the value of the conference. For example, in 
its 1958 report, the NEC reported that “Bandung marked a new era” and that “it was 
one of the most important events of our time.”47 There was no doubt that the ANC felt 
inspired by the conference and its resolutions.      
 
While it was clear that the ANC assumed that once world opinion was mobilized, 
constructive action would subsequently follow, it was not until 1958 that some clarity 
was provided on what was expected of the other countries in support of African South 
Africans. A study of internal minutes and memoranda revealed that in spite of a more 
definitive foreign policy directive, the African National Congress remained bound to its 
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Internal Developments, ANC Responses and the USA 
Being bound to internal activities was critical for the ANC, especially after the victory of 
the Nationalist Party government in 1948. The white election secured a fragile win 
obtained purely on a racist platform, thus pushing the organisation to far more 
significant action. In view of this environment, it will be argued that the ANC responded 
by undertaking more extensive internal campaigns which solicited ruthless and extreme 
government responses. Suffering the effects of such responses, the movement also faced 
some organisational problems, which rendered many organisational operations 
ineffectual. Nelson has attributed these problems and weaknesses to four major 
problems:  discipline, coordination, lack of finances and communication.48 For Nelson 
Mandela, these difficulties stemmed from the „independence of branch leaders.‟49 It was 
for this reason that he recommended the M-Plan, which could have assisted in the 
creation of a highly centralised and disciplined structure.50   
 
By the end of the 1950s, the ANC faced a number of other pressures, thus making the 
need for a new strategy such the necessity of tapping into the international domain, more 
necessary and urgent. Its campaigns failed, its leaders were imprisoned, government 
action against the movement continued relentlessly-all of which contributed to its 
decision to draw the international spotlight into its future strategies in a more effective 
manner. In view of the draconian measures implemented by the South African 
government, the ANC eventually acknowledged the importance, for its long-term 
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survival, of locating its internal activities within the global setting. In short, its haphazard 
attempts at international networking through individual contacts and petition oriented 
activities were no longer viable. A long term strategic planning initiative for the 
articulation of a programme of foreign relations was vital.   
 
As indicated earlier, with intensified state action, the ANC was compelled to respond 
with greater action which took the form of many national campaigns of which the 
Defiance Campaign of 1952 against Unjust Laws, the Bantu Education and Anti-Pass 
Laws had the greatest influence on the growth of the organisation.51 While this campaign 
marked a turning point in the struggle for freedom, the white state took greater strides 
“towards authoritarianism,” causing participants to become less enthusiastic about their 
role in the campaign.52 In relation to my arguments relating to the ANC and the USA, 
the value of the Defiance Campaign can be gauged from its influence on the civil rights 
movement in the USA and on young Martin Luther King, Jr.  Pioneering anti-apartheid 
activists from the USA, such as William Minter and George Houser have alluded to 
this.53   
 
Covering Nelson Mandela‟s visit to the US in July 1990, correspondents for Time 
Magazine continued in this vein by pointing out that “American civil rights 
activists…used the struggle in South Africa as a rallying cry” from the 1950s for their 
own struggle in the US, even through until the 1980s.54 In his  epic study  No One can Stop 
the Rain, Houser took a close look at the actions of the ANC in South Africa and at US 
Policy arguing that international action on its own was not effective to bring down the 
apartheid state, but that  it was important to communicate to the South African state that 
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“the world will no longer support the injustice of apartheid.”55 For Houser, the Defiance 
Campaign was important because this campaign “introduced him to the African 
Liberation Struggle” initiated by the ANC. His interest in this campaign was generated by 
its non-violent principles which influenced his work to “combat segregation in the 
United States.” 
 
Aside from its influence on many like Houser and Minter, it did manage to gain some 
attention in the USA. Through Houser‟s efforts, supporters of the South African struggle 
from New York formed an ad hoc support group for the Defiance Campaign called 
Americans for South African Resistance (AFSAR). The group saw themselves as a 
channel for information in the US about the campaign and as a fundraising body. As a 
result, AFSAR sent $5000 to South Africa during the campaign, much of it through ZK 
Mathews.56  
 
Whatever the short term successes of ANC national campaigns, it can only be concluded 
that given the repressive action of the South African state and the resultant sufferings of 
the African people, the ANC was no closer to realising its goals of freedom than it was 
before it embarked on the campaigns of resistance. The situation was complicated by 
their split in 1958 from the Africanists who went on to form the Pan Africanists 
Congress (PAC) under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe. This division within the 
movement was to remain a major affliction of the struggle for liberation until 1994, 
although this can be considered a feature of history. But it must also be pointed out that 
other factors contributed to this split as well. They could be attributed to the changes 
that were taking place on the African continent at this time.  
 
In fact from 1958-1960 the issue of African liberation in some parts of the African 
continent were becoming a reality. In 1958, delegates to the All-Africa People‟s 
Conference (AAPC), declared 1960 to be the „Year of Africa‟ and by 1960, there were 
references to the „winds of change‟ on the African continent. These emanated from an 
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address made by the then British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan to the Joint Houses 
of Parliament in Cape Town on 3 February 1960 in which he cautioned colonial powers 
on the need to make way for a new order on the continent.57  Macmillan‟s address 
captured the attention of Africans on the continent, including those in South Africa who 
now accepted, rather prematurely, that freedom was an inevitable event. Within this 
decade ten countries on the continent had gained their independence and within three 
years of Macmillan‟s speech, the Organisation of African Unity was formed.  Given these 
continental developments, it was not unreasonable to find Africanists in South Africa 
riding high on the crest of inevitable freedom, resulting in their decision to use this 
opportunity to split from the ANC.   
 
But before proceeding, the reader needs to be reminded also of the value of the African 
continent within the context of global developments such as the Cold War. While this 
will be examined at some length in the next chapter, it would suffice to point out at this 
juncture that from the late 1950s and early 1960s, Africa came to represent one of the 
major battlegrounds of the East/West encounters.  This occurred as Washington began 
to be drawn more directly into the colonial affairs in Africa and Asia and was evidenced 
by the crisis in countries such as Egypt, Algeria and Congo. 
     
The ramifications of this ANC/PAC split were clearly disastrous for the ANC‟s attempts 
to advance the struggle. Evidence for this came from the views shared by members of 
the solidarity organisations in the USA and by leaders of the ANC itself. For instance, in 
a letter to Chief Luthuli on 10 June 1959, George Houser of the American Committee on 
Africa (ACOA) communicated his concern “about the rise of the Africanists and the 
split that this seems to imply to some extent in the ANC.”58 Mandela, who was very 
bitter about this split saw the rivalry between two organisations as “sabotage of the 
popular struggle” and criticised the PAC for “blundering right from the beginning.”59      
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Coming hot on the heels of the Congress of the People at Kliptown, the stage was set for 
a massive offensive by the state against the members of the organisation. In April 1956, 
the Minister of Justice, Mr. C. R. Swart, announced in the House of Assembly that the 
police were about to make some 200 arrests on charges of high treason. With the result 
that in a pre-dawn raid on December 1956, 156 people were arrested and charged under 
the Suppression of Communism Act, with plotting to overthrow the government 
through violent means.60 The raid was clearly anything but unobtrusive as details of the 
arrests were around the world. 
 
What is critical is how the state tried unsuccessfully, in its charges, to link the freedom 
struggle with Marxism and its espoused ideology of the forceful overthrow of the state, 
and in this case, the South African state. The way the state handled his trial helps one 
understand how the state engineered charges by linking activities to Marxism61. In sum, 
the state accused the ANC and its allies of treason through means of revolutionary 
activity. Such accusations were not lost on the USA which used these to guide its 
relationship with the ANC in later years   For the ANC, which had to that point always 
embarked on non- violent campaigns and activities, the charges made a mockery of its 
virtues.  
 
The trial placed the activities of the ANC in the international arena as the plight of its 
leaders was publicised throughout the world. In the USA, the American Committee on 
Africa(ACOA) under Houser played a critical role in setting up funding initiatives for the 
treason accused and for conscientising the USA  public about the trials. Given the 
complexities of the cold war being played out across the globe, Washington‟s persistence 
in believing that the communist menace had secured its stranglehold on Africa‟s 
foremost liberation movement proved to be a challenge for those like Houser. This made 
his work even more arduous. The ACOA set up the South African Defence Fund in the 
USA which eventually contributed over $75000 to the legal defence during the trial.62 
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According to Houser, the most important project of the ACOA was to arrange for the 
Dean of the Harvard Law School, Erwin Griswold,  to go to South Africa as an expert 
legal observer at the trial. Other activities included programmes and campaigns in New 
York, which, said Houser, “aroused the ire of the South African government.”63 
 
Three years later, the state dropped the case. Evidence from this time has pointed to the 
positive effect that the state‟s action had on the ANC, thus allowing me to argue that it 
clearly helped to enhance the profile of the ANC. For US sympathisers the formation of 
the Defence fund “signalled the kind of international support to come as the struggle in 
South Africa intensified.”64 Further evidence to support these contentions was provided 
by Elena Venturini Dorabji, who, in her doctoral dissertation on the ANC, traced the 
reasons for the latter‟s tactical changes from one of non-violence to sabotage and 
violence, as a means of trying to “carve out for its followers a greater share of political 
power.”65  
 
I found Dorabji‟s approach refreshing for in attempting to explain the reasons for the 
ANC‟s changing strategies, she simultaneously tried to explore the “revolutionary 
potential of South Africa”, by drawing on the theory of Chalmers Johnson.66  Hence she 
was able to demonstrate that as a result of this trial, the way was paved for the ANC to 
forge more communication networks with the rest of the world. Even Mandela, she 
pointed out, urged members to use this opportunity to take the message of the ANC 
abroad, both into Europe and North Africa.67 For the ANC and its sympathizers the trial 
brought the realisation that „the spirit of man is undying and rises like the Phoenix from 
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the fires of the deepest oppression.”68 While the trial was viewed as just another 
formidable obstacle placed in the path of liberation, it was not considered powerful 
enough to turn aside the wind of protest which was already sown by the accused. This 
spirit of euphoria though commendable, did not acknowledge the other obstacles placed 
on this path to liberation. These took the form of organisational problems, tactical 
problems and ideological problems.69 
 
However during a period of self reflection in prison in the 1970s, Mandela wrote about 
this period admitting that the ANC was aware of its tactical failures. Evidence for this 
admission was provided by the Mandela prison letters that were written to his family in 
this period.70 Even at the leadership level, it was accepted from certain quarters, that 
passive resistance as a modus operandi was not effective in challenging the state. 
In view of the tone of the Macmillan speech and the impending reality of the end of 
colonialism, and its influence on liberation organisations, it would not have been unusual 
if it created a climate of panic for the state. But the latter was comfortable with its 
attempts to entrench its minority power. Hence as argued by Dorabji, “the white 
oligarchy believed that no struggle would be attempted and that the winds of change 
would pass South Africa by.”71 But the actions of the PAC were to reverse such 
confidence as the events of 1960 in Sharpeville and Langa demonstrated.72 With the 
result that on the 31 March 1960, using its emergency powers, the government declared a 
state of emergency resulting in the banning of the ANC and the PAC, the arrest and 
detention of persons considered to be a danger to the public interests and the banning of 
public meetings of all races in number of districts. Over 30 000 people were imprisoned 
without trial. The State of Emergency was lifted after five months, but South Africa was 
never the same again. 
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Sharpeville was a turning point in many respects, especially since the banning of the 
ANC and PAC meant the large influx of activist leaders into a life of exile and the 
neutralising of the activities of the ANC. While this event was strategically used as a 
rallying cry for civil rights activists in the United States between 1960 and 1964 and later 
in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, it has still been argued from several quarters that US 
civil society failed to bank on crises such as Sharpeville to advance the ANC cause as well 
as that of the anti-apartheid movement.. In raising this issue with veteran US anti-
apartheid activist William Minter, he explained that in the 1960s activist groups which 
comprised US civil society were “miniscule in comparison to the scope of US society: 
and that in general the idea of groups having impact on foreign policy was not 
particularly noticeable.” He went further to confirm that groups that existed, such as 
ACOA, did respond to Sharpeville, but their impact was very limited “outside of those 
sectors of opinion which were already inclined to be convinced.”73  This meant an 
exclusion of those either in the executive branch or Congress. 
 
But the effect of Sharpeville can be gauged from the role it played in the formation of 
organisations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil  Rights in the USA, which devoted 
much work to highlighting the plight of South Africans in that country.74 Evidence has 
supported the view that Sharpeville did succeed in raising awareness of the international 
community in a far more significant manner than had previously been the case with other 
events. It galvanised the ACOA into action with the organisation initiating campaigns 
such as boycotts and creating media awareness.75  
 
After his escape from South Africa, Oliver Tambo was invited to spend four weeks with 
the ACOA promoting the work of the ANC. But in view of problems he experienced 
with Washington, he was unable to take this visit. After the Treason Trial, even Nelson 
Mandela attempted to visit the USA, but as Benson pointed out, he was unable to obtain 
travel documents from both SA and the USA.76 Yet surprisingly, barely 48 hours after 
Sharpeville the US State Department condemned the events arising out of Sharpeville. 
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The UN Security Council did the same on April 1 and received the support of the US 
Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, for its resolution.77    
 
The struggle for liberation was never the same again as the ANC strategy had undergone 
a drastic change with  Mandela and some of his colleagues finally turning their backs on 
that long African tradition of non-violence leading to the formation in November 1961 
of the ANC‟s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. In his 1964 speech from the dock, he 
explained that, in embarking on this course of action, they had reached the conclusion 
that “fifty years of non-violence had brought the African people nothing but more and 
more repressive legislation.”78 In fact, he added that the white government continued to 
remain unmoved by the African plight.  
 
Embarkation on this path of violence by the ANC only resulted after years of 
disillusionment with existing tactics, yet this strategy did not prove to be effective in the 
short term. If anything it served to increase the ruthless onslaught of the South African 
authorities. With the result that on July 1963, the police raided the 28 acre farm in the 
white suburb of Rivonia.79  The capture of the ANC‟s High Command was certainly a 
victory for the state and a devastating loss for the liberation movement. In 1962, 
Mandela was on a six month tour abroad to meet leaders of African states, with a trip to 
London as well, where he met with leaders of the opposition parties. On July 20, 1962 he 
returned to South Africa and on August 5, he was arrested outside Howick Natal, 
disguised as a chauffeur. Rumours circulated that the communists had betrayed Mandela. 
But it was clear that the USA played a key role in this arrest and for the purposes of this 
study, merits substantial scrutiny.80 
 
The question often asked is how did the apartheid police get Mandela on 5 August 1962 
and the answer in recent years has been that “he was stopped by the American CIA”, 
committing him to a lifetime in prison(27 years) until his release in 1990.81 For years 
speculation was rife that it was the CIA, under George Bush Snr. which played an 
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instrumental role in Mandela‟s arrest by collaborating closely with the apartheid state. But 
in 1986 stories were picked up on international networks such as CBS television in the 
USA on how police happened to know Mandela‟s whereabouts that day. The protagonist 
in this affair was Donald C. Rickard who informed the Special Branch of the South 
African police of Mandela‟s movements for that day and his disguise.82 When the story of 
his role emerged, he maintained that he learned this information through an ANC 
informant. But in 1987, it was reported that at farewell party held for him at the home of 
Colonel Hoare, Rickard admitted, while in an intoxicated state, and in the presence of 
guests, that he was due to meet Mandela that night, but instead fed the information to 
the South African police. He was approached by CBS to elaborate on this confession, 
but he refused.83 
 
Four years later, in June 1990, it was reported in the US media in Atlanta that a retired 
“US intelligence officer” had been informed  by Paul Eckel, a senior CIA operative, 
within hours of Mandela‟s arrest that “we have turned Mandela over to the South 
African security branch…we gave them every detail…it is one of our greatest coups‟.84 
Such evidence clearly strengthens my argument of the US role in the Mandela arrest. But 
the ANC was not to know this until the 1980s, by which time it was successfully 
entrenching itself in the USA. 
 
The Rivonia Sabotage Trial began in October 1963 and ended on June 12 1964 and 
appeared to have sealed the fate of the ANC and its leadership.85 As it had done during 
the Treason Trial, the state‟s attempt to draw attention to the role of the communists 
within the movement did much harm to the ANC. Again this was going to adversely 
influence its future relationship with Washington where perceptions were created that the 
ANC, far from being a progressive liberation movement, was actually part of the 
legendary International Communist Conspiracy. By exaggerating the influence of the 
communists, the state gave the communists more credit that they deserved. No evidence 
emerged to justify the government‟s claim that the ANC was a front for the communists. 
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But there was no doubt that the ANC was indebted to the communists who were able to 
provide assistance to the ANC inside and outside the country. Assistance inside the 
country came from white communists like Ruth First and her husband, Joe Slovo, 
Harold Wolpe, Michael Harmel and others. But as appropriately pointed out by Dorabaji, 
for the South African government, “the involvement of all these figures was proof 
enough that is was international communism which was on trial at Rivonia. It was a 
violent communist revolution and not African self determination that was the real 
issue.”86 But this was not true. 
 
It was evident that from the 1960s that the ANC wanted to open up the international 
battlefront with the intention of encouraging divestment and the international isolation 
of South Africa. By turning world opinion against the state, the movement hoped that 
this kind of pressure would coerce Pretoria into abandoning its oppressive policies. This 
also guided the logic of strategy to be outlined at the Morogoro Conference that was to 
take place in 1969. But without any intervention by the ANC, a new uprising in 1979 




The Soweto Uprising 
The Soweto uprising, which began on 16 June 1976, has been well documented in a 
range of studies.87  Therefore a focus on the events that led to the uprising or to the 
uprising itself is not necessary.  This does not mean that the value of this uprising to the 
freedom struggle in South Africa has been downgraded. Rather an assessment  of  
whether it succeeded in influencing attitudes in the US, will be undertaken. No study of 
the ANC in this period can be conducted in isolation to the aftermath of this uprising. It 
will be demonstrated that Soweto aided, if not grudgingly, the ANC‟s attempts to draw 
the attention of the international arena, especially the US, to the extent of the apartheids 
atrocities. Undoubtedly it provided the ANC with many new opportunities in world 
politics, including the attempts to develop a favourable relationship with the US.  
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In order to explore the opportunities, it will be necessary to look at what the Soweto 
uprising meant for the apartheid government, for the majority of South Africa‟s 
oppressed and for the ANC itself. But again it would be emphasised that the ANC 
played no role in instigating such an uprising. As alluded to earlier on, the uprising took 
both, the South African Government and the ANC, by surprise.88  The resulting 
reactions merit scrutiny as changes in strategic planning and policy-making initiatives 
undertook markedly new paths.  
 
Once the uprising began, the ANC tried to make use of the event by infiltrating student 
networks such as the Soweto Student‟s Representative Council (SSRC). This was evident 
in the case of ANC operatives in Mozambique who made contact with the SSRC through 
Elias Masinga.89 Another such link was established by ANC veteran in Soweto, Elliot 
Shabangu, through his nephew, Super Moloi, who was an SSRC insider. But there is no 
significant evidence to suggest that the ANC laboured to intensify the revolt once it 
broke out. Neither, says Gerhart, did it use the revolt to produce any written propaganda. 
The only documentary evidence produced in the early weeks following the revolt, was a 
flyer entitled “People of South Africa:  The African National Congress Calls on you. Amandla 
Soweto”.90 Aside from the usual rhetoric calling on its supporters to unite against the 
oppressor, the flyer contained no meaningful propaganda exploiting the uprisings. The 
first coverage of the uprising by its official journal, Sechaba, only occurred in the first 
quarter of 1977.91 
 
Even later in 1985, in a report to National Consultative Conference in June, Oliver 
Tambo lamented the fact that the ANC had not recovered sufficiently to take full  
advantage of the situation that crystallised from the first events of June 16 1976. 
  
Organisationally, in political and military terms, we were too weak. We had few active 
ANC units inside the country. We had no military presence to speak of. The 
communication links between ourselves outside the country and the masses of our 
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people were still to slow to meet the situation such as was posed by the Soweto 
uprising.”92  
 
Without being pretentious it would be necessary to interrogate the reasons for such a 
blatant omission. I would argue that the movement failed to capitalize on the event for 
two reasons; firstly the organization, being unprepared for the revolt, was still trying to 
find a suitable strategy to deal with, or benefit from the outbreak; secondly although 
Adelaide Tambo might have thought otherwise, I would contend that the movement still 
lacked the capacity to undertake any significant action inside South Africa.93 This was 
understandable given the circumstances which saw political repression reach 
unprecedented levels. The impact of these conclusions on the historiography of the 
uprising and of the role of the ANC may perhaps be unsettling, but again this area brings 
to the fore dilemmas posed firstly by engagement with such material that I generated and 
located and secondly in relation to the issue of the ANC as an agent of change. 
 
That the ANC was prepared to act and devise pertinent strategies and responses was 
apparent when in July 1977, the ANC‟s National Executive held a meeting to assess the 
kind of post Soweto strategy that needed to be adopted. In describing its international 
perception of the movement and its work, the NEC reported its frustrations at being 
ignored by the UN Security Council. The report proposed that an urgent campaign be 
launched by its international department for the “eventual exclusive recognition of our 
organisation” as the sole representative of the oppressed people of South Africa.94 
 
While pondering the problems created by the Soweto uprising, a delegation led by 
Tambo was dispatched by the ANC to Vietnam in October 1978 to learn from the 
Vietnamese revolutionary experience.95 As a result, a meeting of the NEC and the 
Revolutionary Council was held in Luanda from 28 December 1978-January 1979 to 
assess the report of the group‟s visit to Vietnam. What was significant about this visit was 
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how it influenced the ANC and its future strategic initiatives, leading to the crafting of a 
critical report. The conclusion reached by participants after the meeting was that “the 
Vietnamese experience reveals certain shortcomings on our part and draws attention to 
areas of crucial importance which we tended to neglect.”96 This meant that the ANC was 
able to confront its shortcomings in a positive manner. 
 
Thereafter the meeting elected a commission of six members which was mandated to 
scrutinize strategic options and make recommendations in the light of the Vietnamese 
experience. This group, which came to be known as the Politico-Military Strategy 
Commission, was headed by Tambo and included Thabo Mbeki, Joe Slovo, Moses 
Mabhida, Joe Gqabi and Joe Modise. After many consultative and discussion sessions 
held in Luanda, Maputo and Lusaka, the commission produced a final report, drafted by 
Joe Slovo. The report was known as the “Green Book” named for its green cover. For 
Joe Slovo, the “Green Book” was the most thorough investigation, from every angle, of 
what was wrong with the organization. The report comprised three sections. But Part 
Two was significant because it provided clear evidence of the ANC‟s strategic path after 
the Soweto uprisings, asserting that the “main task is to concentrate on political 
mobilization and organization so as to build up political revolutionary bases throughout 
the country‟, with armed struggle being considered to be “secondary.”97 So I would 
ground my conclusions about the value of the uprising within the context of the 
compilation of this vital report and of the ANC‟s recognition of its failures. 
   
The Soweto uprising represented one of the milestones in the process of developing a 
relationship with the USA. This will be examined in the following chapters during which 
I will explore the attitudes and actions of the US state and civil society and how Soweto 
improved opportunities for the development of the relationship. The uprising also led to 
the visit to Vietnam which resulted in the movement undertaking a thorough assessment 
of the current state of the movement and of future paths.   
 
While the state had the benefit of a powerful military and police apparatus, the support 
of its electorate and the support of western nations concerned with containing the 
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“communist threat” as well as trade benefits, the uprising did create a serious crisis for 
the government. The latter, while never admitting to the existence of any crises, faced for 
the first time since 1960, a serious challenge to its power. Yet in an address at a public 
forum in Springs in late August 1976, then Prime Minister John Vorster assured those 
present that there was really “no crisis” at all and that there was no intention on the 
state‟s part of changing any of the apartheid policies.98 
 
Evidence has been provided to indicate that the ANC embarked on many strategies to 
challenge the South African state. The ANC began with the constitutional struggle, then 
moved onto the mass based non-violent campaigns, which was followed by the MK 
strategies of armed struggle. These range of tactics brought the organisation no closer to 
achieving its goals. Instead as the state began to apply greater pressure which took the 
forms of ruthless legislation, detentions, bannings and arrests of members of the 
organisation, the banning of the organisation and the life sentences imposed on its 
leadership, the ANC adopted yet another strategy. It attempted to secure for itself 
international political status, and in so doing hoped to be able to challenge the South 
African state on a diplomatic and political front. Sources within the organisation were 
optimistic about the effectiveness of this strategy. 
 
 
International Developments in the 1960s 
Looking back to 1960, having anticipated the government‟s restrictions, the ANC sent 
out roving diplomats to secure international support for the ANC. Oliver Tambo, the 
Deputy President of the ANC, slipped out of the country in that year and went on to 
establish the organisation‟s first overseas offices in London, Cairo, Algiers and Dar es 
Salaam. External missions, as these offices abroad came to be called, were mandated with 
the following functions; to make provision for the training of military cadres, to devise 
strategies for the infiltration of South Africa, to mobilize political support in the rest of 
the world and fundraising. In effect, the external missions were responsible for the 
support of the internal operations. During his visit to the USA, Tambo in his address at 
Smith College, reiterated this view that the external officials were responsible for the 
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support services of the internal forces and that this included the support for the ANC‟s 
military operations inside South Africa. In 1964, the ANC headquarters were shifted 
from London to Morogoro, in Tanzania. Offices were also opened in New Delhi, Lusaka 
and Morocco. Informal representation was also established in the Scandinavian 
countries.99  
Addressing the UN Special Committee on 8 October 1963, Tambo spoke about his 
assignment. He explained: 
 
In 1958, the people of South Africa had become convinced that if nothing was done to 
bring pressure to bear on the South African government in addition to their own effort, 
they would be compelled as a last resort to rebel against tyranny and oppression.100 
 
This new tactic was therefore meant to continue with ANC attempts to apply pressure 
on South Africa. Tambo was appointed to head the external structure. In weighing up 
the evidence, it would be simple to argue that Tambo‟s ability to control the operations 
of this structure was limited. But in order to be realistic in the interpretation of the 
evidence it would be necessary to point out that in view of the difficulties of 
communication, each office followed its own guidelines and was left on their own to 
implement ANC programmes. A study of the records of the mission offices revealed that 
while in later years, a more structured system of communication was established between 
the Headquarters in Tanzania and the other offices, in this early period there was no 
coordinated system of communication. While offices remained linked through the 
exchange of letters, memoranda and cables, it was a very haphazard arrangement.101 
Hence I would be justified in refraining from reaching conclusions about the value of 
this new strategy at this stage.   
 
For the conduct of their international activities, in the ANC developed an organisation 
together with the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), South African Indian Congress 
(SAIC), South West African People‟s Organisation (SWAPO) and South West African 
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National Union (SWANU). The United Front, as the organisation came to be known, 
was officially launched in London in May 1960. The Front had a twofold purpose; to 
assist the ANC and PAC to work together internationally and to assist both organisations 
to combine their efforts. This was an agreement for informal cooperation in exile, with 
the common understanding of the need to eliminate white rule in South Africa.102   
 
The United Front enjoyed some degree of success and it received the recognition and 
support of organisations such as the Pan African Freedom Movement of East and 
Central Africa (PAFMECA). In November 1960, Tambo was granted permission to 
appear before the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations where he called for the 
transfer of South West Africa to UN control.103 Further success came in the form of 
boycotts by some European nations of South African goods and in the termination of 
Tanganyikan contracts with South Africa. The most successful campaign of the United 
Front could be discerned from its attempts to have South Africa excluded from the 
Commonwealth. The lobbying for the country‟s exclusion began at the conference of 
Independent African States. This was a group of countries who were concerned about 
issues such as African freedom, racism and segregation. After the South African 
government announced the referendum relating to the country becoming a republic, the 
United Front intensified its campaign for exclusion. Chief Luthuli sent telegrams to every 
commonwealth Prime Minister. Together with this strategy, the United Front 
representatives visited every Commonwealth country for political discussions. With the 
strong support of Julius Nyerere, victory for the front was assured. In March 1961, South 
Africa was excluded from the Commonwealth. But given the internal squabbling and 
dissension, the United Front was dissolved on March 15 1962.104  
 
 
ANC Strategic and Organisational Reassessments: The Lobatsi and Morogoro 
Meetings  
But looking at events back home in South Africa, the actions of the South African police 
began to take their toll on the internal leadership of the ANC.  This resulted in the 
troubled organisation meeting at Lobatsi in Bechuanaland in 1962, after Mandela was 
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arrested, to undertake an assessment of their worsening situation. While my argument 
has been that that with the banning of the ANC, the movement was poised to enter the 
international arena, it was this meeting that formalised such a necessary entry. Hence for 
this study, the Bechuanaland meeting marked a milestone or turning point in the process 
of developing an international policy. This was the first ANC conference since the 
banning of the ANC. Attending the meeting were a number of ANC leaders from South 
Africa as well as leaders from the external missions. While many scholars have pointed to 
the secret nature of the meeting, through an interview held with Peter Peyise, I have been 
able to confirm that the meeting was secret, but that it focused on ANC strategy. The 
„historic‟ nature of this meeting was conveyed though the following statement issued by 
the NEC of the movement in April 1963.   
 
Our mass political line of action is inspired by our Historic National Conference held in 
Lobatsi in November last year. The Conference was significant, not only because it was 
fully representative of all the regions of the ANC…, but also because of the militancy 
that characterised it. The impressive attendance of the youth on an unprecedented 
scale.… It gave its fullest attention to the strategy and tactics to be used in the new 
situation. It is a guide to our members of the political line of action to be followed.105 
 
According to Pyise, several issues that emerged in this statement had already been 
debated and approved at Lobatsi. So although the meeting was highly secretive, the NEC 
statement of a year later provided evidence of the discussions that took place at that 
meeting. The statement reaffirmed the ANC strategy of mass political action, and went 
further to explain that such action was vital for the effective operation of military action. 
The statement called for a change in “the character of our activities,” which was 
necessary to keep abreast of the “changes in the national situation.” International 
pressure or the role of the international community was considered a vital link in that 
strategic chain which included mass political action and military action. Attention was 
drawn to the role of the External Mission in accomplishing this ideal. The meeting noted, 
with much optimism, “that internal and external situations favour us,” and that the 
external mission has “done magnificent work in exposing the immoral policies of the 
Nationalists abroad and in enlisting the sympathy of the democratic world.”106 To 
illustrate the success of the external Mission, reference was made to events such as the 
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resolutions at the UN to impose sanctions on South Africa and the PAFMECA 
Conference (Pan African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa). According to 
Karis and Carter, this statement was significant for other reasons as well. This was the 
first time that an NEC statement linked the ANC with Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Also, 
it must be remembered that MK‟s strategy of military action was directed at provoking 
international action against the South African economy.107   
 
In the final analysis, the Lobatsi meeting was a vital step in formally launching the ANC 
onto the international stage as delegates laid out the broad outline of ANC foreign policy 
in exile by approving the military actions of MK and the policy of seeking foreign 
support through diplomacy. The prognosis was now clear. The ANC had suffered a 
blizzard of disappointments in the implementation of its resistance strategies against the 
state. It therefore again confronted its inadequacies by considering the need for a major 
strategic and organisational reassessment. To accomplish this, a major conference was 
held in Morogoro in 1969. In this regards, I recall my time at the ANC Headquarters in 
Johannesburg during the 1990s when Mororgoro always acted as a reference point for 
discussions of strategy. Now I understand now why this was so. One of the most 
noteworthy outcomes of the conference was the development of the historic document 
entitled Strategy and Tactics, which resulted from a frank assessment of priorities for the 
struggle. The conference was also convened to address ambiguities that became apparent 
after the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto.108 
  
The dilemmas that faced the ANC were encapsulated in a memorandum submitted by 
Ben Turok, a member of the South African Communist Party (SACP), then residing in 
Dar-es Salaam. This document is perhaps the most candid piece of evidence detailing the 
extent of the problems that faced the ANC during the first decade of exile. In this 
document, Turok complained that “No one in the movement can be content with the 
present situation, all must be aware of a deep going malaise such as we have never 
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known before”. After focusing on among others, the „failure of the leadership‟, the 
„political problems‟, the „style of work‟, „the treatment meted out to our military  
comrades‟, he concluded that for the struggle to achieve any degree of success it was “up 
to those of us who are now lying relatively immobilised in exile to take up with new 
resolve the fight to free South Africa.”109  
 
While many documents were produced and circulated in advance of the conference in 
order to allow for productive discussions, of all the documents produced for the 
conference, it was the “Strategies and Tactics‟ document,  drafted by Joe Slovo,  that 
represented the most bold attempt by the ANC , to undertake an an-dept analysis of its 
role in the struggle for liberation.110 Given the brief and value of this meeting, even 
Sechaba, the official publication of the ANC which was directed at members and 
sympathisers, afforded the conference much coverage. It reported that the conference 
“studied the enemy, his strength and weaknesses…it examined the struggle, its record 
and achievements and its targets for the future. What I found pertinent, especially for 
this study was the resolution relating to the importance of the international arena. This 
being that it was resolved “to intensify the international campaign against South Africa‟s 
apartheid regime because this helps to weaken the enemy.”111 
 
While I may be accused of over-emphasising the merit of this meeting, it can be seen that 
the resolutions of the conference marked a significant transformation in ANC foreign 
policy, indicating that the liberation movement had integrated itself fully within the 
framework of the global ideological struggle of the cold war, taking up both the rhetoric 
and the thrust of the rivalry of the super powers. This was indicative of the ANC‟s 
attempt to move in a more organised manner from the margins of the international stage 
to the centre stage, while at the same time firming my argument about the ANC as an 
agency of change. 
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The Development of a Foreign Policy Document 
The movement went even further in pursuing its international agenda. As a result of the 
Morogoro meeting a sub-committee was appointed to deal with the issue of foreign 
policy. The draft document, produced by this committee, and which was entitled “Our 
Foreign Policy Objectives,” provided lucid evidence on the ANC‟s conceptual views and 
framework for a foreign policy. The origins of this document are interesting in that it 
provides evidence of challenges in locating or obtaining data on the period under review. 
This document was furnished by an anonymous donor who obtained a copy from the 
Ruth First papers at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London in 1987. It has 
been difficult to establish the author of the document, but the donor had indicated that 
this could have been drafted by Ruth First as a note was found with a request from O. R. 
Tambo for her to draft such a document. A source has confirmed that First was often 
called upon by Tambo to draft policy documents, while other sources have confirmed 
having had access to this document while at the ANC London Mission, when it was sent 
there from Lusaka for comment and input.112     
 
In its preamble, the document drew attention to an urgent need for a sharply defined and 
directed foreign policy. Briefly summarised, it focused on relationships with four 
different categories of countries: with „firm friends;‟ with countries which are not „firm 
friends‟, but generally support the struggle against apartheid; with hostile countries which 
have powerful opposition forces but which are supportive of the ANC; and finally 
hostile countries which have no powerful groups that are supportive of the ANC.  
 
It called for the greater consolidation of its position with firm friends such as the Soviet 
Union, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria and other Socialists countries in 
Eastern Europe., with Cuba in South America and India in Asia. Its objective in dealing 
with these friendly countries was to ensure full support for the struggle for as long as it 
took to attain freedom. Turning to its friends in Africa, specific reference was made to 
Algeria, the United Arab Republic (UAR), Zambia and Tanzania. In attempting to secure 
support from these sources, the document cautioned on the need to ensure “that we are 
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not treated merely as one of the liberation movements that must be supported only on 
the grounds of Organisation of African Unity (OAU) resolutions. By support, we must 
mean simply support for the ANC and its struggle.” In regards to its „firm friends in 
Europe, reference was made to Sweden and the Scandinavian countries. 
 
So much for the different categories and the firm friends. But what becomes crucial to 
my work was the location of the USA within this structure. Category D, or the last 
category, was reserved for countries such as Britain, the USA and Germany. However, 
here it was stressed that while the USA was „hostile‟ to the movement, there was in 
existence the African-American movement which was able to provide the ANC with new 
opportunities to influence US opinion in government. This distinction must be viewed as 
an important one that would continue to play itself out in the years leading to South 
Africa‟s freedom in 1994, as the African–American movement came to form the base of 
the mass anti-apartheid US lobby. Mobilising support in this „hostile‟ country was a 
pertinent concern raised in the document. But not only did it raise this concern, the 
document even proceeded to outline its strategy to “influence the press and public 
opinion by a powerful campaign against apartheid.” It went on to explain that while the 
focus “need not be on the armed struggle, but on the need to prevent intervention on 
the side of apartheid.” What is significant is that it realised that “we cannot hope for 
more than contact at some levels” with the government, public organisations and press. 
But support could be sought from students and left wing groups.113 
 
From 1969-1970, this draft foreign policy document was circulated to mission offices for 
further input before it could be finalised. That the document generated much discussion 
is clear from the responses received from the different mission offices. A study of all the 
responses yielded the following broad agreement on areas that required amendment or 
inclusion. There was a call for a two pronged tactic against “hostile” countries such as 
the USA. This strategy should seek to build a strong movement of political commitment 
to the ANC, through the raising of practical aid for the struggle, and encouraging 
confrontation with the collaborators. Secondly it should seek to influence broad opinion 
makers to question government policy toward South Africa. To implement this dual 
strategy, it was considered necessary to initiate a programme of visits by key ANC 
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representatives to key countries with the intention firstly, of establishing the necessary 
mechanisms for continued contact, and secondly, for an outlet for publicity material and 
thirdly for the purpose of isolating the apartheid state.114 
 
The London Mission called for a thorough review of the mechanisms that the ANC had 
in place for its international work. There was a need, they argued, for a structure in which 
“vertical and horizontal relationships and responsibilities” are clearly defined. This call 
emanated from the Mission‟s concern over the problems associated with ANC‟ s 
international policy and over the failure of the Congress Group to effectively undertake 
the tasks allocated to it. This group, which comprised 11 members, was set up by the 
ANC to initiate and coordinate international solidarity work in Western Europe, the 
United Kingdom and the USA. But according to the London Mission document, the 
group was afflicted by many problems such as poor attendance at meetings, its informal 
status, its inability to reach decisions and its lack of effective contact with the rest of the 
ANC structures.    
 
At a meeting of the Foreign Policy sub-committee held on 15 April 1970 these issues, 
comments and concerns were scrutinised and the final recommendation from the group 
was for the ANC to “seek to steer a course in foreign policy, so as to commit itself to 
issues directly confronting the South African liberation movement.”115 In spite of 
evidence to the contrary, I have succeeded in arguing that in spite of the hostile domestic 
and international environment within which the ANC found itself, by the late 1960s the 
ANC was no longer guilty of haphazard applications of policy. It began to focus on 
strategic planning and had the most organised revolutionary operations in Southern 
Africa. The ANC‟s confidence in the effectiveness of such an approach, guided it 
through the next decade as it continued to fight the apartheid state while working to 
build a relationship with the United States of America. 
 
On the domestic scene, as was usually the case, state action determined and was 
determined by the activities and strategies of the liberation movement. Hence within the 
National Party camp conflicts began to grow regarding the future direction of state policy 
in respect of “separate development.” In spite of threats of international isolation, party 
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hardliners challenged any attempts to placate liberal and foreign bodies while party 
pragmatists feared the looming effects of international isolation that could eventually lead 
to a collapse of the economy.116 The latter acknowledged the existence of disastrous 
publicity generated by the uprising – the kind of publicity that seriously dented the image 
of South Africa abroad. The solution to this dilemma, for this group, was for the 
introduction of reforms, which could repair South Africa‟s image internationally as well 
as compose black rage. 
 
Given this call, the dilemma facing the National Party was how to introduce „reforms‟ 
without alienating the conservative element while at the same time placating blacks 
enough to seduce them into project a more positive image of South Africa abroad. This 
was clearly a staggering task and in the short term the government emerged relatively 
unscathed from the domestic uprisings. There was no reform to the calamitous school 
system and township conditions remained the same. „Concessions‟ that were offered 
were, in reality, no concession at all. Urban Bantu Councils were scrapped, only to be 
replaced with like bodies called Community Councils. Although rent hikes were 
postponed in Soweto, they were eventually imposed. The term “separate development‟ 
was replaced with the term “plural development.” The department of Bantu Affairs 
changed its name to Department of Plural Relations. Despite the role played by the 
townships in the uprising, life in the townships remained much the same after June 1979. 
These so-called reforms, which were consistent with past apartheid policy, were passed 
off as being done in the spirit of democracy. That the revolt made no difference to the 
state‟s resolve never to respond to demands for that truly democratic principle of one-
man-one vote in South Africa was evident as it moved to even harsher methods of 
crushing resistance, of new strategies to divide the majority as well as of new strategies to 
improve its image abroad. This endless spiral continued well into the 1990s during the 
dying days of apartheid when the writing was on the wall-that majority rule for South 
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By examining the early attempts of the ANC to become involved in the international 
arena, this chapter has raised important issues relating to the ANC‟s efforts which will be 
explored further in following chapters. The ANC was not very visible internationally in 
the early years, thus allowing me to conclude that up to the Treason Trials, the ANC had 
no foreign policy, relying instead on informal networks and individuals. The situation 
was aggravated by relentless state persecution as evidenced through the many trials-all 
which presented a hopeless scenario for the ANC. While those events such as the 
Treason Trial may have helped to somewhat raise the profile of the ANC in the USA, 
they did nothing to endear the latter to their cause. 
 
Refusing to cave in to this situation, the movement reacted in a positive manner by 
assessing and reorganising its priorities at Lobatsi, and then at Morogoro. The result of 
these assessments proved critical for my study because they provided the catalyst for the 
birth of a formal foreign policy as demonstrated by the crafting of the historic Foreign 
Policy Objectives in 1969. While a policy was set and the ANC was poised to take on the 
global players, in the case of the US State, it faced an arduous endeavour in gaining 
recognition from quarter. This will become clear when one looks at USA policy, through 
the different administrations beginning with John F. Kennedy in the following Chapter. 
Hostility, edged on by cold war developments was the order of the day.  
    
Having said this, I would like to conclude this chapter with the following observations. 
While the ANC may have had no foreign relations or policy as such before this, it had 
not been guilty of any major international relations errors which may have given cause 
for international enmity towards the movement. The ANC was presented with a blank 
canvas upon which to develop its relations with the USA, this in spite of the hostility it 
was expected to confront. Having suffered a blizzard of disappointments in its attempts 
to secure freedom, it would be argued that the blank canvas provided a fortuitous 
opportunity to make strategic and informed choices. Whether this was done will be 
interrogated in the following chapters. The freedom to form loose bonds became a 
certainly. Although the ANC was not tied to a Matthews or Plaatje‟s policy, it was 
offered the flexibility and opportunity to be more creative and to, for instance, take up 
the racists and human rights areas in the USA. But it also had as its guidelines, early 







contacts, institutional or personal, and prior USA State reactions in relation to global 
events-all of which played a significant role in driving organisational foreign policy 
initiatives with the USA State and Civil Society. Having said this, the following chapters 
will continue to engage these areas with a view to illustrating that in spite of the odds, the 
ANC‟s work was dominated by moves which ensured that an effective foreign 
relationship with the USA was secured. 
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It is my purpose to briefly look at the views of the different US administrations from the time of Kennedy 
to Kissinger under the Nixon era towards South Africa, towards the freedom struggle and towards the 
African National Congress within the context of apartheid, arguing that these administrations were, as 
Christopher Coker pointed out, “trapped by the ambiguities of their own position”1 This study of the 
administrations of 1960-1976 takes account of the context of global developments such as the cold war 
as these developments guided the USA‟s crafting of international policies. This context is critical in 
providing an understanding of the difficulties the ANC encountered in trying to secure the serious interest 
of the US State. I will prove that it was a formidable endeavour which only achieved some success later 
during the Ronald Reagan administration as will be demonstrated in Chapter Four. An examination of 
how the ANC positioned its relationship with the Soviet Union will comprise an element of this study. 
Although the USA and the Soviet Union were clashing head on during the 1970s and 1980s the 
ANC still continued in its attempts to develop links with the USA. The reasons for this will be 
interrogated. Even the historiography of this area is complex as they fit into three categories: scholars who 
have looked at the relationship within the cold war lens; those who looked at international policy in the 
region as apologists for the apartheid state; the third group which moved away from the traditional 
approach to take into account the different constituencies influencing the relationship. While this chapter 
does not attempt a study of USA Policy per se, this overview is necessary in demonstrating the 
effectiveness of civil society in changing USA Policy towards liberations movements such as the ANC. 
This is vital in promoting my arguments that events such as those at Sharpeville did not aid the ANC 
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cause in relation to shifting USA policy in favour of the liberation movement as the USA still appeared 
reluctant to take a firm hand with Pretoria.  Aside from anticipated effects in the USA, Sharpeville did 
not even move Third World countries as evidenced by the meeting of Non-Aligned states held in Belgrade 
just after the event, where the latter did not even merit mention. But while the ANC experienced 
challenges in the USA until the Reagan era, by 1979 opportunities for global support began to open up 
rapidly.  In that year, the Front Line States, liberation movements such as the ANC and the Non-
Aligned Movement took a common position  on the conflicts in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, 
implying that the ANC could expect meaningful support, for the first time from that quarter.  Outside of 
the African continent, international non-governmental organisations such the International Defence and 
Aid Fund(IDAF), International University Exchange Fund(IUEF), the International Commission of 
Jurists(ICJ) and the World Council of Churches(WCC), all crafted serious projects of support for  
liberation organisations such as the ANC.  These projects were inspired by the work of activist groups in 
countries such as Great Britain, Australia, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, France and Belgium.2 
Despite this, ultimately Coker‟s interpretation of successive US administrations‟ reluctance to support the 






Developments in the USA in the 1980s proved favourable for the ANC in its attempts to 
develop a relationship with, and attract the attention of the presiding administration. In 
1986 the Congress of the United States passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 
(CAAA), against President Reagan‟s veto. In early 1987 US Secretary of State, George 
Shultz officially received Oliver Tambo in Washington and in the latter part of 1989 the 
ANC was able to open an office in Washington.3 Yet only a year later the ANC was  
unbanned and Nelson Mandela released from prison and four years later South Africans 
won the freedom for which they had fought for almost five decades.  This building a 
relationship with the US Government lasted for as long as the ANC‟s struggle with the 
apartheid state. I would go further to argue that while this was the case, South Africa‟s 
                                                 
2
 For  more on the work of these organisations see George Shepherd Jr. Anti-Apartheid: Transnational 
Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa (Westport. Greenwood Press, 1977). 125. 
3 In 1974, the ANC was granted Observer Status at the United Nations and hence had an office in New 
York from 1974-1994. See Roger Pfister. „Gateway to International Victory:  The Diplomacy of the 
African National Congress, 1960-1994, ‟ in Journal of Modern African Studies. 41:1, (2003), 57.  







leading liberation organisation persevered in its efforts and though it realised success 
only in the final years of the struggle, it paved the way for a diplomatic relationship in a 
post apartheid society. Therefore this chapter again strengthens the theme of the ANC as 
an agency of change. 
 
The thinking of the different USA administrations from Kennedy to Nixon will be 
interrogated as a critical component in appreciating the daunting nature of the ANC‟s 
task. Given earlier observations regarding what could be perceived as positive 
developments for the ANC only in the late 1980s and during the Reagan era when the 
ANC saw some relief in sight, it could well be argued that the ANC enjoyed no tangible 
success until the last years before freedom. But instead what evidence will demonstrate is 
that this was not the case. This is so because the ANC had succeeded in mobilising civil 
society in the USA, which in turn exerted the necessary pressure on Washington resulting 
in the international isolation of the apartheid state. Hence a review of the different 
administrations and the political dynamics that shaped the policies of those 
administrations reinforces this perception. 
 
The reader may be tempted to criticise the strategy of  examining the thinking of the 
many administrations, this given my conclusion that the successive US state 
administrations studied in this work were indecisive and their policies towards African 
and liberation movements such as the ANC lacked vision and direction. If anything 
many Presidents adopted a strategy of supporting and implementing policies that 
reflected low political costs for Washington. Hence in most cases, and more specifically 
in the case of John F. Kennedy, they preferred to hedge their bets. In this regard, I find it 
comfortable to align my conclusions with views of scholars such as Richard Bissell and 
Christian de Vos.   
 
Bissell appropriately pointed to the USA‟s “ability to pursue contradictory policies 
simultaneously” while de Vos who specifically focused on the Kennedy years and the 
ANC, attempted rather successfully to dispel the prevailing view that John F. 
Kennedy‟s(JFK) presidency “has been that of a liberal administration unable to take a 
stronger stand on apartheid”, demonstrating instead that his administration “chose to 







align itself with the Nationalist party‟s  depiction of apartheid as a policy in the „interest 
of both sides.‟”4   
 
The reader may well advise on a generic conclusion which could dismiss an overview of 
the different administrations. After all this study is not focused on USA foreign policy 
and there is a notable historiography on this area. While consideration was given to such 
a model in the structuring of this chapter, such a step may have resulted in simultaneous 
scholarly accusation of a degree of weakness on my part since the South African 
dilemmas had to compete with global challenges such as the Cold War. For the ANC, 
attempts to secure support from the USA was certainly daunting especially since the 
USA‟s international policy informed its Africa policy.  This in turn influenced its relations 
with and support of the apartheid regime and ultimately its views of liberation 
organisations such as the ANC. It is therefore vital to examine all these dynamics within 
the Cold War lens. Hence it will be necessary to explore briefly the actions and decisions 
of each administration within this context. In this regard, what is also significant is that 
the ANC was able to leverage its relationship with the Soviet Union, a key protagonist of 
the Cold War, in a manner that allowed it to draw the attention of the USA to its 
activities. But again it will be demonstrated that this relationship could only be leveraged 
until the early 1980s for by the later years of that period cracks began to emerge in 
ANC‟s relationship with the Soviet Union-and this was also tied to global developments. 
The latter argument will be explored in Chapter Four. 
  
Harking back to the formidable nature of the task that confronted the African liberation 
movement in its attempts to construct a relationship with what was generally considered 
to be the most powerful global player, can be further demonstrated when trying to 
compare its attempts in trying to implement similar strategies with countries in Western 
Europe. This comparison grows out of the manner in which the civil rights struggle, 
domestic African American politics and strong anti-communist sentiment influenced 
American perceptions of the struggle in South Africa. In fact it was far easier for the 
ANC to operate in countries like the United Kingdom where communism was not a 
                                                 
4 See Richard E. Bissell. “How Strategic is South Africa?” in Richard E. Bissell and Chester A. Crocker 
(eds). South Africa into the 1980s  (Boulder, Westview, 1980). 209-231, quoted in Larry W. Bowman. 
“The Strategic Importance of South Africa to the United States:  An Appraisal and Policy Analysis”. This 
was an essay prepared for the Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa and presented to 
them in October 1980. Christian M. De Vos. “Balancing Acts:  John Kennedy, The Cold War and the 
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decisive factor in determining whether to support organisations like the ANC. The 
existence of pro-communist movements in developing countries like India, Brazil and 
countries in Africa as well as those such as the England and the Scandinavian group 
made this aspect of the ANC‟s history not as important as it was in the USA.  
 
Hence the ANC‟s main and most effective office of the Foreign Missions was established 
in London in the 1960s, thus facilitating the growth of the largest and most powerful 
solidarity movements such as the British and Irish anti-apartheid movements, which 
leveraged support for the international isolation of the apartheid state.5 The same can be 
said of the Nordic countries like Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. But a 
discussion of these various international attempts does not fall within the scope of my 
study.6 In fact during the 1950s, the civil rights movement, like the American labour 
movement, was purged of its communist members. So as a means of promoting civil 
rights at home, many African-Americans realised the need to illustrate their patriotism 
towards their country by supporting its anti-communist foreign policy abroad.    
 
 
Africa in Relation to the USA’s International Policy 
Whatever the importance of my sentiments as indications of the nature of the ANC‟s 
task at hand, it still raises questions about how the USA was able to translate state 
perceptions of Africa into official policy. While the USA may have emerged as the 
guiding force of the imperial powers after World War Two, as pointed out by those like 
Bernard Magubane and Walter LaFeber, evidence supports the point of view that it was 
                                                 
5 For Mohamed Tikly, who wrote up a Study of the ANC‟s External Wing for the Party, the United 
Kingdom was important for a number of reasons, the obvious being that it had strong diplomatic and 
trade ties with South Africa. Organisations like the International Defence and Aid Fund whose sole focus 
was to support the freedom struggles of Southern Africa were operational in the UK from 1966-1992. 
.Mohammed Tikly. „The ANC External Mission‟. Paper commissioned by the ANC Archives Committee 
in 2006. Tikly was a former Principal of the Solomon Mahlangu College in Tanzania, set up by the ANC 
to provide an education for those fleeing South Africa after the Soweto Uprisings. He is also a member 
of the ANC‟s Archives Committee since 1993. For the work of IDAF see Horst Kleinsmidt. “The Role 
of the Defence and Aid Fund.‟‟ Presented at the conference on International Anti-Apartheid Movements in 
South Africa‟s freedom Struggle:  Lessons for Today. University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. 10-13 October 
2004. Kleinsmidt was the Executive Director of IDAF from 1983-1992. See also Scott Thomas. The 
Diplomacy of Liberation:  The Foreign Relations of the African National Congress Since 1960 (New 
York. IB Taurus Publishers). 174, who also argued that the UK became an area of focus for the ANC‟s 
propaganda activities. He also pointed out that this country was the first Western country which provided 
refuge for the ANC activists since 1960.   
6 For Nordic Solidarity and more specifically Swedish support for national liberation in Southern Africa, 
see Tor Sellstrom. Sweden and National Liberation and South Africa. Vols. 1 and 11 (Uppsala. Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, 1999) and Tor Sellstrom(ed.). Liberation in Soutern Africa: Regional and Swedish Voices 
(Uppsala. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002).    







not until the late 1950s and early 1960s that Washington began to be drawn more 
directly, but slowly, into the colonial affairs in Africa and Asia. From the time of 
President Richard Nixon‟s visit in 1957, American diplomatic activity began to grow in 
the African continent, culminating in the rise to power of Moboto Sese Seko through the 
efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).7 But none of this was significant 
enough to really help edge the US state any closer to the ANC cause until the 1980s. La 
Feber‟s study of  America and Russia‟s relations against the backdrop of the Cold War 
provided a new perspective of what became seen as „not the most satisfying chapter in 
American  Diplomatic History” Also from evidence provided by Chester Crocker in his 
many speeches, articles and policy documents, it was clear that only by the 1970s that 
American interest specifically in Africa was “rudely awakened” and caused Washington 
to “shift gears” towards a more „active‟ diplomacy with African nations.  To articulate it 
simply, what this shows is that up to the 1970s the African continent did not merit any 
serious consideration in American policy. 
 
Where Africa stood in relation to state policy in the pre-1970s was also well documented 
by Senator J. H. Grobler, who writing as early as 1957 in his book Africa‟s Destiny, 
engaged in an analysis of the importance of Africa in any future world war and explained 
that in the event of such a war, “the clash will presumably be between Western 
democracies and the Communist Constellation” and Africa will remain to effect the 
balance of power in the future world.8 The scenario presented by his analysis was the 
following; should Europe fall threat to an „atomic blitzkrieg‟ by Russia and her satellites, 
the Western world will be compelled to turn to Africa,  more precisely  Southern Africa 
to effect a counter offensive against communist dominated regions of Europe, the 
Middle East and even possibly North Africa.9 Another interesting analysis offered by the 
Senator was the existence of the close link between American domestic colour policy and 
its foreign policy. He acknowledged that the US state “realizes only too well that it can 
hardly make any favourable impression on countries like India and Egypt unless its 
                                                 
7 The purpose of this visit was to attend Ghana‟s independence celebrations. See Thomas Karis. “United 
States Policy toward South Africa,” in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O‟ Meara (eds.). Southern 
Africa:  The Continuing Crisis (Bloomington. Indiana University Press, 1979) 320. See also Bernard M. 
Magubane. „United States/South Africa Relations‟. 1988. Unpublished paper furnished by Professor 
Magubane to the author. See also Walter LaFaber. America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1990 (New 
York. McGraw Hill, 1991) and Chester Crocker. “A US Policy for the 80s.” This appeared as part of the 
Occasional Paper series of the South African Institute of International Affairs. May 1981. 
8 J. H. Grobler. Africa‟s Destiny (Johannesburg. Book of the Month Club, 1958). 11. 
9 Grobler. Africa‟s Destiny. 41. 







colour policy is in conformity with the tenet of the new slogan of „fundamental human 
rights.‟”10 
 
But whatever the scholarly perceptions and arguments regarding the US state and its 
thinking on the African continent and South Africa, given its track record in the context 
of the Cold War, it was clear that when it did take the decision to become actively 
involved, as will be argued later on in this chapter and in Chapter Four, it would settle 
for nothing less than being the dominant imperial power on the continent. Also given 
evidence from 1914, which includes looking at the USA‟s early relationships and contacts 
with South Africa, its officials and South African issues, especially at the UN, was a good 
indication of the direction any future relationship with the latter would take.11  
Such support did not emerge out of a vacuum, but was guided by dynamics such as 
human rights and democracy and the Cold War.  
 
This it will be argued was clearly discerned in the 1940s, when two threats confronted the 
USA and hence served to strengthen the USA/SA relationship-much to the detriment of 
the African National Congress and its attempts to secure support against the apartheid 
state. Firstly the Cold War entered a perilous phase and at the same time, but on another 
level, there was a call for human rights and democracy.12 The solution to such threats, as 
perceived by both countries, was to focus on the communist scare. In his insightful study 
which was devoted to investigating the relationship of Africans-Americans to the African 
continent, Magubane focused on the related issues and arguments which informed  the 
relationship which in turn was shaped by the whole concept of what constituted the 
black identity. These issues included factors  such as the  stereotypes of Africa, racism, 
                                                 
10 Grobler. Africa‟s Destiny. 24 
11 Since the conclusion of the first World War the relationship between the USA and South Africa grew. 
This was demonstrated by the relationship between Jan Smuts and Woodrow Wilson. Recommendations 
by Wilson to the USA about Smuts and his role in the League of Nations enhanced the image of the 
South African Prime Minister. This relationship was strengthened during the Second World War when 
Smuts played a significant role in drafting the United Nations Organisation Charter. After the War, by the 
time the Nationalists assumed power in SA, the relationship strengthened with South Africa participating 
in the Berlin Airlift in 1950. See Nelson. „Some External Aspects of Internal Conflict‟. 104 and  
Magubane. „USA/SA Relations‟. Even during the infant stages of the UN when India together with the 
newly independent countries, proposed a resolution requesting that the Union of South Africa provide a 
report on its treatment of Indians in that country, the US vote on this issue stood at a distinct „NO‟. On a 
further proposal for negotiations on this issue, the US joined South Africa with another „NO‟ vote. On 
this issue see Magubane. The Ties that Bind:  African-American Consciousness of Africa (New Jersey. 
African World Press, 1987). 213. 
121948 witnessed the Soviet annexation of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Bloackade. See also Chris Alden. 
“From Liberation Movement to Political Party:  ANC Foreign Policy in Transition,” in The South 
African Journal of International Affairs. Vol.1. No. 1 (Spring 1993), 69. 







Pan Africanism, African „nationhood‟ and the role of movements such as the “Back to 
Africa” Movement. According to Magubane, the “capitalist mentality” saw no other 
route to defusing the “challenge to its exploitations and oppressive politics: it knows only 
one answer-anti-communism.”13 To emphasise this point, he pointed to the views of  
those like  Paul Robeson of the Council on African Affairs, who “lamented the fact that  
as in South Africa, where the notorious Suppression of Communism Act is used to 
attack the liberation movement, the enemies of Negro freedom in our country have 
accused the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People) of 
being a „subversive conspiracy‟ and the organization has been outlawed in Louisiana, 
Texas and Alabama, and legally restricted in Georgia, Virginia, South Carolina and 
Mississippi.” He went even further to allude to “City ordinances,” such as those in Little 
Rock, that were also used for this purpose.14 
 
In view of such developments, it was not surprising to find evidence demonstrating how 
the Nationalists, who, when they were elected to power in 1948, adopted strategy linked 
to international developments. This was apparent not only in their use of only racial 
segregation together with anti-communism as their campaign platforms, but also during 
the trials of South African activists as demonstrated in an earlier chapter. One has to 
understand that these officials really expected such platforms to ingratiate them to 
Washington. Also nothing frightened the white racist and capitalists more than the 
horrifying prospect of a “communist organized revolution of the vast Bantu 
Population.”15   
 
These circumstances and perceptions must be borne in mind when examining areas such 
as Nelson Mandela‟s underground activities which were communicated to the South 
African intelligence services by the US Central Intelligence Agency and which has already 
been examined in an earlier chapter. That action marked the beginning of what many 
historians and political analysts have termed the „unholy alliance‟ between the United 
States and South Africa to undermine the work of liberation movements such as the 
African National Congress. 
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At this point in the study it would be necessary to interrogate the extent to which the 
ANC‟s relationship with the USSR may have shaped Washington‟s attitude and actions 
towards the liberation movement. A useful source for this relationship between the ANC 
and the USSR is Vladimir Shubin who provided a rare study of the history of the African 
National Congress. Given the many decades of political, military, diplomatic and 
financial cooperation between Moscow and the ANC, it was not unusual to find that 
Shubin had positioned this relationship well in his study of the movement. After all, as 
pointed out by Shubin the relationship took root as early as 1927 when President Josiah 
Gumede visited the USSR. In this detailed study he endeavoured to put the record 
straight by addressing years of academic and media distortions of the relationship. In 
effect as an insider, he succeeded in unravelling many of the mysteries of this 
relationship.16 
 
While it is not the purpose of this chapter to examine the relationship of the ANC with 
the USSR, it will be strategic to allude to a comment made by President Oliver Tambo 
during an interview with Time magazine during his visit to the USA in late 1986. When 
asked to comment on Soviet Aid given to the ANC he responded by pointing out that  
“we have sought assistance everywhere,” and “we found it in some places and not in 
others.” More importantly he added, “No country in the West would give us weapons, so 
we went to the Soviet Union.” Therefore he questioned, “where else could we have 
gone.”17 This response best explains the pragmatism that guided the ANC‟s decision to 
approach the Soviet Union when it did and its constant defence of this relationship. 
Moreover the Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognise the ANC as “a 
legitimate revolutionary liberation movement.” According to Professor Esterhuyse, who 
explored the international status of the movement, this recognition gave the ANC an 
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international status of a „high order‟ which proved advantageous for the ANC in relation 
to its attempts to establish relations with the Western countries.18  
 
While countries such as the USA may have expressed concerns about the relationship 
which the ANC enjoyed with Moscow, such evidence has provided me with the platform 
from which to argue that the relationship did contribute to the process of compelling 
Washington to take the movement seriously. In any event by 1987 the Soviet Union 
began to re-examine and reposition this relationship as will be demonstrated later in this 
study. So it serves to confirm that there were other factors - such as the role of civil 
society and domestic developments in South Africa–that compelled Washington to take 
notice of the plight of South Africa‟s majority and to recognise the ANC as a major 
player in this dilemma. The USSR, while still a factor, was no longer a critical one.  
     
As I have continued to accord emphasis to the USA/USSR relationship during the Cold 
War years, throughout this chapter, one may well ask why it was considered important 
enough to merit scrutiny-this given the fact that there is an enormous body of literature 
covering this area. But I would like to position my contentions to demonstrate that one 
cannot undertake any assessment of the relationship between the ANC and USA without 
doing so within the Cold War lens. Hence I consider a brief overview of how the Cold 
War played itself out during the tenure of different American administrations, necessary 
for these purposes. 
 
 
The Cold War and US Administrations 
Like Magubane, Walter LaFeber has argued that the character of the Cold War changed 
between 1953 and 1956 forcing the attention of both the US and Russia away from the 
European arena to the less developed parts of the world. During this period the Russian 
leader, Khrushchev, having secured the protection of the Soviet Union through the 
Warsaw Pact turned to newly emerging nations by introducing a new aid programme for 
these nations.19 At the same time the Cold War between the USA and Russia played itself 
                                                 
18 W. P. Esterhuyse. “The International Political Status of the African National Congress,” in Africa, Vol. 
19, No. 1. 1989. 32.33. See also Chris Alden. “From Liberation Movement to Political Party:  ANC 
Foreign Policy in Transition,” in The South African Journal of International Affairs. Vol.1(Spring 1993).   
19 Walter LaFeber. America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1990. 172.  Fourteen economic and military 
assistance agreements were contracted with nations in Asia and the Middle East and included countries 







out in Egypt during the Suez crisis.20 For the purposes of this study, this crisis was 
considered significant because it demonstrated to African and Asian states how Russia 
could be used for their protection against western imperialism. But as Paul Hastings had 
pointed out, they had conveniently forgotten Russian‟s suppression of the Hungarian 
uprising.21  
 
This blinding determination to contain communism caused American administrations 
from those under John F Kennedy to that under Richard Nixon to blunder from one 
international crisis to another. This was evident in their involvement in Latin America 
and South East Asia from the 1960s.22 President Kennedy‟s response to such blunders 
was interesting as he apportioned blame purely to other members of his administration 
and not to himself. He complained “all my life I‟ve known better than to depend on the 
experts”. “How could I have been so stupid to let them go ahead”, he asked.23 Even their 
disastrous entry into Vietnam was defended by the President as representing a strategy to 
end the „global communist menace.”24 An important observation made by scholars of 
this period was that the American administration prided itself on its realism, its „political 
pragmatism, and its determination to save emerging nations,” yet it was fraught with 
many blunders.25 While this may have been the intention of the administration, these 
blunders and blinding determination to end the „global menace‟ demonstrated a total lack 
of „political pragmatism‟ and this has been demonstrated by my earlier discussion. For 
the purposes of my arguments, this discussion is relevant in furnishing confirmation on 
how the US state viewed Africa and its dilemmas.    
 
Hence it was regrettable that the Johnson administration had to be the inheritors of these 
poorly constructed set of foreign policies principles. But given his belief in the New 
                                                                                                                                            
such as North Vietnam, Indonesia, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and Egypt. See also Russel H. Fifield. 
Southeast Asia in United States Policy (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963). 252. 
20 See LaFeber. America, Russia and the Cold War. 184 and Robert Engler. The Politics of Oil: A Study of 
Private Power and Democratic Directions (Chicago. Phoenix, 1961) 261. 
21 Paul Hastings. The Cold War 1945-1969. (London. Ernest Benn, 1969). 93. 
22 Kennedy pledged military assistance to non-communist countries. Aside from training for anti-guerrilla 
forces, Kennedy pledged $20 million for ten years to Latin America, but the growth rate of Latin America 
failed to materialise. American support of the Bay of Pigs episode on 17 April 1961 which was designed 
to remove Fidel Castro from power was another disaster.  
23  Conversation with Theodore Sorenson regarding the Bay of Pigs debacle. Theodore C. Sorensen. 
Kennedy (New York. Harper and Row, 1965). 309.   
24 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. A Thousand Days:  John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston. Mariner 
Books, 1979) 548.  
25 David Halberstam. The Making of A Quagmire (New York. Random House, 1965). 67. 







Frontier and in the creation of a great Society in the domestic sphere, Johnson was 
determined to wage the Cold War externally, in a sense then continuing with Kennedy‟s 
policies towards the conflict in Southeast Asia, with disastrous results.26  
 
It is paradoxical that by intervening in the war in Southeast Asia, successive American 
administrations aimed to contain the spread of the Red Menace. Yet through their many 
political blunders, they only served to benefit any intervention on the part of their arch 
enemy- the Soviet Union. With American focus and resources so tied down in Vietnam, 
Russia emerged favourably in international affairs between 1965 and 1971. She refrained 
from intervening in the conflict as the protracted nature of the war meant that the US 
would continue to suffer many losses, much to Russia‟s benefit. A further benefit for 
Russia was that American‟s role in the war was even questioned by her own allies, thus 
dividing the Western alliance.27  
 
Not only did she suffer through the international quagmire in which she found herself, 
the US administration also experienced crises back home. These included the ghetto 
riots, the assassinations and the anti war riots between 1964 and 1968.28 In the midst of 
all of this, Richard Nixon won the Republican nomination and ascended to the American 
Presidency in November 1965.29 This scenario proved to the ANC that its early decision 
to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union meant that it was backing the right horse. 
In spite of this, the argument that will be advanced will be that the ANC still saw the 
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The Cold War and the Liberation Struggle 
To understand the intensity of the link between the Cold War and the liberation struggle 
raging on the African continent‟s most Southern tip, it is essential to undertake an 
investigation into the place of the South African dilemma within this cold war 
diplomacy? There is considerable scholarship in this area with scholars providing 
interpretations within the USA/Pretoria context. But in the same token, there is 
unfortunately a vacuum in literature focusing on Washington‟s stance on liberation 
movements such as the African National Congress. Hence this chapter has provided 
challenges as it has been difficult to locate primary evidence on this area. This challenge 
allows me to conclude that since Washington remained steadfast in its policy not to 
engage with liberation movements, which in essence, may have accorded movements 
such as the ANC some official USA recognition, there has been no official recorded 
discussions on this issue. Even the study of the memoranda that moved between state 
officials and Presidents, such as those in the Kennedy library has yielded no significant 
material.30 This concern has been shared by scholars such as Christian de Vos.31  
 
In trying to understand the reasons for this, I have been guided by the view that South 
Africa never occupied centre stage in USA politics during this time. As already pointed 
out, it played second fiddle to other crises that faced the successive American 
administrations. This was demonstrated when the US called for the liberation of Eastern 
Europe from communist dominance, while at the same time, according to Thomas Noer, 
it  faced a „dilemma‟ when it came to the liberation of southern Africa. In  challenging 
conservative analyses of  American Foreign Policy, Noer pointed to evidence of the 
existence of hard interests such as trade and defence which clashed with soft interests 
such as human rights. Another consideration was the existence of a complicated 
relationship between domestic issues and foreign policy. American policy, through most 
decades was designed with two purposes:  to placate domestic demands as well as to hold 
onto European allies.32 This often resulted in conflicting statements and action.  
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That America built up an image of being the champion of anti-colonialism was 
undeniable. But this was an inaccurate perception of her role. This was seen during the 
early period  of the cold war when the Truman administration embarked on a drive to 
aggressively propagate its anti-imperialist image to the extent of explaining its battle with 
communism as one „between freedom and slavery.‟33  
 
What is clear is that internal matters can influence „foreign affairs‟ of a country. This 
happened during the Kennedy years, when the American Civil Rights Movement of the 
60s influenced the country‟s international relations and policies, especially toward Africa. 
Kennedy‟s approach to Africa was associated with the rise of black agitation in the US. 
The civil rights movement and the demand for black freedom in Africa became two 
areas which held the common aim of eradicating racism. Any American foreign policy 
committed to issues of human rights, equality and the elimination of racial prejudice had 
to encounter the spectre of apartheid. 
 
Regardless of these perceptions, early scholarship on the Kennedy years pointed to 
dilemmas Kennedy faced-dilemmas which placed constraints on his ability to assist in the 
ending of apartheid in SA. Firstly, Kennedy realised that unlike countries like Angola, in 
the case of SA, there was no guerrilla movement in the country, and secondly there was 
no „mother country‟ to pressure. More importantly, South Africa, more than any other 
country in Africa, was of economic and strategic importance to the US and the Western 
Europe.34 So it was not surprising to find the American business community opposed to 
any strategy that would restrict their trade and investment with South Africa. This 
demonstrated how heavily dependent American industries were on good relations with 
SA.35 But at the same time it could justifiably be demonstrate that during this time purely 
economic interests did not shape policy decisions. They were but one of the many areas 
that influenced foreign policy decisions. Military and strategic interests carried far more 
influence.   
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And so it was that when Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower, it was expected that the new 
administration would take a tough hand with Pretoria.36 Even the South African 
authorities feared problems with the US after his assumption of office. Senator Frank 
Moss, then Senator of Utah did forecast a dramatic change in policy toward apartheid 
under Kennedy, with a clear commitment to freedom and the ending of racial problems 
in SA.37 These views were commonplace and were derived from prevailing judgements 
that this was a liberal administration.38 But recent scholarship has provided an alternate 
view which causes me to review my earlier pronouncements of constraints placed on 
Kennedy. This body of evidence represents a widening of perspectives to include many 
previously ignored factors such as social, economic, cultural and political factors of a 
domestic and foreign nature, this allowing the authors to demonstrate that Kennedy‟s 
administration was reluctant or not inclined to act against the apartheid state.39  
 
 The Kennedy administration was divided by the tensions caused by differing views of 
key officials who either fell into the Africanist or Europeanist camp. But Kennedy was 
strategic in his appointment of these officials ensuring that choosing Africanists such as 
Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Bowles  as 
Under Secretary of State, Wayne Fredericks as Deputy Secretary of State and Adlai 
Stevenson as UN Ambassador demonstrated his support for African decolonisation. But 
his more senior appointments reflected his concern that European issues far surpassed 
those relating to the African continent. These appointments were also indicative of his 
desire to placate European allies. These senior appointments included officials such as 
Dean Rusk as Secretary of State, Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defence and he 
retained  J. Edgar Hoover as Head of the FBI and Allen Dulles as Head of the CIA. 
While the former group called for a tough stance against Pretoria and for contact with 
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liberation movements, the latter appeared unwilling to tackle apartheid and its creators 
head on.40   
 
For instance, George Ball who hinted at the dangers of isolating South Africa, argued 
convincingly that the US should maintain all economic, political and cultural links with 
the country to display to the white minority state, „the evolving social ideas of the west”. 
Any belief that Washington could compel the Afrikaners to abandon racial inequality was 
according to him “pie in the sky.”41 Africanists such as Williams, remained highly critical 
of apartheid and promised stern efforts on the part of his administration to bring about 
changes. He labelled apartheid “a wrongheaded policy, fraught with dangers not alone to 
the peoples of South Africa, but to international peace.” But from the debates that took 
place in the corridors of power, key evidence was found to support my view that 
Africanists in the administration were not successful in influencing policy in the Kennedy 
administration. In fact, throughout 1961 America obstructed UN efforts to impose 
mandatory sanctions against SA. By the end of 1961 American policy toward South 
Africa was clearly one that could be described as a „middle course‟. 
 
The usual concern about the threat of communism in South Africa and the rest of the 
continent also surfaced. Joseph Satterthwaite, US Ambassador to SA, indicated his 
concern over the rising communist influence in SA by alluding to the influence of the 
SACP and by calling for greater military aid which could assist “counter insurgency” 
activities by the Afrikaners to the communists‟ threat.42 Satterthwaite met with Chief 
Albert Luthuli in 1963 to discuss the activities of MK and according to him, Luthuli 
remained committed to non-violence, but that other members of the ANC were 
determined to turn to “terrorist activities” to secure their freedom.43 Kennedy was 
concerned that the crises in many African countries could clear the path for communism 
threat and infiltration. He was also greatly influenced by the situation in Congo. What is 
significant about the Congo issue was that it gave the conservatives in the administration 
the necessary ammunition to argue that African countries were not ready for majority 
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rule.44 In fact the only evidence of the Kennedy administration‟s abhorrence against 
apartheid appeared in 1963, when after much criticism it voted in favour of a UN 
resolution banning weapon sales to SA. But then again this only happened after Adlai 
Stevenson explained that America would honour existing commitments.   
 
Kennedy‟s successor, Lyndon Johnson ensured there was little change in American 
policy towards SA. In any event, I would contend that there was not much significant 
action in the early years for two reasons:  Johnson was involved in the fight for the 
passage of the civil rights bill and in his election campaigns. So he was not likely to 
embark on any drastic policy changes that could have adversely affected his campaign 
initiatives. In fact the relative silence on South Africa was rapidly seized upon by the 
South African authorities as was evident in a remark by a South African diplomat who 
observed to a State Department official that “you haven‟t been too horrible to us 
recently.”45 While Menon Williams vehemently denied any relaxation in such opposition, 
in 1964 Washington did moderate is policies with the result that the official rhetoric 
against apartheid took on a more moderate tone. This was evident in March 1964 when 
Williams, who for three years was at the forefront of the verbal assaults on SA, submitted 
a draft speech (to be presented at Harvard) to the State Department for their comment. 
The relevant authorities at the department attacked his speech as being “too 
provocative.” The content of his speech suggested that the administration was 
considering the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. But Satterthwaite chided 
him for his failure to use quiet diplomacy.46 
 
State reaction to the Rivonia trail was also a clear indication of policy towards South 
Africa. Since Sharpeville, no other event in South Africa generated such considerable 
international attention and protest. Even the American press joined the international 
press corp in denouncing the South African government. Britain implored Washington 
to jointly ensure the conclusion a fair trial for the accused. The US State‟s response was 
to send Judge Charles Fahy as the official observer of the trial proceedings. When five of 
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the defendants, including Mandela were found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment 
on Robben Island, Fahy reported that the trial was fair. He added that those found guilty 
were guilty of “revolutionary activity.”47 
 
That the administration found the South African issue a complex one was evident during 
Mennen Williams‟s submission to the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee 
of Foreign Affairs. In his submission, Williams acknowledged that given the racial 
dilemmas, SA posed one of the most difficult problems faced by policymakers purely 
because “it involved one of the most sensitive aspects of human relations, the problem 
of getting different races to live together in mutual respect and cooperation.”48 In 
formulating policy towards SA, he cautioned the US to consider the liabilities as well as 
the benefits pf the relations. He pointed out for instance, that the reason for the 
communists‟ successes in Africa was due to their efforts to identify with the aspirations 
of South Africa‟s majority and by emphasising the US relationship with the white State. 
   
In July 1964, when the Civil Rights Bill was passed, it was hoped by certain quarters that 
the passage of this bill would indicate America‟s commitment to racial equality and 
Africa while others hoped that this would lead to a more involved role in the South 
African dilemma. This came to pass when Johnson became involved, but not in the way 
many expected. In resuming with Kennedy‟s arms embargo, the president faced extreme 
difficulties in keeping up the spirit of the embargo, especially in relation to the problems 
faced by the Lockheed contract relating to the sale of submarines and aircraft to SA. By 
turning down permission for the sale of submarines Johnson‟s action was indicative of 
Washington‟s commitment to the terms of the embargo and to some kind of dissociation 
with the Afrikaner government. This in spite of the administration‟s lack of interest in 
any kind of anti-apartheid action. Such actions encouraged Africans in the US as well as 
in South Africa and members of the liberation movement.49 
 
But it was the situation in the Congo that made such optimism a short lived 
phenomenon. As it did for Kennedy, this issue raised its head again and hence depleted 
any further support for the African cause. Even African leaders were bitter in their 
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criticism, especially after the Stanleyville raid, of what they considered to be the 
beginnings of US intervention and cooperation with Belgium. Officials also feared that 
African governments would not be able to maintain good anti-communist governments. 
These developments caused officials to call for a cautious policy with Africa and this was 
certain to impact on any policy towards liberation organisations such as the ANC.  
 
Criticism of the administration‟s lack of interest in apartheid came from others quarters 
such as the African Americans and the liberals. Martin Luther King Jnr. joined this 
quarter by striking  out at the United Sates for promoting „tyranny‟ by refusing to 
implement any direct pressure such as economic sanctions. He questioned whether 
Washington was waiting for a bloodbath „before they recognised a crisis.‟50 King was 
joined by George Houser, Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa, the 
National Student‟s Association, the African Studies Association and the Methodists 
Church. Protests by more radical groups followed with the Students for a Democratic 
Society staging protests in New York, Boston, Detroit, San Francisco and Washington.51 
 
These protests in the 1960s raised fears of conservatives that such action could lead to 
American confrontations over South Africa. But this did not happen as America became 
more involved in the Vietnam War and South Africa seized the opportunity to pledge its 
commitment and support of the war and of its abhorrence of communism. In view of 
these crises facing the American authorities, it came as no surprise that South Africa did 
not enjoy centre stage. In the same year, the US abstained on a resolution in the UN 
calling for “universally applied mandatory sanctions” against South Africa. Not 
surprisingly, the US delegate to the UN justified the abstention by drawing attention to 
the violent tone of the resolution, which he believed would not do anything to change 
apartheid. Business and military leaders used this opportunity to call for the elimination 
of further restrictions in SA as they considered punitive restrictions to be detrimental to 
their business operations.52 As they considered Johannesburg to be the Detroit of South 
Africa, they were keen to exploit opportunities provided by the city. Noer again provided 
interesting statistics on US executives attitudes to SA. According to him, a poll of US 
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executives in SA found 60% felt the nation “was attempting to solve the racial situation.” 
Over 40% said they would vote for the Nationalist party if eligible and only 9% saw 
apartheid as “altogether incorrect.”53 
 
My arguments therefore demonstrate that for the ANC, the picture was bleak. There had 
been no consistent condemnation by the US of apartheid policies, nor has there been any 
evidence of an inclination to support strong action against South Africa.  Further there 
had been no desire to build strong links with the liberation movements such as the ANC, 
or even any interest in African affairs. Even worse, Williams resigned in 1966 hence 
removing the last serious supporter of fresh foreign policy initiatives against apartheid. 
The Vietnam War, the domestic racial problems and the communist phobia ruined any 
sign of hope for freedom. But the ANC persevered in its attempts to develop a 
relationship with this powerhouse.   
 
Before proceeding to examine successive administrations views on liberation movements 
and the apartheid state, I would like to pause and explore the question of why the ANC 
persevered in its attempts to forge a relationship with the US State. The answer was 
partially provided by Enuga Reddy, former Director of the UN Centre Against Apartheid 
who in an interview in 2006 explained that because the USA was the „leader of the 
Western alliance‟ and because the state was „protecting the regime in South from 
effective international pressure‟, the ANC needed to get the attention of the USA. The 
only way to do this was to forge a relationship with the American state.54  
 
But as evidence continued to prove, US administrations moved headlong on a rightward 
path and hence worked toward strengthening ties with the apartheid state. Even though 
this happened not long after Sharpeville, it made this move all the more ironical since it 
would appear that even the atrocities perpetrated by the apartheid state did nothing to 
change opinions in Washington. My view remains in variance with scholars such as 
Christopher Coker and Daan Prinsloo who have credited events at Sharpeville and 
                                                 
53 Noer. Black Liberation. 180. 
54 Interview which I undertook with Enuga Reddy in May 2006 in New York. Enuga Reddy was the 
former Director of the UN Centre against Apartheid and even after his retirement from the UN, 
continued to play a significant role in the post apartheid South Africa. From my time Yale University up 
to recent years, he generously furnished me with copies of document s which he considered important 
for my research. While we have innumerable face-to-face discussions, telephonic and electronic 
conversations, this was the only formal interview which I conducted with him. Interview in possession of 
author. Folder 3.  







Soweto for a hardening of US attitudes towards South Africa.55 My evidence allows me 
to argue that while these events may have raised some degree of awareness of the ANC‟s 
struggle against apartheid, they did not cause a hardening of attitudes in Washington.  
 
 
National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) and Liberation Movements  
Nothing demonstrates this better than the formulation of a document entitled the 
National Security Study Memorandum or known as NSSM 39 during the Nixon 
administration. For the purposes of strengthening my arguments, a substantial scrutiny 
of this piece of evidence was required. Drafted under the direction of the US President‟s 
National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, it was significant for a number of 
reasons. Firstly it was a secret document and secondly it was expected to provide the 
National Security Council with guidelines for a US policy framework for Southern Africa. 
This therefore demonstrates that the USA considered Southern African as developing 
into an important component of US foreign policy, the reasons of which will be explored 
in the course of this and the following chapter.   
 
Hence any study of US policy towards South Africa would not be complete without an 
analysis of this document which included five elemental goals of US policy.  
They were: 
 to improve the US standing in black Africa and internationally on the racial issue; 
 to minimize the likelihood of escalation of violence in the area and the risk of US 
involvement; 
 to minimize the opportunities for the USSR and China to exploit the racial issue 
in the region for propaganda advantage and to gain political influence with black 
governments and liberation movements; 
 to encourage moderation of the current rigid racial and colonial policies of the 
white regimes; 
 To protect economic, scientific and strategic interests and opportunities in the 
region, including the orderly marketing of South Africa‟s gold production. 56 
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Option two of the NSSM 39, which was to prove critical in future developments of 
policy stated that “the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change 
can come about is through them. There is no hope for blacks to gain the political rights 
they seek through violence…” For scholars like Thomas Karis this option was 
interpreted as being “to be a gross miscalculation.” This policy shift was intended to 
remain secret and according to Karis, the state department maintained that Option Two 
was not adopted.57 The name that Option Two inherited was interesting. Dubbed the 
„Tar baby Option‟ the premises of this option collapsed in the wake of a series of 
international events which included the coup in Lisbon.58 
   
According to Roger Morris, who was one of the main authors of the study, it was 
intriguing to note how „clientism‟ and not objectivity determined the positions that were 
adopted by the different agencies. For example the position taken by the CIA was “so 
transparently pro-white,” while Treasury and Commerce remained vehemently hostile to 
any policy which could adversely affect their attempts at “corporate expansion.” Even 
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, David Newson neglected to offer any opposition 
to these radical pro-white policies‟ for he believed that while any isolation of the 
apartheid state could result in greater resistance to change, opening the doors of 
communication could instead succeed in speeding up the pace of change. He even 
provided his guarantee to officials that any possible opposition from the African quarter 
in the UN was “containable.”59 
 
What NSSM 39 also demonstrated was that the behaviour of officials in the Nixon 
administration was driven by personal interests, organizational interests and 
organizational prejudices. Individual perceptions of Africa and African issues were also 
determining factors in policy making initiatives. For example, whenever African issues 
emerged as areas of discussion, Alexander Haig gestured wildly as though he was beating 
                                                 
57 Thomas Karis. „United States Policy towards South Africa‟. 334.   
58 This name was drawn from the story “Brer Rabbit and the Tar Baby”, an Uncle Remus Story by Joel 
Chandler Harris; in which Brer Fox who used a sticky doll to capture Brer Rabbit. Brer Rabbit attacked 
tar baby with his hands and feet and became totally stuck. The term has often been used to describe 
situations or problems from which it is difficult to extricate oneself. The US experienced this during its 
involvement in Rhodesia. For this see Anthony Lake. The „Tar Baby‟ Option:  American Policy towards 
Rhodesia (New York. Columbia Press, 1976). For further evidence on international developments which 
led to the collapse of „tar baby‟ see Prinsloo. United States Foreign Policy. 49.   
59 Danaher. Political Economy o US Policy. 91-92.  







drums on the table.60 The President himself could not understand that African tribes 
could be more intelligent and accomplished than others, referring to African people as 
„jigs.‟61 Other officials were unable to distinguish between Rhodesia and South Africa. 
 
But however scholars, whether conservative Europeanist or Africanist, analyse the study, 
in spite of its use of fancy political jargon, I can make a simple and obvious conclusion. 
NSSM 29 favoured Pretoria. The policy path finally chosen by Washington was one of 
moderation or low political cost, hence indicating a synergy with policy of previous 
administrations like that of John F. Kennedy.62 In presenting the range of evidence I 
have succeeded in demonstrating that NSSM 39 was instrumental in providing us with 
that window into US policy goals and its criteria for greater international intervention. 
Therefore it was not surprising that when in 1971, Portugal faced its crisis of empire, 
President Nixon intervened swiftly. The rationale for this intervention was that the US 
required not only a powerful NATO, but also access to Portugal‟s strategic base in the 
Azores.63   
 
While NSSM 39 may have spelt a certain doom for liberation organisations, there was no 
specific reference to such movements. But given these policy directions, scholars did not 
require further evidential support to gauge attitudes towards such organisations. The 
writing was clearly on the wall. But such evidence does exist and came in the form of two 
events that occurred during the Nixon Presidency. One was an article in the New York 
Times, and dated 2 April 1972 and the other was the visit of the US Secretary of State, 
William Roger to the African continent in February 1970.     
 
Southern Africa and its problems were of secondary importance to the Nixon 
administration and the latter was also loathe to become involved with liberation 
                                                 
60 Alexander Haigh was the National Security Council Aide to President Nixon. 
61 Danaher. Political Economy of US Policy. 93. 
62 The „new‟ foreign policy initiatives were launched and formalised through the signing of this document 
by then President Nixon in February 1970, ten years after Sharpeville and the banning of the African 
National Congress. This document also included other more specific guidelines which included amongst 
others the realization of the arms embargo to SA and the relaxation of the arms embargo to Portugal. See 
Danaher. Political Economy of US Policy. 93.  See also Magubane. “South Africa-USA Relations.” 11.   
63 In return for such access, Nixon signed an executive agreement that made available to that country a 
loan of $436 million which assisted Portugal with covering the costs of its colonial wars in Africa. In 
1972, Nixon authorised the sale of military transport vehicles to Portugal, followed by further loans for 
the purchase of helicopters needed for use against liberation movements in its colonies. As a result 
Portugal became the only NATO ally to allow US aircraft en route to Israel during the Yom Kippur war 
to refuel in its territories. See Magubane. 







organisations of the region,   This was communicated in evidence alluded to earlier on in 
relation to the New York Times  article. A Mr. Terence Smith, about which I was unable to 
get further information, alerted readers to a secret debate within the Nixon 
administration, where the Defence Department indicated the need to treat the apartheid 
state as any sovereign friendly nation, without any regard for her internal policies. But the 
National Security Council favoured a partial relationship towards South Africa combined 
with milder language at the UN and elsewhere. As seen from the NSSM, the latter course 
was already agreed upon. Mr. Smith went on to report that Nixon and his advisors 
reached agreement that since the USA was involved in Indo-China and elsewhere, it 
could not take on the problem of Southern Africa and its organisations.64 
 
The second piece of evidence comes from the then Secretary of State, William Roger‟s 
African tour, during which he seductively referred to the “unfinished business of 
liberation” and of his administration‟s „depth of feeling” of the crises facing the African 
continent. Yet during his visit to the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa, it was reported 
that he refused to even discuss the Southern African problem. In a statement to 
American ambassadors, he clearly emphasized that the USA will “not become involved 
with liberation movements” and that the Southern African problem could only be 
resolved through a programme of “peaceful change.” This statement supports initial 
conclusion relating to the challenge of locating primary material on the USA‟s stance on 
liberation movements. There was only one stance and that was one of non-involvement 
with freedom movements on the African continent. Roger proceeded to point out that 
the African continent “should be removed from the cockpit of international competition 
between the great powers.” For this purpose, it was important for the US to secure 
agreements with other major powers involved on the continent on the premise that the 
situation in Africa, and more specifically in Southern Africa, could best be served in this 
way. This visit was well documented by the ANC‟s publication, Sechaba, which provided a 
party analysis of the tour and of Nixon‟s foreign policy speech.65  
 
Sechaba also provided an official ANC reaction to these developments. The movement 
perceived such understandings and agreements as being part of the US strategy to ensure 
that “the liberation movements would disappear for want of international support and 
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assistance” and that vital states such as Tanzania and Zambia would “lose interest and 
become inward looking…and reach accommodations with the apartheid states.” Their 
interpretation of this inter-connected set of approaches and policies- which involved 
opposition to the liberation movements, peaceful change, “withdrawing Africa from the 
strategic battleground of the cold war” and conditional economic aid-as a means of 
“safeguarding southern Africa as a critical base area for international imperialism in the 
African continent.”66 Little wonder then that the Vorster and Smith regimes welcomed 
the Nixon initiatives and Roger‟s pronouncements as “realistic” and “refreshing.”67 
 
The African National Congress faced the daunting realization that any attempt to 
establish a relationship with, and seek assistance from the US, was grim. All evidence 
pointed to the commitment of the Nixon administration to assisting the South African 
state to entrench its powers and privileges. In its analysis of the Nixon policy, the New 
York Times declared that  the effect of such policy would be “…to treat the stability of 
Southern Africa as a strategic interest of the United States which in effect will call for 
more explicit collaboration with the Southern African regime in the military and political 
fields.”68 The lessons learned from the Nixon administration were indeed harsh for those 
involved in the cause for South African freedom. As it was by now inarguable that that 
collaboration between South Africa and this administration was strengthened.   
 
 
The Role of Henry Kissinger 
The situation was worsened in 1973 when Henry Kissinger assumed the position of 
Secretary of State. Danaher pointed out that as Secretary of State only one ambassador 
from the African continent was allowed access to Kissinger-Johan Botha of South Africa. 
Even the head of the South African intelligence agency, Hendrik van der Bergh visited 
Washington often and maintained close ties with George Bush who was Head of the 
CIA at the time.69 Such engagements set the tone for future interactions with Pretoria 
during the Kissinger era. 
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As argued earlier on, the domestic crisis and related events such as Sharpeville in South 
Africa did not influence any change in Washington‟s policy towards South Africa and the 
ANC. Three  years later, when in June 1976 the Soweto uprising shook the apartheid 
state, Kissinger‟s name continued to dominate the areas of USA foreign policy and the 
African continent. This in itself provided the answer to any question one may ask 
regarding changing USA foreign policies. Since the uprising captured the international 
spotlight and focused significant attention on the plight of South Africa‟s majority, the 
ANC though unprepared for this event, appeared encouraged and hopeful of a change in 
the international climate in so far as support for its activities were concerned. But in the 
case of the USA, this was not to be. At about this time the USA was close to undergoing 
a drastic change in leadership as the country prepared for the Presidential election of that 
year. But before the current administration under Gerald Ford left office, US policy 
remained consistent for as Danaher reminded us that it was Kissinger who “really called 
the shots on foreign policy.” Further he pointed out that while Ford was in command, it 
was “Kissinger who personified US policymaking.”70 A former member of Kissinger‟s 
National Security Council provided a good summation of this perception by explaining 
that since Ford entered the Presidency being “unprepared”, “unknown” and inheriting 
“the most corrupt administration in memory”, he  found Kissinger indispensable in 
appearance and fact.”71 
 
With the collapse of Portuguese Colonialism, the USA‟s attention to Southern Africa was 
certainly heightened, resulting in greater internal conflict within the Ford administration. 
While this conflict provided evidence of a US policy move slightly to the left, the basic 
objectives of US policy remained the same.72 Using the strategy of “shuttle diplomacy” 
for much of 1976, Kissinger travelled around the Southern African region in an attempt 
to persuade presidents of the Frontline States to coerce Zimbabwean liberation 
movements to the conference table. Simultaneously he persuaded Vorster to do the same 
with Ian Smith.73  
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That he was holding meetings, as Secretary of State, with John Vorster, the leader of the 
apartheid state was indeed a major concession to Pretoria. Scholars have viewed these 
meetings as a break with US policy which discouraged public contacts with South 
African leaders. In June 1976, Kissinger, during an address to the US House 
International Committee, vehemently rejected allegations of his having made any 
promises to Vorster. Yet it was later discovered that he in fact did make many positive 
overtures to Vorster in return for the latter‟s cooperation on Rhodesia.74 
 
Again it was Sechaba that furnished confirmation of the ANC‟s reactions and views of 
developments arising out of Kissinger‟s “shuttle diplomacy.” The ANC appeared 
disconcerted and labelled his methods “dangerous” for two reasons. Firstly, then 
Secretary General Alfred Nzo claimed that the purpose of US diplomacy was to “cut the 
umbilical cord” linking the liberation movements to “the world socialist system” 
especially the Soviet Union and Cuba.75 Secondly Nzo made the claim that the kind of 
policy result that the US envisaged for Africa was “neo-colonialist” and “pro-imperialist” 
because its objective was to safeguard western economic and strategic interests.” I 
believe that this was obvious not only to the ANC but to any international observer of 
USA foreign policy. Nzo went further to call on progressive support groups to build 
powerful lobbies to oppose the growing economic collaboration between South Africa 
and the governmental structures of Britain, the US, France, West Germany and Japan 
and to secure the international isolation of the apartheid state.76 The extent to which 
Nzo‟s call was heeded will be explored in the Chapter V. 
 
On the domestic realm Kissinger‟s African policy received much criticism from the 
Conservatives in Washington. Moreover since that was an election year, the Ford 
administration was concerned about the challenge from such Conservatives. It was 
alleged that Ronald Reagan‟s victory in the Texas primary was assisted by the Secretary of 
State‟s trip to southern Africa and his efforts to secure majority rule for Rhodesia. 
                                                                                                                                            
be protected. This strategy could also curtail future demands of radical groups in Namibia and South 
Africa and also stop the spread of the Soviet influence in Southern Africa. 
74 He invited the South African navy to send a frigate to the US as part of the country‟s bicentennial 
celebrations; he offered US sponsorship and training of a Namibian military force in return for 
cooperation on transfer of power in Namibia; the granting, in 1976-1977 by the International Monetary 
Fund of credits to the value of $464 million to South Africa.   
75 Sechaba. First Quarter. 1978, “New Phase of Struggle in South Africa”. 
76 Sechaba. First Quarter. 1978. 







Kissinger also sought the support of the African-American community for his southern 
Africa initiatives.77 There is no evidence to indicate that Kissinger was successful in 
gaining African-American support for his policies or for that matter, for the Ford 
administration. Instead one finds that Jimmy Carter gained 90% of the black vote in the 
1976 election. In regard to the Rhodesian conflict, Kissinger failed to bring the conflict 
to its conclusion. This had been attributed to his failure to understand African Affairs.78 
From a more objective position, I would contend that he was merely maintaining the 
consistence of his predecessor when it came to African Affairs. The African continent 
never featured prominently in Washington. Given US interest in maintaining corporate 
and security interests, the US government remained wedded to the white minorities in 
the region. Granted that officials in Washington verbally attacked the racial policies of 
the apartheid state, they nevertheless maintained their friendly ties with the white 




Concluding this Chapter has been simple. The examination of policy of the US 
administrations from Kennedy to Nixon towards the ANC has yielded the following 
conclusion; that state policy was consistent. In spite of the usual rhetoric, the trend was 
cooperation with the apartheid state and zero contact with liberation organisations such 
as the ANC, and as such, the whole period appeared bleak for the ANC. In official 
circles it was apparent that the ANC remained largely unknown and its work 
unrecognised. That this was a deliberate ploy on the part of policy makers was clear. This 
allows me to conclude that the ANC‟s attempts to build a relationship with the western 
alliance‟s leading power during this period was made more complex by global 
developments such as the Cold War, by documents such as NSSM 39 and by the role of 
individuals such as Henry Kissinger.  These indicate the inter-dependence of 
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relationships, political dynamics, economic and strategic considerations and international 
events. An analysis of these factors allows me to conclude that in its attempts to develop 
a relationship with the ANC, the African national Congress found itself at the mercy of 
so many different forces.  
 
It paves the way for the next chapter which focuses on the African dynamics and their 
impact on the ANC‟s attempts to forge ahead uninterruptedly in its relationship-building 
initiatives. It also helps us understand why the ANC persevered and succeeded in these 
attempts, in spite of the support provided by the American administrations to the 
apartheid state. This understanding opens the door for the forthcoming argument that 
the decision to keep the lines of communication with Washington open was a strategic 
one, with the hope of securing a break or a foot in the door. This did come in 1987 and 
will be explored in Chapter Four. 








C h a p t e r  T h r e e  
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In this chapter, my focus moves to another continent to demonstrate how events in that part of the world 
further complicated the work of South Africa’s premier liberation movement. The intention in looking at 
developments on the African continent between the 1960s and 1970s will be to show that these made it 
imperative for the ANC to pursue links with a hostile yet powerful United States of America. These 
developments coincided with the US administrations of Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon and Gerald 
R. Ford. Challenges presented on the African continent exacerbated the organisation’s attempts to advance 
the liberation struggle and the isolation of the apartheid state. What this confirmed is that like other 
international developments such as the Cold War, African developments also impacted on the ANC’s 
diplomatic efforts in the USA. The triangular relationship between the USA, Africa and the ANC 
therefore occupies centre stage in this Chapter. What is also important is how the ANC reacted to what could 
be seen as African betrayal. What added to this disappointed was the eagerness of Francophone African 
states in developing diplomatic initiatives with Pretoria.1  In this regard I would argue that the ANC’s 
reactions and guarded responses set the trend for a post apartheid African policy which would see silence, quiet 
diplomacy and lack of criticism as the order of the day. This was clearly reflected in ANC historiography of 
the period. Such silences were offset by the realities presented by interviews of key ANC individuals. This 
issue strengthens my views on the relevance of memory construction and the archive as raised in my 
introductory Chapter. I will also show that the ANC had no influence on African diplomacy-resulting in a 
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 The President of the Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny established a grouping of countries interested in 
„dialogue‟ with Vorster.  These included the Central African Republic, Benin, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Swaziland and Upper Volta.  The ANC tried to rationalise Francophone African 
states‟ enthusiasm for Vorster‟s dialogue initiatives by questioning whether French Imperialism was behind this.  
After all these states had close relations with France.  See Sechaba. January 1971. 2, 3.   







long and lengthy battle with the African states until 1990. My arguments will be strengthened by focusing on 
South Africa’s new outward looking policy for the region and the African responses to this. These responses 
were derived through the many regional meetings that took place between1969-1975. This would also 
necessitate looking at what US involvement was in this region at this time. While the Chapter examines 
regional dynamics largely for the 1960s -1970s, it briefly touches on the developments in the 1980s such as 
the Nkomati Accord as a strategy to demonstrate that winning the battle for the African Soul was still 




    
 
This Chapter was written at first in 2002 which was a fortuitous time for the Southern 
African region. It was a time of many regional shifts which had arisen as a result of a 
triangular relationship that played a significant role in foreseen and unforeseen events such 
as the death of the Washington-backed Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA rebel leader, on 22 
February, the Zimbabwean elections in March and the Inter- Congolese Dialogue, which 
began in South Africa on 26 February 2002. This chapter was completed in 2008-a year 
which witnessed the shameful episode of xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Given the 
public and international outrage caused by these events and the accusations of how well 
South Africans were treated by countries whose citizens became the victims of these attacks, 
makes the position I have taken in this Chapter, all the more complicated.   
 
The period and events I will be reviewing in this Chapter for the 1960s and 1970s are also 
indicative of what the repercussions of the triangular relationship between the ANC, USA 
and Africa, have been. These included the regional shifts for Southern Africa, which 
impacted on the attempts of the ANC to establish itself in the international arena by 
securing a relationship with the USA. By looking at these shifts which demonstrated the 
ANC‟s failure to influence the direction of African diplomatic policy, I argue that these made 
it imperative for the ANC to pursue a relationship with one of the major players in the globe  







as a means of ensuring its survival and of achieving its goals of forging ahead with its 
struggle for a democratic South Africa. This happened even though the USA was by 1975 
involved in covert activity on the African continent. In advancing this argument, I find 
myself inclined to support the views of scholars such as Roger Pfister and Scott Thomas 
who presented evidence to strengthen the view that prior to 1990, the ANC struggled to 
secure support from and the assistance of the African states.2 But while Pfister argues that 
the situation improved in the 1980s I would present evidence to the contrary, instead 
demonstrating that the situation only showed signs of improving by 1989.3 
 
 
South Africa’s activity in the Southern African Region 
The key protagonist of the regional shifts was the apartheid state which had a new leader at 
its helm. John Vorster, its new Prime Minster implemented his new and dangerous strategy 
for the region when he assumed his new position in January 1967. To counter the effects of 
international isolation, Vorster, embarked on a new „outward policy‟ towards African states.4 
This radical departure in foreign policy was to pose a serious challenge to the ANC and 
other liberation movements in the region. But while Vorster‟s policy may have created 
enormous problems for the ANC in its work on the African continent, the 1960s proved 
challenging enough for the movement. With the formation of the Organisation of African 
Unity(OAU) in 1963, came much hope for the ANC.5 But for the new organization, with its 
formation it faced competing attempts by the different liberation movements such as the 
ANC and PAC to secure its favour and support. Given the ideological and political 
differences between the two movements,  the PAC‟s policies of black nationalism found 
appeal on the continent, rather than the non-racialism of the ANC. Evidence for this 
conclusion came from Nelson Mandela himself who experienced this directly during his 
African tour when he found his movement coming under intense criticism from African 
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play a vital role in the negotiations in South Africa. 
4 It was expected that this policy would help normalise South Africa‟s relations with African countries. 
5 The 1960s were marked by a wave of independence washing over the continent, with 30 African countries 
gaining their independence within the decade. All this and the formation of the OAU created a climate of 
optimism for the ANC. Even the travels of Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela in 1960-1961 through to 
many African countries created such optimism for the movement. .  







countries for their non-racial policy, thus causing him to lament the fact that “in the rest of 
Africa most African leaders could understand the views of the PAC better than those of the 
ANC.”6  
 
What is significant about Vorster‟s policy was that it was to test the strength of ANC-OAU 
relations and ANC-African relations. The fact that Vorster considered it necessary to 
implement this policy is evidence that the international efforts at isolating South Africa were 
taking root. A few years later in September 1970, the goals of Vorster‟s  „outward policy‟ 
became clear when he explained the enthusiasm of the apartheid state to form „non-
aggression‟ pacts with African states on the „basis of mutual goodwill and neighbourliness.‟7 
Throughout the 1970s these goals manifested themselves in other new initiatives launched 
by Vorster after the Portuguese coup of 1974 -the policies of dialogue and détente.8 Again 
while these efforts serve to indicate that South Africa was under immense pressure, the ANC 
did not see it this way. For them these efforts meant that their attempts to isolate South 
Africa were heading for failure. 
 
A study of ANC coverage of regional developments drawn from the organisation‟s official 
publication, Sechaba, clearly strengthens my view. For example, the then ANC‟s Director of 
Political Affairs, Duma Nokwe reacted to this alarming development by comparing Vorster‟s 
new policy to “a spider‟s web carefully and systematically spun to ensnare weak African 
governments like flies, into the influence and control of the racists and imperialists.”9 This 
reaction was not exaggerated given the fact that the first African leader to respond to 
Vorster‟s new initiatives was Chief Lebua Jonathan from Lesotho, who visited South Africa 
in 1967. In fact the ANC went so far as to express disappointment and contempt for 
Lesotho by accusing the latter of humiliating the African continent by going “cap in hand to 
beg for crumbs from the aggressor‟s table.”10 The ANC‟s dilemma worsened when in May of 
the same year, Malawi‟s President Hastings Banda visited South Africa and a day before the 
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9 Sechaba. Vol. 5. No. 6, 1971. 
10 Quoted in the ANC‟s Weekly News Digest, Spotlight on South Africa.  (17 February 1967). 7. 







OAU summit began in Kinshasa, diplomatic relations between these two countries were 
established. Relations between South Africa and Malawi began in 1966, when a secret loan 
was granted for different projects.11 Nokwe again reacted by sending out a futile and 
ineffective warning to others planning to follow in Banda‟s footsteps by cautioning those 
“who are going to frogmarch to Pretoria,” following Malawi, “to wine and dine with the 




Between May 1967 and April 1975 a number of meetings took place on the African 
continent in order to deal with challenges and threats. While the ANC may have hoped that 
such meetings would have helped advance the cause of the liberation struggle, this was not 
to be the case further affirming my argument that they failed to exercise any significant 
influence on African foreign policy during this time, making it all the more important to get 
the support of the more powerful Western players. What is also significant is that the ANC 
failed to secure the support of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).13 While the 
movement continued in the post apartheid era to hark back to the unstinting support given 
by African countries and organizations such as the OAU, evidence has supported another 
view which showcases a relationship dominated by years of disagreements and 
subordination.14 While the ANC was reluctant to openly demonstrate its unhappiness with 
OAU policy, it had to face the reality that African diplomacy including that of the OAU 
appeared deaf to the needs of African liberations movements such as the ANC and 
nonchalant about the apartheid state‟s activities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead it devoted its 
attention to what it considered to be more priority issues such as the problems in Uganda, 
Egypt, the Nigerian civil war, Chad and Western Sahara. That the ANC could not hold back 
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its frustration was clear when Tambo criticized the OAU for prioritising these other conflicts 
while it paid no attention to the “real conflicts” in Southern Africa.15    
 
At the OAU Summit in 1967, the ANC suffered its first setback because the OAU was slow 
to respond to the Malawi and Lesotho actions. This was attributed to the Summit‟s concern 
with the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war and with the problems of the Liberation 
Committee, rather than with the breach of South Africa‟s isolation.16 
 
But it was at the fifth summit conference of the Eastern and Central African states in Lusaka 
in April 1969 where the impact of Vorster‟s foreign policy was acknowledged and challenged 
by thirteen countries, that the shortcomings of ANC influence on African diplomacy was 
discerned. At this conference a strategy document entitled the “Lusaka Manifesto on Southern 
Africa” was produced.17 What was important about this document was that again it illustrated 
how ineffective the ANC was in influencing African policy. Although the Manifesto was 
objectionable to the ANC and to its strategies, it was still adopted as official OAU policy. 
The ANC had three main objections against this document. Firstly, as the movement was 
involved in renewed attempts at armed struggle, such as the Wankie Campaign, the 
Manifesto made reference to the importance of “peaceful change.” Secondly, the document 
undermined the ANC view that the apartheid state was an illegitimate one. Thirdly, the 
Lusaka Manifesto separated the struggles of South Africa from those of Rhodesia and 
Namibia.18 Although the latter objection went against ANC military and diplomatic strategy, 
this policy was endorsed by the frontline states and the OAU. 
 
The signatories of this manifesto endorsed the aim of a liberated Southern Africa. However, 
much to the horror of the ANC, they went further to suggest their willingness to establish 
relations with colonial and racist governments. Liberation movements were encouraged to 
„desist from armed struggle‟ if those governments provided their acceptance of the „principle 
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17 ANC Archives. Luthuli House. Records of the Zambian Mission. Pamphlet Collection. Box file 21.  
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of human equality.”19 The African Communist described the Lusaka Manifesto as “insufferably 
patronizing and even arrogant.20 It was not surprising to find that the chief protagonist of 
this document was President Banda of Malawi who used this document to justify his 
collaboration with the racist regime. That the tone of the document was unusually moderate 
was clear. It pursued the point that preference should be given to „negotiation‟ rather than 
destruction and murder. It urged „our brothers‟ in the resistance movements to use peaceful 
methods of struggle, even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change.21   
 
Even at the Addis Ababa summit in September 1970, the conference appeared reluctant to 
endorse any firm action towards South Africa. Instead, it endorsed the Lusaka Manifesto, 
thus alarming the ANC even more. In regard to the issue of arms sales to South Africa by 
NATO countries, there was no consensus on the matter of condemning these arm sales. 
From interviews undertaken with ANC cadres, it was clear that the movement felt strongly 
about the Lusaka Manifesto. They admitted, though reluctantly, that many in the movement 
felt betrayed by the document.22 Yet the ANC did nothing to voice its protest against the 
terms of the Manifesto. In public, the ANC remained accepting of the terms. Even Sechaba, 
which regularly reported on African conferences, remained quiet on the Lusaka meeting.23 
  
Three year later the ANC failed to get any closer to its goal of isolating the apartheid state 
while at the same time the goals of Vorster‟s „outward policy‟ became clear when he 
explained the enthusiasm of the apartheid state to form „non aggression‟ pacts with African 
states on the “basis of mutual goodwill and neighbourliness.”24 Throughout the 1970s these 
goals manifested themselves in the policies of dialogue and détente.25 This was apparent after 
the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Madagascar, Gabon, Lesotho, Swaziland, Upper Volta, Niger, 
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Mauritius, Dahomay, Togo, Gabon and Malagasy-all expressed interests in either visiting 
with or entering into dialogue with South Africa. What did „dialogue‟ offer? According to 
Nelson this proposal “offered trade, tourism, investment capital and developmental loans to 
African states which would, in effect, pledge to curtail their opposition to apartheid.”26 For 
the Rev. Kenneth Carstens, „dialogue‟ was intended to open up new markets for South 
African goods.27 
 
Again it was the ANC that suffered the effects of these initiatives and their influence on 
certain African states:  That this was a shock to the movement was apparent. In an article in 
Sechaba of January 1971, the ANC made this obvious. 
 
….from our point of view even more dangerous, are the reported urging by the leaders of 
the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana and Madagascar for negotiations with the Vorster regime. 
What a slap in the face this is for those men of vision who held such high hopes in the 
sixties for the total liberation of the African continent….Our movement badly needs friends, 
particularly in Africa where lies not only our political base but also our African identity….28 
 
But in all fairness to the African states the concern over the issue of „dialogue‟ did raise 
concern to the extent that it dominated the seventeenth session of the Council of Ministers 
meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1971. In order to generate productive debates on this issue, 
liberations movements such as the ANC, PAC and SWAPO (South West Africa Peoples 
Organisation), were encouraged to make opening statements. For the ANC, the issue of 
„dialogue‟ represented “part of a carefully coordinated strategy to gain economic openings, 
undermine African unity, and cut off support for the liberation governments.”29 As a result 
of such representations, the meeting in Addis turned down prospects of any dialogue with 
that country. In spite of these decisions and resolutions, the Presidents of Malawi and the 
Ivory Coast proceeded with their visits to South Africa. In fact Banda, after his visit, 
brazenly chided the ANC and PAC for “blatantly spreading untruths about South Africa 
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overseas.”30 There was no doubt that the justification for such African responses could be 
traced to the need for economic assistance from the apartheid state. 
   
But by the time of the Seventh Summit conference of East and Central African States met in 
Mogadishu in October 1971, the ANC experienced a brief spurt of optimism as the states 
adopted a harsh stance towards those countries that took advantage of Vorster‟s new 
initiatives in foreign policy. This „dialogue group‟, as they came to be known, included the 
Ivory Coast, Malawi, Madagascar, Uganda and Ghana. Given their firm commitment to the 
cause of Liberation, Presidents Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, 
led the delegates in issuing the Mogadishu Declaration, which stated that there was “no way 
left to the liberation of Southern Africa except armed struggle.”31 Perhaps the greatest 
significance of this meeting was its granting of observer status, for all future meetings, to 
liberation movements such as the ANC and PAC. 
 
Given the nature of the terms of the Lusaka Manifesto, it would appear that the resolutions 
adopted at Mogadishu provided the ANC with a certain degree of optimism in its attempts 
to secure the support of the region. This positive mood could be contrasted with the somber 
moods generated by the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto. Then Secretary-General Alfred 
Nzo was so encouraged that he described the declaration as a „revolutionary document,” 
expecting it to lead to more support, in different forms, for the liberation movements. Since 
the OAU Summit had officially rejected „dialogue,‟ Nzo argued that the OAU represented a 
threat to South Africa and its allies who had embarked on a ruthless campaign to crush the 
organization. The Mogadishu Declaration was viewed by many, including the liberation 
organizations, as a sign of the continent‟s commitment to end colonialism and imperialism.32 
By the time of the Rabat Summit in June 1972, much to the delight of the ANC, the issue of 
„dialogue‟ as a threat had faded from the discussions, to be replaced by the importance of 
liberation. For the South African Prime Minister, new strategies had to be devised to 
consolidate his country‟s position in the region. 
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While this situation unfolded, the twenty-forth session of the African Liberation Committee 
took place in Dar es Salaam in January 1975. A highlight of the meeting was the production 
of another major policy document entitled „The African Strategy in Southern Africa.‟ Yet 
again this was another document which caused the ANC‟s optimism to be a short lived 
phenomenon. For Scott has argued that there were many similarities between this document 
and the „Lusaka Manifesto.‟33 Like the manifesto, the strategy encapsulated in this document 
separated the Rhodesian and Namibian struggles from the South African struggle. Much to 
the dismay of the ANC, it went further to prioritise those struggles as was done previously. 
 
The Front Line States (FLS) such as Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia supported this 
document and even worse, the OAU later provided its endorsement.34  The role of the 
former in relation to the ANC‟s struggle on the continent finds application in this 
interrogation of African dynamics. According to Abillah Harrid Omari, who conducted a 
thorough investigation of the rise and decline of the FLS, “the formation of this alliance in 
the mid-1970s represented one of the most important developments in contemporary 
Southern Africa.” Yet he also acknowledged that while the alliance demonstrated its 
commitment to liberation movements such as the ANC through its opposition to apartheid, 
its actions and views remained in line with those of other “regional groupings”.35 Hence its 
support of documents such as „The African Strategy in Southern Africa.‟ Although the FLS 
was not only a product of the conflict which riddled the region, and also of the South Africa 
regional initiatives such as „détente‟, it lacked the military capacity to match the apartheid 
state‟s aggressive might.  Hence while the formation of the FLS may have been viewed as an 
encouraging development for liberation organisations such as the ANC, its subsequent 
actions and relationships added further constraints to the movement‟s efforts in the region.     
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It was apparent to the ANC that what was needed was a new strategy. For this purpose and 
in preparation for the OAU‟a ministerial session to be held in April, a meeting   of the 
ANC‟s Revolutionary Council and the National Executive Committee took place in March 
1975 in Morogoro. A study of Tambo‟s Presidential address to the meeting makes some 
interesting revelations. In his address, a very demoralised Tambo lamented the poor 
performance of the ANC. He made reference to the ANC past failures and made a candid 
reference to the organisation‟s poor management. His perception that the movement was 
perhaps still “ill managed, poorly directed and badly led” was not far off the mark. While the 
mood was no different from the Morogoro Conference of 1969, this meeting I would argue, 
was an important gathering aimed at plotting the future course. Responding to the new 
developments in the Southern African region, Tambo emphasised the importance of 
“restating the objectives” of the struggle. Hence he viewed the forthcoming OAU meeting 
as one “not about détente,” but about the “future of Africa.”36  
 
It was also the ANC view that since the Portuguese coup had altered the balance of power in 
Africa, the USA together with other Western powers, South Africa and its allies, had 
adopted a „counter-revolutionary offensive.‟ To neutralise South Africa‟s diplomatic 
initiatives in Africa, it recognised the need for a dual pronged approach. Action was needed 
from international organisations such as the UN and OAU and through the solidarity of the 
international anti-apartheid network.37 Again, the ANC saw its salvation in the international 
realm. 
 
When the ministerial session of OAU ministers began in Dar es Salaam in April 1975, the 
ANC delegation was lead by Oliver Tambo and included Josiah Jele, who was the then Head 
of the Department of International Affairs, Johnny Makatini, the ANC Chief Representative 
from Algeria, Florence Moposho, from the Woman‟s department, Alfred Nzo, Secretary-
General and Moses Mabhida, then a member of the National Executive. The meeting was 
opened by Julius Nyerere who made a strong plea for South Africa‟s isolation, pointing out 
that the meeting was “not about so-called dialogue or detent with South Africa,” but about 
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“the liberation of Southern Africa.”38 While the ANC appeared to be placated by this 
declaration which focused on the movement‟s main foreign policy objective of isolating 
South Africa, it failed to exercise influence on the OAU in other areas. There were three 
such areas. The first related to the priority accorded to the Namibian and Rhodesian 
struggles; the second related to the talks between Vorster and Front Line States which the 
ANC perceived as a blatant „betrayal of African interests‟; the third related to the ANC‟s 
dissatisfaction with paragraph 20 of the Lusaka Manifesto, which made reference to South 
Africa as a sovereign State. In spite of these concerns and arguments put forward, the ANC 
failed to influence the OAU which continued to give its support to the Liberation 
Committee‟s Dar es Salam Declaration which prioritised the struggles of Namibia and 
Rhodesia. 
 
Again it was the Rhodesian struggle that dominated events in the region after this meeting. 
In August 1975 the talks between Ian Smith and the liberation movements collapsed. This 
led to a meeting of the Frontline States in Quelimane, Mozambique in February of the next 
year during which they acknowledged the failure of attempts to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement of the Rhodesian dilemma. In view of the recognition of the need for a far more 
effective strategic initiative, it was unanimously agreed to support armed struggle. 
 
The meeting, while not recognized by historians as vital, had enormous international 
repercussions especially in the US, where it was widely believed that if there was any 
escalation in the conflict, the role of the Soviet Union would be amplified.39 It was vital for 
the United States to intervene in ensuring that a peaceful settlement was implemented. 
 
These changes in the Southern African region had far reaching implications for USA foreign 
policy. In fact, Scott has argued that these changes in the region, which followed the 
.Portuguese coup as well as the Soviet and Cuban involvements in Angola and Cuba, led to a 
“complete reorientation of American foreign policy in the region.”40 It was not surprising 
then for the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger to begin his African tour in April 1976. 
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After meeting with Nyerere in Dar es Salaam and with Kaunda in Lusaka, he announced his 
country‟s full support for majority rule.  
 
 
USA’s Responses to Regional Shifts in Africa 
But what begs scrutiny here is how interested was the USA in Africa. While I briefly alluded 
to USA‟s policies towards Africa, especially sub Saharan Africa in the previous chapter, it 
becomes important to examine the US state‟s involvement and responses if any, to these 
regional shifts in the 1970s. Did any of this impact in the ANC‟s attempts to develop a 
relationship with that country. Piero Gleijeses in his compelling study, entitled Conflicting 
Missions:  Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-1976, drew the spotlight on Cuban involvement 
in Africa from 1959-1976 and of the former‟s clash with the USA. In so doing he furnished 
us with a lucid view of how the USA viewed the African continent and African 
developments. Using newly released documents obtained through the Freedom of 
Information Act, Gleijeses was able to successfully argue that the USA lied about its 
relationship with the South African state and about events which were to lead to years of 
chaos and civil war in southern Africa.41 
 
Up to 1974, senior US officials were hardly interested in sub-saharan Africa and as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, US administrations all leaned towards the White 
regimes in Africa although they did try to avoid openly antagonizing African governments. 
This was until the Cubans landed in Angola. Comments by US officials of the period clearly 
justify my view that there was no real interest in the continent at this point. Larry Devlin was 
of the opinion that top US officials “weren‟t really interested in Africa.”42 In fact Gleijeses 
argued that the lack of interest in Africa “by the US Congress was legendry,” thus clearly 
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affirming my arguments from the previous Chapter. Using the case of the appointment of 
Chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittees, he pointed out that “Africa was the 
booby prize.” John Kennedy accepted the job of the first chair in May 1959 on the 
agreement that he would not have to hold any meetings.43 When Kennedy in his second term 
as Senator, was approached to Chair the Committee, he asked, “How often does it have to 
meet?” The response from Carl Macy, the committee‟s Chief of Staff was as follows. “As 
often as you want” to which Kennedy further enquired “and suppose I never want it to 
meet.” Marcy replied “then it never meets.” And so it was that Kennedy agreed to accept the 
Chairmanship of the Committee that met only once under him.”44 
 
So unless they faced a threat from communism, US administrations were not inclined to care 
about the continent or about freedom movements such as the ANC.45 The only two Cold 
War crisis the US faced in this respect between 1959 and 1975 were those in the Zaire and 
Angola.46  Also when the USA considered any Communist threat in the world, it looked for  
Chinese or Russian involvement. But in Africa it faced Havana both in Zaire and in Angola. 
There is no evidence to support a view that when the USA took the decision to become 
involved in Angola, it perceived any Soviet threat there. Perhaps it saw Angola as the 
opportunity to show the USA‟s might in the wake of the Vietnam disaster.47 
 
According to Gleijeses, who has documented the conflict in Angola so well, the Russians 
became involved in Angola “slowly and reluctantly.” In August of 1975, in spite of growing 
“external” support for the FNLA and UNITA, Russia rejected “Castro‟s proposal for the 
dispatch of Cuban troops.” Confronted by the evidence he concluded that until mid-
October 1975 the war remained largely a struggle among Angolans and the MPLA was 
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winning…then the real power grab began.”48 Briefly put the result was as follows, South 
African became an active participant in the conflict through Washington‟s goading. With the 
apartheid state invading Angola, Cuba‟s response was to send troops which proved 
catastrophic for the former which took on a hasty retreat causing further humiliation for the 
US administration. 
 
What all this demonstrated was that the USA has failed on its image recovery project and 
even worse that it was collaborating with the apartheid state in destabilizing sub-saharan 
Africa. Cuba became a factor of concern in USA policies. This was well articulated by Policy 
Planning Director Winston Lord who in early April of 1976 warned about the “ultimate 
nightmare” of “Soviet/Cuban intervention in Southern Africa with widespread African 
support.”49 Facing this possibility, Kissinger undertook his first official visit to Africa later 
that month believing that “If the Cubans are involved there, Namibia is next and after that 
South Africa itself.” Hence he shared with the National Security Council his intention to 
“identify with African aspiration.”50 And so it was that the USA‟s previous policy of non-
interest in the African continent had been reversed. But whether this would prove 
advantageous to the ANC and other liberation movements had still to be seen.  
 
 
Regional Challenges for the ANC 
In view of these developments and given the involvement of many major powers on the 
continent, for Vladimir Shubin it was clear that the African continent “was in a state of 
flux”, and this spelt further doom for the ANC and its attempts to establish itself 
internationally as well as isolating South Africa.51 While the ANC was desperately trying to 
establish foreign relations with, and seek the support and attention of the countries like the 
USA, it was experiencing no success even on the African continent. The effects of South  
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African initiatives such as „dialogue‟ were tragic for the liberation movements as relations 
between African countries and the apartheid state continued to grow. Even countries such as 
Tanzania and Zambia began to feel marginalized by these shifts in policy. 
 
This also probably explains the reasons why MK lost its capacity to operate from Zambia 
and Tanzania. In Zambia, where the ANC headquarters were located, President Kenneth 
Kaunda alluded to the “voice of reason for which Africa and the whole world were 
waiting.”52 However, the reality was that this African country began to feel the pressure 
exerted by Pretoria. Several attacks were made on Zambia by agents of the apartheid state. 
These included the parcel bomb explosion which killed the ANC Deputy Chief 
Representative, Adolfus Mvemve (John Dube). Many other activists, including Max Sisulu, 
were wounded and received treatment in a Moscow Hospital.53 Two issues were apparent- 
the future of the ANC in Zambia was unpredictable and the relationship between them 
appeared to be strained.   
 
In 1974, the ANC was instructed by the Zambian authorities not to undertake any attacks 
against South Africa from Zambian soil. The instruction went even further to request the 
ANC to cut back on its struggle-related activities. Shubin provided further examples to 
illustrate attempts by the Zambian authorities to curtail the work of the ANC in Lusaka. He 
makes reference to a meeting between Tambo and Kaunda that was cancelled at 30 minutes 
notice. The number of ANC officials at the African Liberation Centre in Lusaka, he pointed 
out, was scaled down to six people. Also, the right of the ANC Secretary-General to stay in 
Lusaka was restricted with the proviso that he remain in the country for not more than 90 
days per year. Radio Freedom broadcasts from Lusaka were suspended, ANC cadres were 
placed under surveillance by the Zambian security and there was a demand from the 
authorities for information regarding ANC members in Zambia.54 
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The changes the ANC underwent in its relations with Zambia actually indicate the kind of 
diplomacy that existed between the South African state and that African country leading up 
to and after its independence.55 For Shubin, the “contacts of the independent African states 
with Pretoria aimed at achieving a settlement in Zambia and Namibia were made at the 
expense of the ANC.56 So their  response to these developments were predictable as was 
illustrated at its Morogoro Executive Meeting where it protested at what it considered to be 
a “smokescreen of…peaceful solution talks..,‟ „development‟, „co-operation‟, „financial aid‟ 
and „détente‟” in an attempt to “strengthen its defences of the status quo” in South Africa”, 
while “recruiting allies from among our own anti-imperialist ranks and moving out in a 
determined bid to break up or sow confusion in the international solidarity movement.”57  
 
 All of this could also even explain the sudden decision to close the ANC camps in Tanzania, 
where some members of that country‟s leadership treated with suspicion the presence of 
non-Africans and communists within the ANC. This latter behaviour could also be 
attributed to the influence of China over Tanzania at this time. So it would appear that since 
no African country was prepared to house MK, the viable option lay in approaching its only 
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In July 1969 our headquarters received a notice requiring the ANC to vacate its military 
cadres from Kongwa Camp within a period of 14 days….The reason given for this 
unprecedented notice was that our cadres in Kongwa stayed so long that they had become a 
security risk to the country….58 
 
The Soviet Union seemed the natural option especially since they also harboured serious 
concerns about the Lusaka manifesto. At the United Nations, the Soviet Delegation argued 
that the time was not right for dialogue with the apartheid state. It went further to point out 
that that only way to destroy colonialism and racism was through “concrete and effective 
action.”59 
  
Given the urgency of the deadline, the MK contingent was transported by 18 Russian planes 
belonging to the Independent Red Banner Special Purpose Air Brigade, from Dr Es Salaam 
to Simferopol and elsewhere in the USSR. Although it was expected that they would stay in 
Russia for a short while, the situation dictated that they stay longer as there was no place to 
which to deploy them. In any event it was even more difficult for the Soviet Union, not only 
to accommodate them for a longer term than originally expected, but also to provide military 
training for the contingent of fighters. According to Shubin, it was JB Marks who was tasked 
with the difficult chore of convincing the political and military commissars in the USSR of 
the need to keep the cadres in the country for longer than expected. Due to his successful 
appeal, the cadres remained in the country until 1972 when the problem was resolved. 
Cadres were either admitted to Soviet Universities, schools or returned to Africa. Algeria 
offered assistance to the ANC and the attitude of the Tanzanian authorities underwent a 
significant change as well.60   
 
Through the preceding study of the developments on the African continent, together with 
the analysis of the effects of the Lusaka Manifesto, I have demonstrated the importance of the  
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need for developing new strategy such as the development of a relationship with the USA. 
The writing was clearly on the wall for the ANC. But on the basis of the evidence presented, 
it was apparent that the movement did persevere in this direction, in spite of the many 
obstacles in its path. 
 
 
Mozambique:  A Further Challenge 
In spite of the unending challenges which the ANC confronted on the African continent, it 
was undeniable that, as pointed out earlier in the discussion, the Portuguese coup in April 
1974 brought much hope to the ANC. For with the coup, came independence to Guinea 
Bisseau in September 1974, to Mozambique in June 1975 and to Angola in November 1975. 
It was clear that the balance of power in the region was undergoing a significant 
modification, much to the consternation of the South African State which perceived further 
threats to its security. The reaction came in the form of the new „détente‟ initiatives.‟61 
 
Even more heartening for the movement was the recognition that one of South Africa‟s 
neighbours was administered by a liberation movement. This perception was reinforced on 
25 June 1975, during the independence ceremony, when support for the ANC was expressed 
by Samora Machel and Frelimo. The ANC delegation to this ceremony, which was led by  
 
Oliver Tambo, was warmly welcomed by thousands of Mozambicans.62 Machel introduced 
Tambo as his “friend, comrade and brother in arms” and announced that: 
 
The Mozambican people and the People‟s Republic of Mozambique under the leadership of 
Frelimo will always assume their duty of solidarity with the interests of the South African 
masses and of all mankind, whatever difficulties they may face.63 
 
In spite of such optimism, after independence the ANC‟s relationship with the fledgling 
FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique) government faced problems leading to 
                                                 
61 All these initiatives have been covered in this chapter. 
62 The delegation also included Joe Modise and other NEC members. 
63 Sechaba. No. 8. 1975.23. 







an eventual break in relations after the signing of the Nkomati Accord between South Africa 
and Mozambique in 1984.64 The tension resulted from the pragmatic decision taken by 
FRELIMO not to anger a hostile and powerful South Africa bent on destroying those 
countries that refused to cooperate.65 As a result I would argue that the ANC‟s campaign to 
win the support of the African countries was still continuing well into the 1980s. In an 
interview, which Jim Casson of the American Committee on Africa undertook with the 
ANC‟s UN Representative, Johnny Makhatini, before he left to take up his new position in 
Lusaka, the latter outlined the priorities of the new position. He elaborated on the difficult 
task of “trying to consolidate our relations with African countries, especially key countries.” 
This interview also provided evidence that the French African countries and the Frontline 
States “privately don‟t want sanctions, though publicly they support them.”66 But none of 
these concerns were ever reflected in coverage such as those in official publications like 
Sechaba. 
 
Two months later, Casson pursued conversations with Makhatini on the related issue of the 
Nkomati Accord. From these conversations it was clear that the tensions between the ANC 
and Mozambique had increased exponentially. While Makhatini downplayed these tensions 
                                                 
64 Fearing what he considered being a “total onslaught” of communism; PW Botha sought a response which he 
launched in the form of a “total strategy” which resulted in him holding discussions with Samora Machel. The 
result of this was the Nkomati Accord, signed on 16 March 1984 and which saw both countries agreeing to 
prevent insurgent movements using their respective countries as bases for attacks on the other. While 
Mozambique agreed to expel the ANC, South Africa agreed to cease support of RENAMO. See C. 
Saunders(ed). Readers Digest Illustrated History of South Africa-The Real Story (Cape Town. Readers Digest, 
1989).   
65 While the apartheid state assured Mozambique of its support for an African administration, it issued the 
usual warning of repercussions of allowing insurgent movements to use that country to undertake attacks 
against SA. So Mozambique was really under pressure to be a cooperative neighbour, thus compelling Machel 
to discreetly  curtail the ANC‟s activities from the country in return for Pretoria‟s agreement to cease support 
of RENAMO, the other local resistance rebel group opposing FRELIMO. See The Economist. “Mozambique:  
Tit For Tat”. 27 June 1981. 39. 
66 Interview with Johnny Makhatini by Jim Casson of the American Committee on Africa. New York. January 
1984. Makatini was the Director of the Department of International Affairs for the ANC in Lusaka. Taking 
up a position in the ANC‟s office in Algeria in 1963, together with Robert Resha, he was responsible for 
elevating the movement‟s status in the Algerian region. In 1966 he became Resha‟s successor in Algeria and 
thereafter became well known in the circles of the OAU and UN. In view of his recognition in international 
circles, the ANC appointed him as its head of the ANC Mission to the UN. While there he developed 
relationships with representatives of foreign governments as well as with international organisations. But 
more importantly he developed a meaningful and special relationship with the thousands of US activists. 
After 1985 he was transferred to Lusaka  to devote his attention to the International Department. Sechaba. 
Vol. 22, No. 1 (January 1989). Copy of interview in possession of author, provided courtesy of Thomas Karis. 
See Folder 4.  







pointing out that while there had been “setbacks and victories in the past,” the ANC 
remained “committed to the close relations it had with Mozambique.” Yet in the same 
conversation he lamented the fact that the ANC had not been given the opportunity to 
advice or influence Mozambique on its decision to seek dependent longer term economic 
ties with South Africa. Evidence has pointed to this being a regular occurrence in the past on 
the part of other African states. For example, the ANC was invited to a meeting of the 
Frontline States in Luanda in April 1977. At the post summit press conference Tambo 
communicated the ANC‟s pleasure at being actually invited to the meeting, using this 
opportunity to voice the unhappiness of the ANC at being left out in the past. He went on 
to question Frontline strategy which saw even Vorster being involved in consultations 
whereas “leaders of the people he oppresses” were not involved in these discussion.67 This 
was a noteworthy observation. 
 
While Casson drew attention to the fact that in February of that year, the Lusaka Office of 
the ANC issued a statement of concern for being excluded from consultations or briefings 
of SA-Mozambique discussions, Makhatini explained that Tambo was eventually informed.  
But he explained that this happened only after the meeting had taken place between the 
South African delegation comprising of PW Botha, Magnus Malan and Louis Le Grange and 
Mozambique. All these developments, Makhatini admitted, would “make our campaign for 
the total isolation of the regime more difficult.”68 
 
What is interesting is how other organizations viewed Mozambique‟s actions. What I 
consider to be key evidence on the volatile dynamics that characterized the region during the 
1970s-180s can be found in publications such as Apdusa News. In its publication of May 
1984, it tried to justify Mozambique‟s actions by explaining that the latter was compelled to 
enter into this agreement with the apartheid state because she was not getting “the promised 
or expected economic and military from her „socialist allies,‟” and this meant “denying the 
ANC a base in Mozambique”. So it would appear that there was certainly a degree of  
                                                 
67 Sechaba. Fourth Quarter. 1977.  “ANC President Explains the Struggle.” 7-14. 
68 Interview by Jim Casson and Richard Knight of the American Committee on Africa with Makhatini. New 
York, 18 March 1984. Transcript in possession of author. Courtesy of Thomas Karis. Folder 4.  







disappointment with countries such as those in the Soviet Bloc, including the Soviet Union 
which was “its newly acquired ally” after Mozambique turned its back on “its principal ally, 
China.”69   
 
But perhaps the most enlightening evidence I have uncovered on Nkomati and its effects 
was an unsigned memorandum entitled „Some questions pertaining to the Frontline 
States/Liberation movements‟ discussion on the Strategy for the Liberation of South Africa‟, 
and dated 15 August 1984. According to Gail Gerhart, in whose possession this document 
found itself, the document was drafted by a committee which included Pallo Jordan, Sipho 
Makana, Mac Maharaj, and Thabo Mbeki-all of whom were tasked by Oliver Tambo to draft 
a memorandum for the Arusha meeting where the devastating effects of Nkomati were 
expected to merit intense scrutiny. 
 
The memo, which listed 43 points or questions for the NEC to ponder, carried with it a 
dispassionate yet pragmatic tone, lacking the usual struggle rhetoric that was evident in many 
internal ANC documents and literature. This meant that the ANC was seriously considering 
its strategic options as far back as 1984. Yet it was a vital piece of evidence that 
demonstrated what internal ANC thinking was about Nkomati.70 For Thabo Mbeki, events 
such as Nkomati justified the need for „self reliance‟, as “in the past we have overestimated 
the extent to which we could get outside support.” He went further to point to the “need to 
take a more realistic, objective position and know that we are to depend a great deal on our 
own ingenuity.”71  
 
Hence what emerged was that the ANC was suffering the devastating effects of the Accord. 
Many of the options considered undeniably lay outside the usual possibilities or strategies  
                                                 
69 See Apdusa News. Vol. 5. No. 2, May 1984. “What of the Nkomati Accord.” This journal was first published 
in 1984 and saw itself as the „watchdog „ of the majority of the oppressed. It was affiliated to the New Unity 
Movement which was the successor of the Non-European Unity Movement.. 
70 H72. “Some Questions Pertaining to the Frontline States/Liberation of Movements Discussion on the 
Strategy for the Liberation of South Africa.” Discussion Memorandum. 15 August 1984. Karis-Gerhart 
Collection. Wits University, Folder 56. 
71 Washington Post (16 April 1984), in Mark Gervisser. Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred (Johannesburg. 
Jonathan Ball, 2007). 490.  







that the movement may have considered. These included options to back away from the 
Soviet Union and to pursue more friendly relations with the West; to “assert the 
independence and vanguard role of the ANC” in relation to the alliance between the ANC 
and the SACP; the “form that negotiations (with South Africa) should take”; and whether 
there “should be a c coordinated approach to the liberation struggles of Namibia and South 
Africa.” What was also apparent from this document was that the ANC had serious 
concerns about the Lusaka Manifesto, the effects of which I interrogated earlier in the 
chapter, pondering the extent to which Africa “as a whole was bound by the provisions” of 
the manifesto. A final option that merits mention is that which placed importance on the 
need to “promote the diplomatic struggle.”72   
 
The value of this document to my arguments and to my work lies not simply in its ability to 
showcase the effects of the Nkomati Accord on the ANC and its activities, but more 
significantly it finds resonance with my themes of the ANC as a vigorous agent of change 
and not as passive victims. I also find it important to testify that the document points to the 
practical realities which the ANC considered as a means of achieving its goals, even if it 
meant abandoning seminal codes of decades gone by. By interrogating new policy options 
which clashed head on with historical beliefs, the movement as well as individuals such as  
Mbeki demonstrated that they were boldly ready to forge ahead at any cost to secure South 
Africa‟s freedom. However while this piece of evidence pointed to the ANC considering a 
negotiated settlement as early as 1984, Gervisser has gone even further to provide evidence 
that consideration for such a settlement could be traced back to 1980 and the Lancaster 
House Agreement-and the informant of this vital piece was Thabo Mbeki.73   
  
So it was not all doom and gloom. Relations with other countries in the Southern African 
region began to gradually improve. This was evident in Lesotho and Swaziland-although the 
establishment of such relationships was not without many problems.74 
                                                 
72 Document H72. “Some Questions pertaining to the Frontline States/Liberation movements‟ discussion on 
the Strategy for the liberation of South Africa”.  
73 For a detailed explanation of this evidence and the importance of the Lancaster House Agreement, see 
Gervisser. Thabo Mbeki. 491,492. 
74 The ANC set up its underground machinery in Lesotho. But by 1975, the Lesotho Security Services harassed 
the movement. Chris Hani and his assistants were detained and brutalised by the security apparatus as they 







The ANC and Angola 
From the 1960s the ANC enjoyed a cordial relationship with the MPLA and this relationship 
endured for many years. On 4 February 1975, an ANC delegation which included ANC and 
SACP members such as Ruth Mompati and Moses Mabhida, was sent to Luanda to 
commemorate the anniversary of armed struggle and to celebrate the triumphant return to 
the capital of Agostino Neto.75 The success of this relationship was guided by Angola‟s 
support of the ANC strategy that the struggles for liberation in Southern Africa could not be 
separated from one another. On 4 February 1976, an International Solidarity Conference 
was held in Luanda, the organization of which involved the ANC which also played a crucial 
role in the international campaign to secure support for the MPLA and the People‟s 
Republic of Angola. The ANC delegation to this conference was headed by Johnny 
Makatini. This relationship with Angola had severe repercussions for the ANC‟s relationship 
with Zambia, who, at that time, supported UNITA. As pointed out by Shubin, this was a 
peculiar situation-to have the ANC headquarters in a country which gave support to the 
ANC‟s enemy.76  As alluded to earlier in my discussion, the relationship between Zambia and 
the ANC had been strained due to the pressures exerted by the apartheid state on the 
former. 
 
Since the Angolan Government viewed the ANC as a faithful friend of the struggle as well 
as against future South African aggression, it conveyed its willingness to host an ANC office 
and to assist in the training of MK cadres. As a result of such agreements, an ANC training 
camp was developed in the country. By February 1976, it had become evident to the 
movement that Angola could become a dependable base. With this realization came the 
decision to train all MK fighters in Angola and that only specialized training would be 
                                                                                                                                                 
began to set up underground structures. Authorities in that country were suspicious of money provided to 
Hani for the setting up of this structure. They believed that the finances made available were to be used by the 
opposition Basutoland Congress Party. In Swaziland, the ANC experienced similar problems. While the King 
supported the work of the movement, officials in his government remained suspicious of the ANC. As a 
result of this, the ANC experienced difficulties such as the detention of Thabo Mbeki. Problems in 
Zimbabwe were documented by David Martin and Phyllis Johnson. “Destabilisation and Dependence.” In 
Mark A. Uhlig. Apartheid in Crisis (Middlesex. Penguin Books,1986).  
75 Sechaba. May 1975 “Report from Angola.” 23. 
76 Shubin. A View From Moscow. 163. 







undertaken in Russia as well as other friendly countries.77 The ANC‟s office in Luanda was 
opened in April 1977 by Joe Slovo and Cassius Make who was the then Deputy-Secretary of 
the Revolutionary Council of the movement. There is no doubt that that these encouraging 
developments in Angola were inextricably linked to Cuba. After all, the ANC enjoyed close 
ties with Havana. This was strengthened when Tambo visited Havana in October 1977 with 
the view to finalizing Cuba‟s role in South Africa‟s liberation struggle, with specific reference 
no doubt to the training of cadres.78 A year later Alex La Guma opened the ANC‟s office in 




While documents such as the Lusaka Manifesto and the African Strategy in Southern Africa, may 
have outwardly sounded the death knell for the liberation struggle waged by the African 
National Congress, and its attempts to gain recognition from the USA, other documents 
such the Thabo Mbeki memorandum clearly allow me to conclude that the ANC would not 
allow its work to be undermined by developments on the African continent. Hence it was 
able during the period under review, to successfully manoeuvre its ways through these 
obstacles and gain some recognition in the US and finally in the African region. Though not 
significant, the competition for the heart and soul of the people of the United States of 
American people was beginning to yield some results as will be demonstrated  in the next 
chapter. However a catalyst was needed to fully catapult the African National Congress into 
the international arena and the 2nd term of the Reagan administration was able to do just 
that. 
 
At the same time I can argue that while this period was one of protracted struggle for the 
ANC on the African continent, it was a temporary setback that was reversed by August 21 
1989 when the Harare Declaration was adopted. At the same time I cannot resist the urge to 
                                                 
77 Shubin makes this claim on the basis of his discussions held with Thomas Nkobi and Alfred Nzo in Moscow 
on 3 February 1976. 
78 “Cuba Help Sought”. London Times (17 October 1977). 
79 La Guma was a South African author and influential member of the SACP. For establishment of missions 
see also Sechaba. Fourth Quarter. 1978. 63; Tikly. “ANC External Wing.” Pfister. “Gateway to International 
Victory.” 







point out that this was a mere year before the unbanning of the movement back home. 
While I am not understating the African contribution to the liberation struggle of South 
Africa and do quite decidedly declare that the Declaration was a step in ensuring that African 
unity against apartheid was restored and that the ANC finally recognized as the dominant 
representative of the oppressed people of South Africa, the road to this moment was a trying 
and disappointing one indeed.80  
                                                 
80 At the insistence of the ANC, an Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa of the OAU adopted this 
declaration at its meeting in Harare in 1989. It recognised that “a conjuncture of circumstances exists which, 
if there is a demonstrable readiness on the part of the Pretoria regime to engage in negotiations genuinely and 
seriously, could create the possibility to end apartheid through negotiations.” It then outlined the principles 
for such negotiations. www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/oau/Harare.html. 
 
 








C h a p t e r  F o u r  
________________________________________________ 
 
THE IRONIES OF THE SO-CALLED ‘LIBERAL ERA’ IN USA POLITICS:  THE ANC 





Following up from a previous Chapter which explored the policy of different US administrations towards 
the ANC and South Africa’s freedom struggle, this Chapter will focus on developments during the 
Carter and Reagan years. The former administration which began on a high note for the ANC, 
produced so little of substance in terms of delivering a suitable agenda for contact with liberation 
organisations such as the ANC.  This is the central theme of this study of the Carter era. The roles of 
those such as Andrew Young, the first African US Ambassador to the United Nations, will be 
scrutinised with a view to demonstrating his ineffectiveness in furthering the African cause and the 
disappointment the ANC suffered as a result of his actions. As the Soweto Uprising preceded the Carter 
Presidency I considered it appropriate to address the issue of the effects of the Soweto uprising on the US 
state,  using a  body of evidence to argue that the uprising did not influence the USA state during Carter 
and Reagan’s tenure, towards conciliatory actions such as according some recognition to the ANC. In 
regards to the Reagan years, I will argue that it was only during the second tenure of this USA President 
that the light began to appear at the end of the tunnel for the ANC. This was demonstrated through the 
passing of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) and the high level Shultz- Tambo meeting 
in January 1987. But that such encouraging developments in the ANC’s attempts to build a 
relationship with the state apparatus in Washington occurred while changes in the Soviet Union’s 
domestic scene were taking place compels me to thoroughly explore changes introduced as a result of 
Perestroika-changes that acted to adversely affect the ANC’s long standing relationship with a loyal ally.  
While the international anti-apartheid scene the late 1980’s indicated the presence of a solid programme 
of solidarity with the ANC from countries in Western Europe, South America, Canada, Africa and 
Asia, this was not the case in the Soviet Union.  Evidence from Vladimir Shubin and Daniel R. 







Kempton corroborate this view.1   It is not my intention, as I have done with my study of administrations 
preceding the Carter era, as well as the Carter administration itself, to undertake an in-depth study of the 
Reagan years, its actions and its officials as much of this will be interrogated in the final chapter. This 
era merits scrutiny as a mechanism to demonstrate how the ANC succeeded in breaking through the 
most belligerent administration. A further area that I will focus on will be the various educational 
opportunities that opened up to South Africans during the Reagan era as a strategy of co-opting support 
from Black South Africans for the USA vision, thus demonstrating that an unprecedented number of 
Black South Africans, including many activists took advantage of such opportunities. In regard to the 
Reagan era, especially the second term, this chapter will demonstrate that all these developments grew out 






In Chapter Two I have argued that for the ANC there appeared to be no positive 
developments to look forward to in regards to US policy. But this was true until Jimmy 
Carter became President of the United States of America in 1977. What is significant 
about the Carter Presidency is that it gave hope to the liberation movement. As early as 
the 1976 election preparation phase, Carter ensured that African Affairs featured 
prominently and this encouraged the leaders of the ANC. It was therefore reasonably 
expected that this presidency would bring a breath of new vigour to ANC/USA 
relations. But events and actions during the Carter Presidency will provide evidence 
showing that this was not to be for Carter and Young were compelled to cave in to 
national interests and hence follow the path taken by their predecessors.      
 
 
                                                 
1
 In his study Shubin acknowledged rather reluctantly, and with a strong voice of condemnation that the 
late 1980s saw Gorbachev gravitate closer to the West and to consultation with South Africa‟s racist state.  
This meant disentangling itself from support for liberation movements such as the ANC.  All of these 
initiatives were driven by economic considerations.   In the same vein, Kempton argues that the Soviet 
Union changed its model of support, adopted from the 1940s to the  1970s to provide high levels of 
assistance in return for “an exclusive supplier” relationship, to one of abandonment of liberation 
movements in the 1980s, driven by the need to prevent economic collapse of the Soviet Union. This was 
the rationale for the former ally of the Soviet Union pushing for a negotiated settlement of the South 
African dilemma in the late 1980s.  See Vladimir Shubin. A View from Moscow (Cape Town. Mayibuye 
Books, 1999) and Daniel R. Kempton. Soviet Strategy Toward Southern Africa:  The National Liberation 
Movement Connection (New York. Praeger, 1989). 165.  







Developments in the Carter Era:  A High Note 
As presidential candidate Carter was also aware of the growing interest of the African 
American community in US policy towards Africa.2 Using Vietnam to draw an important 
historical parallel, he called for the black community to take a more active role on 
African issues pointing out the value to the US nation “if people in public life were to be 
made aware of the problems of Africa through a significant Black interest in Africa.” He 
believed that “Americans might not have made the mistakes we made in Vietnam had 
there been an articulate Vietnamese minority in our midst.”3 
 
The high priority accorded, though unusual and unlike in the Kennedy administration, to 
African affairs could be attributed to the key staff members that comprised the Carter 
Team. Although Carter himself had little knowledge of Africa, many of his appointees 
and advisors were well informed on events in southern Africa and the problems resulting 
from white minority rule. Ruth Schacter Morgenthau, a respected Africanist, became the 
advisor to the UN Social and Economic Council. Andrew Young, a former aide to 
Martin Luther King Jnr., was appointed as US Ambassador to the UN. Goler Butcher, a 
black lawyer, went on to head the Africa section of the Agency for International 
Development (AID). Butcher called for a new policy of “providing no new support to 
the minority and of ending present support, while providing all the appropriate support 
to the majority and those working for change.”4 Even Carter‟s foreign policy advisor, 
Soviet expert, Zbigniew Brzezinski, acknowledged it would be detrimental to the US “to 
position itself as the ultimate shield of the remnants of white supremacy in Africa at a 
time when racial equality is coming to be accepted as an imperative norm.”5   
 
Aside from the expertise of Carter‟s team on African issues, there were related events 
that encouraged the ANC. These included the increasing involvement of prominent 
African-Americans in the fight against apartheid, an area which will be explored in detail 
in Chapter V, and was seen in the calling of the Black Leadership Conference on 
                                                 
2 He indicated that he reached this conclusion through his campaigns where he was questioned extensively 
by African-Americans about Africa.  He was not far off the mark especially when one considers the 
evidence furnished by scholars such as Penny Marie von Eschen, Nikhil Pal Singh and  Michelle Anne 
Stephens as interrogated in Chapter One of this study. 
3 Africa Report (May/June 1976). 20 
4 Africa Report (anuary/February1977). 3-4.  
5 Quoted in Kevin Danaher. The Political Economy of US Policy Toward South Africa (London. 
Westview Press, 1985). 139. 







Southern Africa by the Congressional Black Caucus in September 1976, just months after 
the Soweto uprising. This meeting which brought together 120 representatives from 
organizations such as the NAACP, Africare, Operation PUSH, the Black Economic 
Research Centre and the National Council of Negro Women, had delivered on an 
important product-the African-American Manifesto. The importance of this document 
lay in its commitment to move its mandate further than the Democratic Party‟s platform 
by announcing its support for armed struggle by the liberation movements and for any 
initiatives undertaken by these organizations to seek aid from any source available.6 Also 
after NSSM 39, this was clearly a breath of fresh air for the African liberation 
movements like the ANC. 
   
Another encouraging development was the incorporation in 1977 of the newly formed 
organization Transafrica, which emerged as the African-American lobbying organization 
for Africa and the Caribbean under the leadership of Randall Robinson.7 For this 
organization, its most “responsive pressure point” in the policy making process was the 
House Sub-Committee on Africa. In 1980, Robinson had many meetings with President 
Carter and the Secretary of State. That these positive developments were short term ones 
was clear when presented with  evidence which show the eventual turn taken by the 
administration on its Africa policy. It also became obvious that the African-American 
constituency still remained a minor voice in their country‟s African policy.8 But this was 
only a temporary one as the situation began to change in the mid 1980s.     
 
Within two weeks of his inauguration, the Carter administration embarked on a strategy 
to review US policy on Southern Africa. National Security Advisor, Brzezinski called for 
the compilation of Policy Review Memorandum No. 4. In this regard, President Carter  
 
                                                 
6 The Democratic Party Platform committed the party to policies that granted recognition to Africa and its 
development, permitted greater involvement by the African-American constituency in foreign policy 
issues and decisions related to the African continent and increased aid to Africa. The platform further 
endorsed the principle of majority rule for countries suffering under minority oppression. 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/aam/afroamericanmanifesto.html. The significance of this 
document and its specific points are also covered here, under “The African-American Manifesto on 
Southern Africa, 1976‟. 
7 In 1980, Transafrica had 10 000 members. Its membership was broadly representative of black opinion 
on Africa. Members included those from groups such as elected officials, academics and other 
professionals who were considered to be specialists on Africa, religious leaders and other observers who 
had a keen interest in Africa and the Caribbean. Interview with M. Munthali at Transafrica  
8 The role of the African-Americans and their struggle to apply adequate pressure against the USA state, 
including the work of Transafrica will be interrogated in Chapter IV. 








signed a „Presidential Directive‟, which included the following distinctions: 
 
 The problem of Southern Africa should receive urgent action. 
 Because the continuation of guerrilla war equates with growing Soviet influence, 
the US must strongly affirm a commitment to peaceful solutions in southern 
Africa. 
 It is important for the US to cooperate with European and African allies in 
developing its initiatives. 
 The administration will need to take „visible steps‟ to distance the US from the 
apartheid regime unless there is noticeable movement towards power sharing in 
South Africa and 
 If the US government does not speak out strongly against apartheid there will be 





While this may be considered a very encouraging development, these distinctions were a 
tall order given the track record of previous administrations. One is also reminded at this 
point of the lessons of Nixon‟s National Security Memorandum 39, which were crafted 
and implemented barely seven years before this. This view is strengthened by the 
experiences of Andrew Young, the new ambassador to the UN, who was to confront the 
real onslaught of conservative forces in Washington. A day after Carter named Young, 
his close friend, to be Ambassador, he was invited to join Leslie Harriman, the Nigerian 
ambassador to the UN, Jesse Jackson from Operation PUSH and William Cotter of the 
African American Institute on the Public Television Service programme, The MacNeil-
Lehrer Report. During the course of the programme he was reminded that it was he who at 
one time referred to this position as a “suicidal job.” He admitted that he used that 
description in the past, but that his perception had changed as he was confident that 
 
 
                                                 
9 Africa Confidential  (19 August  1977). 1-2. The fact that Carter‟s policies were reported in this publication 
clearly allows us to understand that impact of his views on the left readership in South Africa which now 
appeared encouraged while the world was now forced to consider the seriousness of this issue. 







“American foreign policy toward South Africa had changed with the election of Jimmy  
Carter.” Two key questions were then put to him by Lehrer. 
  
 “On the United States role in Africa, are you going to be involved in defining 
what that role is rather than just going to the UN and saying what it is.?  
And  
 “On the issue of moving the nation towards a resolution of the constant friction 
between the United States position and the Third World position in the UN, can 
you move our nation? 
 
To both questions, Young provided positives responses indicating that he was confident 
of accomplishing the goals inherent in those questions. Perhaps at that stage he was too 
naïve to acknowledge that in fact there were other interests in Washington who would, in 
the final analysis, determine foreign policy.10 
   
And so it was that within weeks of his new appointment, Young was hastily sent to the 
African continent to convey the new initiatives and trends in Washington‟s African 
policy. More importantly, Young‟s intention was to revive Kissinger‟s failed attempts at 
reaching a solution to the Rhodesian dilemma.11 The results of his endeavours were not 
very positive as the Presidents of the Frontline states indicated their reluctance allow the 
US to take on any significant role in Southern Africa. Given the US track record in terms 
of its African policy, this reluctance came as no surprise. As if difficulties with the 
African leaders were not enough, Young already began to face intense pressure from the 
conservative quarter in the capital. As the ambassador prepared to depart for Africa, the 
US State Department undertook a number of key manoeuvres aimed at sabotaging the 
new African policy, which Carter tried to implement. 
 
On the day of Young‟s departure for Tanzania a report, purported to be deliberately 
leaked by „US intelligence sources‟ referred to Cuban military advisors who it was alleged, 
arrived in Tanzania to train Zimbabwean guerrillas. This report clearly disturbed the 
ambassador whose intention it was to dissociate US policy from the cold war by 
                                                 
10 MacNeil-Lehrer Report. Public Television Service. Radio-TV Monitoring Service Inc. 17 December 1976. 
11 His key meetings were with Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Agostinho Neto of 
Angola and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. These leaders carried the greatest influence over the 
liberation movements of Zimbabwe. 







according little emphasis to the presence of the Cubans or Soviets in Southern Africa. 
This was evident in his observation that “one of the most wholesome things about our 
administration is that …it won‟t be paranoid about communism.”12 This strategy also 
drew much criticism from his country‟s ally across the Atlantic. According to a report in 
the Seattle Post people in the British government as well as in political and diplomatic 
circles were appalled by the statements which the newly appointed ambassador had been 
making about the Southern African situation. His remarks before the Foreign Relations 
Committee, on television and in interviews that Cuban troops have brought “stability 
and order” to Angola, that “there is no reason to be concerned if militant black Marxists 
gain control of Rhodesia and South Africa and that communism has never been a threat 
to him” were received in London with shock. The report went further to allege that these 
statements had already caused the first quarrel in the American cabinet, putting Young at 
loggerheads with Zbigniew Brzezinski, the new Director of the National Security 
Council.13 
 
Meanwhile it was not surprising that while still in Africa, his attempts should suffer 
further harm when the New York Times published a headline story with a shocking title 
which read ‘7 White Missionaries in Rhodesia Slain in Raid by Black Guerrillas.’14 However, the 
story left out many important facts. Regardless of these manoeuvres Young continued 
with his attempts to sell his country‟s new Africa policy to key African leaders. What is 
interesting about these visits is the agreement by Nigerian Head of State, Lt. General 
Olusegan Obasanjo to meet with Young, this after refusing Kissinger the opportunity on 
three occasions to visit his country. This was heartening for relations between these two 
countries.15   
 
Developments in 1977 took on a new turn when Vice President of the Carter 
administration, Walter Mondale met with John Vorster in Vienna from the 19-20 May. 
                                                 
12 Baltimore Sun (6 February 1977). “Kaunda asks US Role In Africa”.  
13 Seattle Post (30 January 1977). 
14 New York Times (8 February 1979). However the report failed to add that there was no evidence to prove 
who committed the crime. The Catholics were known to enjoy good relations with the Patriotic Front. A 
special black unit of government troops were known to masquerade as guerrilla forces, carrying out 
atrocities as a means of discrediting the latter.  
15 The Nigerians had opposed the US role in Angola and Zimbabwe. For Carter a good relationship with 
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This meeting was important because it represented the first senior level contact between 
the new American administration and the apartheid state. Regrettably, not much is 
known about what transpired at this meeting. But the press conference given by Mondale 
was enough to get a sense of the discussions that took place behind closed doors. He 
admitted that there was “a fundamental and profound disagreement between the two 
governments” and warned that South African obstinacy was the “surest incentive to 
increase Soviet influence and even racial war.”16 According to Mondale, a strong message 
was conveyed to Vorster that should their repressive policies lead to racial conflict with 
the majority, the US would not come to the rescue of the white minority-even if the 
conflict resulted in intervention by the communist countries. Mondale had just two 
demands for Vorster:  the ending of racial discrimination and the “full participation by all 
of its citizens on an equal basis.”17 The final demand raised intense interest in the press 
who pressed the Vice President for further details. The exchange on this issue was an 
enlightening one and went as follows: 
 
QUESTION:  Mr. Vice President, could you possibly go into slightly more 
details on your concept of full participation as opposed to one-man-one-vote? 
Do you see some kind of compromise? 
ANSWER:  No, no. It‟s the same thing. Every citizen should have the right to 
vote and every vote should be heavily weighted. 
 
This confirmation surprised the international press as it illustrated that this was the first 
time that any US official of such seniority ventured into demanding democratic change in 
South Africa. Reacting to what was considered to be a faux pas, and to rapidly undertake 
some damage control, State Department spokesman, Hodding Carter furnished an 
obvious and quick retraction. He did this by pointing out that the US was not really 
demanding one-man-one vote in South Africa. All the administration was calling for was 
“steps” in the direction of democratic reform. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance confirmed 
that “we did not demand one-man-one-vote tomorrow.”18 
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For my research all of these statements really represented a contradiction in terms which 
the different US officials failed to confront. While Ambassador Young was trying to 
market a new image for his country‟s policy in Africa, his countrymen in the state 
department were furiously contradicting one another. Although claiming that they were 
moving further from the Kissinger policy of proceeding delicately with South Africa in 
return for that country‟s favourable cooperation on Rhodesia, they continued to 
emphasise that reform should come gradually. They proceeded further to add that while 
the administration was searching for progress on any one of the three areas (Rhodesia, 
Namibia and South Africa), it did not expect such progress to happen all at once. 
Moreover the approach preferred “is still one of reform by the white rulers at the top, 
assisted by selected Blacks, in opposition to the radical programmes of the African 
Liberation.”19 
 
At the risk of courting criticism for any impudence, I would point out that Young‟s 
efforts were half-baked and futile. To say the least, he was a disappointment to the ANC 
and too many in the movement, including the solidarity groups in the US. Young did not 
enjoy much success nor did he display any real understanding of the dilemmas of the 
African continent. This was most evident during his attendance of the United Nations 
conference in Maputo, Mozambique. He failed to satisfy expectations of liberation 
movement representatives who expected him to refer to the action that the US would 
take to support the course of liberation movements.20 Considering that this was one of 
the first addresses Young had given in the region, in the presence of a predominantly 
African audience, he neglected to use the opportunity to market his brief while securing 
the support of African leaders. Instead he presented a 30-minute sermon on the civil 
rights struggle in his country. Namibia was hardly mentioned.   
 
In regard to Zimbabwe he proposed that the liberation movement should turn away 
from armed struggle and focus instead on non-violent boycott strategies as mechanisms 
to end white rule. He went further to point out that international arms embargoes and 
economic sanctions would be futile. It came as no surprise that his speech did not go 
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down well with participants who were highly critical of his visit. These included Robert 
Mugabe who drew Young‟s attention to his ignorance of the Zimbabwean struggle. 
Further criticism came from the Nigerian ambassador and Chairperson of the UN 
committee against Apartheid, Leslie Harriman. He was annoyed by the Ambassador‟s 
remarks adding that “we are not talking about improving the lot of Africans…we are 
talking about liberation.”21 There was a noted difference in views from his earlier 
interview with Lehrer. That Young lacked the political will to stand up to those other 
interests in Washington was clear.  
 
Perhaps I am being too harsh on Young. Living in the USA in the 1980s activists and 
many involved in ANC activities remained scathing about the ineffectiveness of Young. 
But now with the benefit of hindsight and with free access to evidence not available 
before, I am inclined to temper my criticism and instead argue that Young was a prisoner 
of his time and of the politics of Washington. In fact the circumstances of his 
appointment were significant in understanding his limitations in carrying through on the 
liberal stances initially proposed by his President. At a press conference in March 1977 
where Carter introduced Young, he alluded to the reasons for the appointment, 
explaining that “the Third World nations now look on the United States as having at 
least one representative…who understands their problems, who speaks their language.”22 
This permits the argument that his mandate was really to secure support from Third 
World leaders, especially those in Africa for Carter‟s agendas on the continent and 
internationally. The Sunday Times of London also felt free to make its own assessment of the 
appointment, alerting its readers to Young‟s actual brief which “ was to restrain Black 
American militancy, to buy time until American arm twisting of South Africa begins to 
produce results.”23        
 
Further expositions on American policy were discerned during a speech made by 
Secretary of State Vance during the annual convention of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Three important points emerged from 
this exposition, firstly that “reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or 
                                                 
21Southern Africa (June/July 1977). 9. 
22 Used by Dr. George Wright in his commentary entitled “A Black Man as President of the United States!  
What‟s Going On? Why Barack Obama might become President,” in The Black Commentator (21 
February 2008) Issue 265 3. http://www.blackcommentator.com. This is an online magazine that focuses 
purely on matters of interest to African-Americans.   
23 See George Wright. Black Commentator.    







Cuban involvement in Africa would be both dangerous and futile.” Secondly, a long term 
approach was favoured “that would depend more on our actual assistance to African 
development than on manoeuvres for short term diplomatic advantage.” The third point 
focused on the assumption that “US policy should recognize and encourage African 
nationalism” for “if we try to impose American solutions for African problems, we may 
sow division among the Africans and undermine their ability to oppose efforts at 
domination by others.”24 This address to the NAACP provided the Carter administration 
with yet another opportunity to issue a warning to Pretoria that its relationship with the 
US would “inevitably suffer” unless South Africa began moving towards the democratic 
route. But this did not happen. 
 
 
South African State Responses to the Carter Presidency 
The Mondale meeting as well as the NAACP address did not go down well with Vorster 
who believed that pressure from the Americans could be met well ahead by the South 
African state, warning that Carter‟s policy can “only lead to one thing as I see it—namely 
to chaos and anarchy in southern Africa.” Instead of making the changes required by the 
Carter administration, Vorster began unleashing the full might of the apartheid state on 
resistance activity. But before doing so, he embarked on reforms of a sinister nature. He 
unveiled his plans for the establishment of “three full-fledged parliaments, one each for 
whites, coloureds and Indians, each with its own prime minister, cabinet and assembly.”25 
In spite of the justifications for this new plan, it did nothing to change the realities 
attached to the apartheid structures. If anything, this „new‟ structure was nothing short of 
being purely racial and was negatively received by black South Africans. 
 
As was usually the case, South African authorities adopted the regular strategy used to 
react to international criticism or threats-petulance. This was evidenced by Prime 
Minister Vorster‟s verbal attacks on the Carter administration, as well as by inappropriate 
actions such as the dissolving of parliament in late September and the announcement of 
early parliamentary elections to be held on 30 November 1977. When he made this 
announcement, Vorster emphatically stated that this step was aimed at showing the 
American officials that his party‟s resistance to international pressure and foreign 
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interference had the support of the minority electorate. And sure enough, the National 
Party increased its majority to an unprecedented level. 
On the domestic front the late 70s witnessed a massive crackdown by apartheid police, 
which was detrimental to the efforts of the liberation movements such as the ANC as 
well as to South Africa‟s oppressed majority. The situation was exacerbated by the death 
in custody of Black Consciousness leader, Steve Biko which resulted in further repressive 
action such as a massive crackdown on the opposition.26 Eighteen African organisations 
were declared illegal, 40 black leaders were arrested, 7 white opposition figures were 
banned and two African newspapers-The World and The Weekend World were closed down 
and their editors arrested. 
 
The international community reacted with shock and condemnation at such actions. The 
UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldeim expressed regret at the fact that “Biko suffered 
constant persecution, imprisonment and stringent restrictions, but was never convicted 
of any offence even under the arbitrary South African laws.” Interesting enough, while 
many speakers in the General assembly brought back their call for an arms embargo and 
an isolation of the apartheid regime, it is alleged that Ambassador Young remained 
indifferent and ineffective and made no effort to address the gathering.27 That he 
succumbed to the „old boys club‟ of Washington was obvious. 
 
 
International Responses to South African Events 
Events in the UN were a clear indication of international responses to the apartheid 
state‟s actions. Members of the Security Council-Libya, Benin, Mauritius-submitted three 
draft resolutions in October 1977 calling for the following:  a comprehensive ban on all 
military aid to South Africa, an end to all nuclear cooperation and the limiting of foreign 
investment and trade with Pretoria. But when these resolutions came up for the vote, 
together with a fourth resolution which called for a condemnation of apartheid, 
containing no punitive measures, the US, Britain and France “approved a non-
substantive resolution,” but exercised a triple veto to block all the other resolutions. 
According to Kevin Danaher, this was the fourth time in UN history that the western 
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permanent members of the Security Council exercised a triple veto and on each occasion 
it was over South Africa, while for many observers these vetoes clearly demonstrated the 
falsity of US policy.28 
 
Officials representing the western countries realised that their vetoes would place them in 
a poor light.  They therefore called for a six-month arms embargo that did not invoke 
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. After a denunciation of this measure by the African 
nations, on 1 November a compromise resolution was worked out that called for 
“review” of licensing arrangements through which Pretoria produces heavy weapons 
such as the French mirage fighter-bomber. But this compromise resolution invoked 
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, and by invoking that Chapter, the resolution marked a 
certain victory for anti-apartheid groups. 
 
 
The Carter Administration’s Swing to the Right 
But again the Carter administration thread carefully. This was evident when they 
attributed their support for the embargo to the specific events of October 1977 and not 
to the general structure of apartheid. On the 28 October, during an interview President. 
Carter stated “we are supporting sanctions against South Africa because of the almost 
abolition of almost any voice of dissent in South Africa last week among groups 
representing black citizens.” According to one official source, “nothing short of a South 
African invasion of the United States” would persuade the US government of the need 
to lend their support to measures such as real sanctions.”29 In any event the arms 
embargo was not a momentous event since the apartheid state was really self sufficient in 
arms production. 
 
Although the Carter administration began its term on a high note raising expectations of 
liberation movements, from 1978 the administrations views on South Africa eventually 
took a rightward swing, spelling an end to the influence exercised earlier on in the 
administration by the regionalists. If anything, its position appeared more conciliatory 
towards the white minority regime. As early as the summer of 1977, the American 
Congress was characterised by a resurfacing of the right wing element which favoured 
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the white minority rule in Rhodesia and the banning of aid to Mozambique and Angola. 
The influence of the regionalists was further undermined by the Cuban/Soviet 
intervention in Ethiopia beginning in late 1977. Given the history of US foreign policy 
from Kennedy, the erosion of any influence exercised by the regionalists in the Carter 
administration was a foregone conclusion much earlier. 
 
In 1978 when guerrillas operating from Angola, invaded Zaire‟s Shaba province for a 
second time, it brought forth a hard anti-communist backlash from Washington. 
President Carter, who in the early months of his presidency provided the assurance that 
the “Russian and Cuban presence in Angola…need not constitute a threat to United 
States interests,” was now issuing warning about the East West conflict on the African 
continent.30 All of this did not augur well for the regionalists who suffered a serious loss 
of supporters in the 1978 Congressional elections. Senator Dick Clark and four other 
supporters of a relaxation of Cold War perspectives were defeated by the right wing 
republicans. The former was the Chair of the Africa sub-committee and had played an 
innovative role in liberalising US Africa policy. 
 
The resurgence of the Cold War view of Africa from 1978, the administrations swing to 
the right and Pretoria‟s refusal to cooperate with Washington-all pushed the regionalists 
onto a retreat on South African policy. By October 1978, Carter and his officials returned 
to a Kissinger model of Africa policy that regionalists such as Young and Lake had 
criticized early in the Carter years. The new policy was very straightforward. The United 
States would hold in check its opposition to apartheid policies in return for South 
Africa‟s cooperation over the Rhodesian dilemma. In October Carter sent a confidential 
letter to South Africa‟s new Prime Minister, P. W. Botha, elaborating on the new 
approach. Not surprising, the South African response to these initiatives was one of great 
enthusiasm as the new Prime Minister spoke of his “gratification” with the President‟s 
letter.31 In effect then, while Washington did pay more attention to southern Africa by 
this time, US policy remained the same.  It did not deviate from the double standards of 
earlier years, with no support for liberation movements such as the ANC. 
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Notwithstanding the American practice of adopting double standards, the Soweto 
uprising and resultant state action succeeded in hardening international, and more 
specifically US sentiment against the apartheid state. The ANC benefited as its attempts 
to isolate the latter gained momentum. Chris Alden, in his analysis of the ANC‟s foreign 
policy, supports this contention by pointing out that the behaviour of the South Africa 
government in the wake of Soweto became “embedded in the politics of other countries 
such as the US which saw the Carter administration place human rights issues within the 
context of its domestic policy agenda.‟32 
 
In 1977 South Africa became the first member of the UN, against which a resolution on 
mandatory sanctions was adopted by the Security Council. All this played favourably into 
the ANC‟s strategy of isolating South Africa politically, culturally and economically from 
the rest of the world. Clearly, the Soweto uprising helped the process of enhancing the 
position of the ANC, but not significantly enough to change official US policy. 
 
Not long after the outbreak of the uprisings in Soweto, in September, the Senate African 
Affairs sub-committee began its hearings on South Africa under the Chairmanship of 
Senator Dick Clark. The aim of the Sub-Committee was to review various aspects of US 
business involvement in South Africa. Opening the hearings, Senator Clark made the 
statement that very little had been done by US corporations for the economic 
advancement of South African blacks. He therefore called on home offices of American 
companies to apply intense pressure on their South African subsidiaries to improve the 
position of blacks in their employment. Concern was also expressed over the increasing 
investment in South Africa by US companies. For Clark, that might have had the effect 
of strengthening the economy of South Africa, its present government and its apartheid 
policies. Witnesses such as Jennifer Davis of the American Committee reaffirmed her 
opposition to US investment in South Africa.33 
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In a strongly worded response to the Chair of the Hearings, South Africa‟s Ambassador 
to Washington, R. F. Botha, made his country‟s objections of the hearings known.  He 
complained “most strongly to the way in which your sub-committee has become a forum 
for attacks on South Africa.” After all “we threaten no state…comply with our 
international obligations…and wish to live in peace with all our fellow African 
countries.” He advised that “your committee would do better to direct its attention to 
the real problems of our continent. Africa is faced with vast problems in many fields 34. 
 
Two months prior to the Hearings, Congressman Stephen Solarz, a liberal Democrat 
from New York visited South Africa, as part of a fact-finding mission to Southern Africa 
on behalf of the Committee on International Relations. A report on the visit was 
presented to the committee, the text of which was read to the House of Representatives. 
For the authorities in Pretoria, the remarks were found to be “rather disquieting.”35 For 
Solarz, the policy of his own government, articulated by Kissinger, was based on an 
illusion. 
 
The importance of this report could be discerned from its ability to showcase US 
attitudes towards liberation movements such as the African National Congress. As 
officials in the US State Department either ignored the role of liberation movements in 
Southern Africa or remained reluctant to interact with them, Solarz alluded to the 
limiting nature of this strategy. In 1976, just before embarking on his African tour, 
Kissinger in a press conference unequivocally stressed that in all of their diplomatic 
manoeuvres, the US State Department and its officials had “not dealt directly with the 
black liberation movements.” In view of these strategies Solarz pointed out, those black 
leaders in the region questioned the sincerity of US support for majority rule because 
they have “refrained,” in contrast to the Chinese and Russians, from providing support 
and assistance to these movements in their quest to achieve majority rule. The solution to 
this shortcoming was to be found in “more actively identifying ourselves with the 
Liberation Movement.” For this to be achieved, he called for the provision of economic 
and humanitarian assistance, since the blacks in South Africa were “among the most 
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repressed people in the world…and whose accumulated resentment constitutes a 
political volcano on the verge of erupting.”36  
 
South Africa continued to suffer greater image damage. According to the press reports 
50 million Americans heard reports in August of a weekend television statement by the 
then South African Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons, Mr. Jimmy Kruger, which had 
become an issue of severe embarrassment for South Africa throughout the world. The 
statement, made at a National Party meeting in Frankfort in the Orange Free State in 
response to the black disturbances in the country was as follows: “He (the black man) 
knows his place and, if not, I will tell him his place.”37 Two of the three national 
television networks in the United States broadcast Kruger‟s statements during prime time 
news programmes on Friday and it was reported that several local television networks 
were referring to the statement for as long as 36 hours later. Even major newspapers in 
the US carried coverage of this statement. 
 
Reaction in the US was thus rapid and effective. Such reaction was not uncommon in 
diplomatic circles as well where it was predicted that Kruger‟s utterances could inhibit 
the American Secretary of State‟s continuing contacts with South Africa. Although 
Kruger tried to counter the embarrassment by issuing explanations hat he was 
misquoted, his efforts proved unsuccessful in countering the damage already in place.  
 
 
A Disappointing End to an Era 
I have succeeded in demonstrating that up until the 1980s, there was no real change in 
official state policies and attitudes towards the ANC and the liberation struggle in South 
Africa. Granted that events such as the Soweto uprising of 1976 succeeded in creating an 
awareness of the plight of the oppressed in South Africa and of the horrors perpetrated 
by the South African state, I would advance the view that they were not instrumental in 
creating a climate of official recognition by the American state officials of liberation 
organisations like the ANC. I have demonstrated that the latter years of the „liberal era‟ 
of Carter were marked by a sharp move towards the right of the political spectrum and as 
a result the ANC made no progress during this „liberal interregnum.‟ 
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What is even more intriguing is that the ANC officially remained silent on Carter and 
Young‟s ineffectiveness. For Gail Gerhart such silence could be attributed to the fact 
that Carter‟s administration, though ineffective, was the only „friendly‟ US administration. 
Her reasoning is strengthened by the observation that while all US administrations came 
under ANC attack in their various publications, on the Carter presidency, silence 
prevailed.38 But in a discussion with Fred Dube, an ANC stalwart who spent time in 
exile from 1970 to 1997 in the USA, the Carter experience did make many within the 
movement more hostile to liberalism which was viewed as a handmaiden of capitalism.39   
    
 
The Return of the Conservatives 
In 1980, Ronald Reagan‟s victory over incumbent Jimmy Carter represented a notable 
and momentous shift towards conservatism in US politics. Evidence supports my 
conclusion that great strides in the ANC‟s attempts to develop a relationship with the 
USA were made during the hostile administration of President Ronald Reagan. This was 
discernable during Reagan‟s second term of office when the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act (CAAA) was passed and when the ANC President, Oliver Tambo 
undertook his visit to the United States, accompanied by Thabo Mbeki in the latter part 
of 1986 and the early months of 1987.40 The latter was targeted by for special attention 
by many, including the CIA in Washington and Chester Crocker.41 Hence since 1982 
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Mbeki held many discussions with Americans in Lusaka and in the USA. These included 
meetings with Crocker himself who in late 1986 forewarned him about a future meeting 
in Washington. So marked were the changes in the status quo, that this culminated in the 
meeting with George Shultz, and this happened some ten years after the Soweto uprising 
and only during Reagan‟s second term of office. While American administrations were 
consistent in their support for the apartheid state, I would argue that the most significant 
changes in policy towards South Africa and the ANC appear to have occurred during 
one of most harshest administrations-that of President Ronald Reagan.  
 
Although closer to freedom which was to come in 1990 with the unbanning of the ANC 
and the release of Nelson Mandela,  for the liberation movement, this meeting set the 
pace for the opening of more doors in Washington. At this point it becomes necessary to 
caution against any view that I may be awarding undue credit to a very hostile Reagan 
presidency for its „generous‟ overtures to the ANC. But the evidence to be presented 
clearly vindicates the view as I demonstrate that these diplomatic manoeuvres 
represented part of an overall strategy designed to push for the dismantling of apartheid. 
In fact Thabo Mbeki, who had accompanied Tambo to Washington for this meeting, 
reflected on his time in Washington some twenty years later in June 2004, when 
attending Reagan‟s funeral. He acknowledged that the Reagan administration had been 
the first in the USA to “recognise the ANC as a liberation movement and work with the 
ANC.…”42 This recognition epitomised the irony of the times.   
 
Looking at the period of the mid 1980s within which these developments occurred,  
readers need to be reminded of the critical, yet intriguing nature of this time for the ANC 
internationally and internally.  The ANC faced serious challenges within its movement 
and these threatened the unity of the movement and manifested  themselves in the 1984 
mutiny within Umkhonto we Sizwe. This resulted in a series of crackdowns by the ANC 
designed to end such activities and which included the construction of the infamous 
prison camp Quadro.43 Internationally, this was a time when a new mood characterised 
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both the protagonists of this chapter-Moscow and Washington. While doors were 
opening in Washington, those in Moscow appeared to be subtly closing as I will later 
demonstrate. This view will be strengthened in the following paragraphs.  
 
 
Events leading up to the Tambo/Shultz Meeting 
But given the dynamics that characterised the political climate in the USA, it would be 
appropriate to firstly focus on Washington where the first high level meeting between a 
leader of an African Liberation movement and senior official of the Reagan 
administration took place. Before proceeding to examine this critical time in the ANC‟s 
history, it will serve arguments in this chapter well to contextualise this meeting. Official 
sources such as US state memoranda between then Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker, 
Secretary of State George Shultz and other state department officials and officials in the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), all provided 
substantial evidence for me to argue that those in Washington, including President 
Reagan, during his second term of office, had reorganised their diplomatic strategies to 
accommodate the following perceptions: 
 
 That apartheid had to be dismantled. This was non-negotiable. 
 That the USA had a role to play in pushing for the appropriate climate for 
negotiations between the apartheid state and South African opposition and 
resistance organisations. 
 That the ANC as an organisation was becoming too much of a force to ignore.  
 That there was no alternative political group to the African National Congress.44 
 
One of the strategies adopted to give impetus to the dismantling process was the 
formation of the US Corporate Council whose aim was to “coordinate business efforts 
promote reform” and to “align with South African business” in this regard. This initiative 
according to Crocker, was expected to “dovetail well with our encouragement of US 
institutions to commit resources to constructive, long term programmes to increase 
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educational and economic opportunities for black South Africans.”45 This allows me to 
surmise that the transatlantic traffic of black South Africans to the USA, wishing to 
exploit such opportunities, would have increased in this time. This did happen but will be 
fully explored at the latter part of this chapter.   
 
Prior to his meeting with Tambo, and in many of his all his memoranda, public 
statements and correspondence to OECD Capitals, Shultz communicated the need for 
“genuine reform efforts” and “most importantly for negotiations between the South 
African government and opposition leaders”- thus allowing me to contend that this 
meeting with Tambo was part of the new US strategy to create that climate “conducive 
to the beginning of negotiations. Such views dominated Shultz official pronouncements 
even after the visit.46 It was according to Executive Secretary Nicholas Platt, necessary to 
look at change in South Africa “as a process which requires a sustained and positive US 
involvement, rather than a situation calling for symbolic one-time gestures, or a negative 
approach.”47 But it was a year later, seven months before meeting Tambo, that Shultz 
acknowledged that “the hour is late for peaceful change in South Africa” and warned 
that “apartheid imposes an intolerable moral, strategic, economic and political” burden 
on Western interests.48 Even Reagan, as reported in a Special segment in the New York 
Times in July 1986, a few months before the Tambo/Shultz meeting,  urged Pretoria to 
move towards “political peace”, and for the first time “asked the government of PW 
Botha to establish a „timetable‟ for the elimination of apartheid and to release all political 
prisoners.”49 Simply enough, these dynamics clearly hastened this process and the ending 
of apartheid in South Africa was for the players in Washington by now a foregone 
conclusion. 
  
Further evidence for my arguments came from the controversial Shultz Commission 
report which was released in February 1987, but was commissioned as early as 1986 by 
                                                 
45 Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker, Action Memorandum for Secretary George Shultz, “US Corporate 
Council on South Africa”, October 24, 1985, In National Security Archive, Making of US Policy. 
Document 17. Washington DC. 
46 See Secretary George Shultz, Cable for ALL OECD Capitals, “Text of Report to Congress on US 
Multilateral Measures to Dismantle Apartheid”, April 4, 1987. Document 19. 
47 Executive Secretary Nicholas Platt, Memorandum for Vice-President‟s National Security Advisor 
Donald Gregg, “Public Diplomacy on South Africa:  Involving US Congressional Groups in Dialogue 
and Chang,: November 5, 1985. Document 18. 
48 “If Apartheid is that Evil”, in the New York Times (4 June 1986). 
49 Gerald M. Boyd, Special Correspondent to the New York Times (23 July 1986). 







the state department to assess and report on US policy toward South Africa. The 
conclusion of the report was valiant and powerful and had phenomenal repercussions for 
South Africa‟s liberation movements such as the ANC. Reagan‟s “strategy of 
constructive engagement has failed to achieve its objectives,” it pointed out and hence 
the panel of commissioners accordingly called on President Reagan “to play a personal 
leadership role in communicating the sense of purpose and will needed for an effective 
US policy toward South Africa.” Picking up on the conclusions of the report, media in 
the USA and Europe supported the conclusion and the call by the panel for a new policy 
towards the South African dilemma. In its report entitled Epitaph for Constructive 
Engagement, the New York Times ended its report with wise advice for those 
concerned. “The Carter policy did not work and the Reagan Administration changed it. 
Now the State Department‟s own handpicked panel says the Reagan policy has also 
failed. It is about time to abandon the wreckage.”    
 
International reaction to this report was predictable as were the views of Reagan 
supporters. Even the Russians were fascinated by the contents of the report. This was 
apparent in a conversation between Michael Clough, the main drafter of the report and 
Vladimir Ganchin, who was the 3rd Secretary at the Soviet Mission to the UN charged 
with responsibility for Africa and small territories. Ganchin even communicated how this 
report raised perplexities in his home country over the “discrepancy between Reagan‟s 
Constructive Engagement and the Shultz report.”   
 
State, media and public reaction to Tambo and the ANC at this time also provided 
further  evidence to demonstrate that the dynamics and perceptions in Washington were 
undergoing a dramatic change and that for the ANC there finally appeared that little bit 
of light at the end of a very long and dark tunnel, thus strengthening my earlier 
contentions. Secretary of State, George Shultz granted an audience to Tambo in January 
1987, demonstrating that Washington was affording the ANC some degree of legitimacy. 
While Tambo had been a frequent visitor to the United States since 1960, during which 
he was given many opportunities to address the United Nations, and there were many 
unofficial meetings that took place between ANC officials and individuals in the USA, 







this was the first ever high level contact between the USA State and the African National 
Congress.50  
 
This is not to say that there were no previous US state contacts with the ANC. One 
example that merits attention is that of Allard Lowenstein who held his first meeting 
with ANC representatives in 1966 in Dar es Salaam and continued to meet with them 
until his assassination in 1980. Lowenstein who, while holding many official positions, 
including that of one of Carter‟s ambassadors to the UN, was also a CIA operative who 
even met Nelson Mandela on Robben Island. While he started out in 1966, by reporting 
to the CIA that the ANC was “unreliable and uncontrollable and therefore 
unacceptable,” just before his death in 1980 he began “laying the groundwork for  a 
flexible American policy in South Africa,” to dismantle apartheid” while acknowledging 
that there was “no alternative political group to the ANC.”51     
 
William Doemar, a correspondent for Time magazine, covered the Tambo visit but 
focused as did many other correspondents reporting on the visit, at some length on the 
ANC‟s ties with the Communists. But the irony was that Moscow was about to 
experience Mikhail Gorbachev‟s perestroika programme which was formally implemented 
in June 1987 and which was to ultimately test these „ties‟, thus proving challenging to the 
ANC‟s relationship with the Soviet Union.52 In a fleeting reference to the Tambo/Shultz 
meeting, Doemar quoted Shultz who „conceded‟ that as the ANC “has emerged as an 
important part of the South African political equation,” it was becoming increasingly 
                                                 
50 US Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker, met Tambo in London in September 1986. This was a 
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necessary to afford it some recognition.53 This was the recognition which the ANC set as 
its goal in trying to build its relationship with the US state.   
 
That this was an encouraging development during the Reagan tenure was undeniable, for 
this was the most painful USA administration for the ANC to handle. This was the 
period which witnessed the implementation of the „Reagan Doctrine‟, „Constructive 
Engagement‟ the „Southern Africa Policy Review‟ and „Coercive diplomacy.54 As Tambo 
pointed out in an interview with Time on 27 October 1986: 
 
The Reagan Administration still holds on to the concept that South Africa is an ally. We 
would like to see the US break that alliance and take a firm position on the side of the 
victims, not only in South Africa, but in the whole region. The US has its own history, 
its own experience, which is similar to what we are experiencing in South Africa. The US 
is the last country that should see itself as an ally of the apartheid system.55   
 
Only three months later, Shultz provided a private audience to Tambo, marking the first 
time that a Senior US official had met with a banned leader of the ANC. Reporting on 
the meeting the National Review viewed this meeting as a “broadening of the US policy of 
constructive engagement with the South African government.”56 Yet the Review 
questioned the convening of this meeting while pointing out that this was the 
administration that opposed “dealing with terrorists” and about which “nobody was 
sterner than Shultz.”57 
 
 
US Media and the Tambo/Shultz Meeting   
While this visit brought a measure of success to the ANC and Tambo, press coverage 
and public reaction was interesting. Much of the press coverage of the visit was hostile. 
The New York Times interviewed Tambo and the resulting Headline, African National 
Congress Leader Defends Killing of Whites was enough to set the tone for the hostile nature of 
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its coverage of the interview. The same reaction came from ABC‟s Nightline programme 
in which anchor person Ted Koppel interrogated Tambo about the movement‟s „guerrilla 
war‟ and went to the extremes of  pushing Tambo to call for a cease fire on television-
without even consulting his executive. Reporting in its editorial, on media reaction during 
the Tambo tour, The Nation made a significant observation that “rarely in recent years has 
the US media so completely allowed a foreign country-in this case the Pretoria regime-to 
define the terms of debate.”58  
 
As the state, through this meeting, afforded the ANC some form of recognition, 
American civil society remained divided. While the solidarity movements may have been 
successful in pressurising Washington to end its support of the apartheid state, this does 
not mean that they represented the views of the majority. This was evident during the 
Shultz/Tambo meeting when conservative protestors mobilised themselves outside the 
State Department and called to Tambo to “go home” while accusing the ANC of being 
an arm of the Russian KGB.59 
 
 
A New Mood in Moscow:  Doors are Closing 
As pointed out in an earlier discussion, it was ironical that many in Washington, 
including media, were unrelenting in their usual criticism of the ANC being an arm of the 
Soviet Union. But events unfolding in Moscow demonstrated a „new mood‟ emerging in 
relation to its links with the ANC, with the Soviet Union beginning to reassess its 
support for liberation organisations such as the ANC. Useful sources were Steven 
Friedman and Monty Narsoo, both who visited the Soviet Union in mid 1987 and who 
undertook a firsthand analysis of the changes being wrought in Soviet foreign and 
domestic policies. Studying the mood in Moscow, they focused on the Soviet views, the 
major players in Moscow, the influence of global developments on changing policy and 
the shortcomings and ANC reactions.60 Another useful source was Vladimir Ganchin, 
the Third Secretary at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, responsible for Africa 
and areas like the Pacific Islands.  
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In essence Friedman and Narsoo argued that Soviet views were undergoing a change as 
there appeared to be more contacts between different sections of Soviet society and non-
ANC South Africans. Previously this relationship and related contact was limited to that 
with the ANC and its members. Meetings took place between South African academics, 
politicians and journalists and the Soviets. One such meeting was that which took place 
in West Germany with the ANC present as well. Further they provided substantial 
evidence to support the view that the Soviet Union appeared keen to join other Western 
nations such as the USA to „secure a negotiated settlement‟ in South Africa.61 However 
Friedman and Narsoo were emphatic that while there was no official view on this issue, 
evidence pointed to a subtle change in official views. These changes were driven by 
economic consideration which necessitated political settlements in areas of conflict 
where Soviet involvement was marked. That Moscow could no longer afford further 
drain on its financial resources provided justification for these subtle mood changes.   
 
The ANC‟s reaction to these developments in the Soviet Union was predictable. Simply 
put, they were just towing the official party line on this relationship or they were 
suffering a denial of the reality. In their interview with the ANC Chief representative in 
Moscow, Mr. Makhana, Friedman and Narsoo learned that in spite of all the evidence 
presented to them, the ANC emphasised that there was no change in their relationship 
with that country. On the basis of the situation in which they found themselves, it would 
be remiss to be critical of the ANC for not facing up to the situation. Remembering 
Tambo‟s earlier justification for the ANC‟s reliance on the Soviet Union, it may have 
been extremely difficult for the movement to accept that it may be losing its only loyal 
and reliable international ally.62 
 
This view is strengthened by a study of views of Soviet activists such as Vladimir Shubin, 
who in his presentation to the Anti-Apartheid Conference in Durban emphatically 
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denied that perestroika meant the Soviet Union‟s „alienation‟ of the ANC and its 
„rapprochement‟ with Pretoria. He supported his argument by referring to Tambo‟s 
meeting with Gorbachev in November 1986 during which he reassured the former that 
he would only consider talks with the apartheid state when the ANC leadership agreed to 
it. Shubin used further examples, such as the Soviet involvement in Operation Vula to 
illustrate that the cooperation between the ANC and Moscow strengthened from 1987 to 
1990.63   
 
But I would take issue with Shubin on this for in September 1987 a closed door meeting 
took place between Cuba, the Soviet Union and the ANC, whose delegation was led by 
Tambo who a few months earlier met with Shultz. I have not been able to locate 
extensive evidence of the discussions that took place, but Shubin himself revealed that 
the crucial area of discussion for this meeting was the need for a political settlement. 
Clearly then, the academics in Moscow were correct in their assessments of Soviet 
developments. Pressure was clearly applied on the ANC to seek a political settlement. 
Further evidence on the Soviet call for a political settlement came from a government 
insider, Vladimir Ganchin, who in a conversation with Gail Gerhart was very candid 
about this issue. He pointed out that given the Soviet Union‟s track record of 
involvement with national liberation movements around the world, they found the 
experience a „disappointment‟. In regard to South Africa, he explained, the Soviet Union 
could make “dividends” for the country by reiterating its current position with the ANC, 
which was that it favoured a “negotiated political settlement.” He also justified these 
policy views by naming many countries or movements who placed the Soviet Union in 
an embarrassing situation.64    
 
 Despite Gorbachev‟s earlier reassurances to Tambo regarding contact with Pretoria, he 
established contacts with the apartheid state by 1990. By the time Boris Yeltsin assumed 
power his policy included the development of rapid ties with Pretoria.  This could best 
be illustrated by the changing relationship between the Soviet Union and the ANC, a 
process that began in 1987. This culminated in the establishment by the former, of 
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formal diplomatic relations with the apartheid state in February 1992 and the ending of 
financial support to the ANC‟s offices in Moscow.  
 
Many have attempted to argue that perestroika signified the demise of the Soviet Union 
and consequently „the end of history‟ and the triumph of world capitalism. Perhaps this is 
how many liberation organisations who depended on this pillar of Socialism for material 
and financial support, amongst others, interpreted the new mood in Moscow. But today, 
as the ruling party of South Africa, the ANC has acknowledged the wisdom of perestroika 
and the resulting Soviet policy decisions that emerged as a result of that initiative. This 
arises from the current recognition within the party of the impossibility of divorcing 
political and economic change from global developments. Writing in Umrabulo in July 
2007, Michael Sachs, a Coordinator of the ANC NEC Economic Transformation 
Committee acknowledged that Soviet developments in the 1980s were tied to global 
developments. In an assessment of Gorbachev‟s policies, Sachs, devoid of emotion that 
so characterised any ANC review of its relationship with the Soviet Union, clinically 
described these policies as an attempt to resolve regional disputes and one “which paved 
the way for the end of the Cold War conflict in Angola, the independence of Namibia 
and the political liberation of South Africa.” The fact that Sachs chose to address this 
issue almost two decades after the implementation of perestroika, is significant. I have 
used this current model of thinking within the ANC to demonstrate that the movement 
was aware during the mid 1980s of these changes taking place and of the global 
considerations that governed them, but strategically chose to ignore the writing on the 
wall until it was secure in the knowledge that it was legitimately governing a democratic 
South Africa-thus justifying why it is currently impossible for South Africa to be 
divorced from international developments.65  
 
As the meeting between Shultz and Tambo represented a milestone in this study, I would 
like to pause and reflect on an observation of Tambo‟s made a few months prior to this 
meeting while on a visit to Malaysia. This observation supports the view that Tambo had 
no earlier indication that a meeting of this level was possible so soon. In alluding to the 
challenges of this relationship, which included the USA‟s refusal to engage with liberation 
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movements such as the ANC, the President of the ANC indicated that the reason was a 
simple and obvious one. He explained that this reason could be found in the link 
between racism and imperialism, between what is considered to be those of a “primitive 
culture or race” and a “superior species.”66 Tambo went further to refer to this 
application in the USA whereupon he pointed out that: 
 
One only has to see the statistics of unemployment, drug addiction, homelessness…to 
realise the extent to which the black population is marginalised and serves as a living 
example for the most backward elements to “prove” the assertion that to be black is to 
belong to a category of the human species that is less than human and which must be 
used as befits its status.67    
 
For my study such a view, which has positioned the relationship within the context of 
race, has been important in shifting emphasis from debates which focused on purely 
strategic and economic considerations in trying to rationalise USA support for the 
apartheid state and non-support for the liberation movements and the freedom struggle 
in South Africa.  
 
But for Nelson Mandela, the world‟s most famous political prisoner, who reflected on 
this meeting between Tambo and the US Secretary of State in his autobiography, this 
appeared to be a non event. In just two lines he dismissed the meeting by indicating that 
“the Americans recognised the ANC as an indispensable element of any solution in 
South Africa.” Yet in the same autobiography, in documenting his visit to the USA in 
1990, he appeared complimentary about his meeting with President George Bush Snr, 
ironically alluding to the fact that “even before meeting Mr. Bush, I had formed a 
positive impression of him….he was  a man with whom one could disagree and then 
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shake hands.”68 Perhaps an interview with Mr. Mandela today, 18 years after that 
meeting, might not yield a similar response. 
 
 
Image 3: Nelson Mandela and President George Bush (Snr.) on the White House Lawns during 
Mandela‟s 1990 visit.69 
 
 
More Doors Open in Washington 
 But backtracking to the Tambo visit to Washington, the real success of the visit could be 
discerned from The Nation’s editorial which reported on the “power elites‟ who were 
“eager to hop on the Tambo Train.” This was a reference to the many political and 
corporate requests to attend a luncheon hosted by the Foreign Policy Association and at 
which Tambo was expected to address guests. Those who eventually heard Tambo speak 
included representatives from Citicorp, Ford, General Motors, Morgan Guaranty, Mrs 
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Laurence Rockefeller and former Treasury Secretary, W. Michael Blumenthal.70 The 
reason for this was clear.  They were positioning themselves for their involvement in a 
post apartheid South Africa. In essence they were reserving their spaces for a place in the 
sun.  
 
They were not the only ones trying to reserve their place in the sun. Six months later in 
July 1987, a meeting of 61 predominantly Afrikaans speaking whites and Coloureds was 
held with an ANC delegation in Dakar, Senegal for three days. This group, led by Dr. 
Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, was convened by the Institute for a Democratic Alternative 
for South Africa (IDASA) with the purpose of opening contact with the ANC. For the 
ANC, this meeting presented an opportunity to present its position and to “demolish 
some stereotypes.”71 The meeting coming so soon on the heels of the Shultz/Tambo 
meeting was significant because it provided the ANC with the legitimacy for which it 
aspired since its birth in 1912.72 
 
The final area that merits scrutiny before concluding this chapter and one with which I 
could personally identify, is the extent of US involvement in the educational sector of 
South Africa.73 This area will be used to strengthen the core argument that it was during 
the Regan area that many doors opened for the ANC and for many South African black 
South Africans, thus demonstrating greater contact between those in the US and the 
latter, but with a specific agenda on the part of the US state. This is best demonstrated by 
data which indicated that between 1981 and 1989, many ANC aligned South Africans 
travelled to the USA as part of the Fulbright, Southern African Research Programme 
(SARP) at Yale University, United States Information Agency (USIA) or the United 
States-South Africa Leadership programmes (USSALEP).74 More US visas were made 
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available for Black South Africans to undertake such travel, a rare commodity during 
previous administrations. As a result by the end of 1983, the administration spent $4 
million annually on scholarship programmes that saw almost 100 black South Africans 
benefit from these undergraduate and graduate programmes in USA. According to Coker 
by the end of 1984, over 400 students had “enrolled in campuses across the country.” 
Such programmes were designed to take South Africans to the USA instead of 
Washington investing in training programmes in South Africa. Instead of using education 
to “increase the black community‟s awareness of power,” the US administration, which 
included Chester Crocker who supported these initiatives and their goals, actually 
“uprooted” South Africans from their communities. Coker argued that such strategies 
found synergies with Pretoria‟s attempts to ensure that Blacks were not trained to 
become “initiators of change.”75 
 
These initiatives also formed part of the larger and new US strategy of increased 
involvement in South Africa with a view to creating a climate for the dismantling of 
apartheid, as discussed at some length earlier in this chapter. An underlying intention was 
also gauged from Executive Secretary Nicholas Platt‟s memorandum in which he 
explained that such programmes would help those who participated “gain a better 
understanding of the process of change, and of our role in it, while at the same time 
strengthening moderate forces in South Africa.”76 So I would be justified in concluding 
that there was certainly no evidence of the presence of any humanitarian element in the 
adoption of the educational exchange strategy. It merely formed part of the overall US 
strategy of appealing to the moderate elements in South Africa and of gaining support 
from participants visiting the USA for US actions and of moulding them in pro-western 
directions. I would argue that these strategies were not all that new. Educational 
programmes were used since 1910 by American missionaries and philanthropists as part 
of their “civilising mission” and as part of their strategy of creating a docile black 
working class.77  
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From a personal perspective, I was part of this programme of exchange at Yale 
University (SARP) in about 1990-1993. While I recall the feeling of awe I experienced at 
being a Yale fellow and of being a part of the illustrious academic experience at this Ivy 
League school, what was subtly happening to me was that I was buying into the US 
concept of a change model for South Africa‟s dilemmas. This recognition did not emerge 
until many years later after my return to South Africa. For me what was explicitly clear 
was that by uprooting South Africans from their communities to be part of the 
„American experience,‟ the intentions was to ensure that time spent in the USA would 
nudge such participants into buying into the USA‟s views of the type of political change 
it envisaged for the country.  
 
While this was not surprising, what I found interesting about this political sphere and its 
dynamics was that in spite of the Reagan administration‟s track record in regards to 
involvement on the African continent in collusion with South Africa and its intelligence 
agencies, and its unyielding support of the apartheid state, ANC aligned individuals 
seized such educational opportunities. Between 1980 and 1989, 375 South Africans 
travelled to the USA as part of Fulbright programme alone. Alumni of this programme 
included prominent political activists such as Dr. Wally Serote, Professor Salem Badat, 
Professor Leila Patel and Dr. Mathole Motshekga. For Dr. Serote, who was head of the 
ANC Cultural Desk in London and Head of the ANC Department of Arts and Culture 
in Lusaka, the Fulbright programme “afforded me the opportunity to interact with 
writers at an international level and also to understand the US as a world power…these 
years I spent in America studying when the most difficult years of totalitarianism, 
oppression and state violence in my country. I was freed from this abnormal life and 
given a chance to think about my future.” Complimentary views by ANC individuals 
were the order of the day. Even President Mbeki, the current State President of South 
Africa, had positive views of the Fulbright programme. On a message to the Programme 
marking the 50th Anniversary of Fulbright in South Africa, he acknowledged “the role 
played by the Fulbright Programme during the apartheid era when academic freedom 
was stifled, access of black people to Higher education in general…was restricted and 
international education and research cooperation for all South Africans was severely 
constrained. Defying the apartheid regulations, the Fulbright Programme provided 







opportunities to South Africans regardless of class, colour and creed to pursue post-
graduate study and research.78     
 
Given the views of prominent ANC officials, it behoves me to conclude that the ANC 
did take a flexible position on these programmes and on those who were part of the 
exchanges. While Marxists academics such as Professor Ben Magubane were opposed to 
programmes such as the SARP at Yale University, I found that such experiences were 
critical in generating links between US progressives and South African progressives. 
Links I established with US progressives during that period served me well in my 
attempts to build educational skills capacity and to repatriate South African heritage 
material in a post apartheid society. Those such as Democratic President William 
Jefferson Clinton were also able to piggyback on such links in a post apartheid South 
Africa. Further, relationships that emerged as a result of those exchanges were clearly 
important in influencing opinions in Washington from the Reagan years through the 




Concluding this chapter presents a conundrum for me for the following reasons. The 
examination of policy of the US administrations from Carter to Reagan towards the 
ANC was consistent. Again a strengthening of the US‟s alliance with the apartheid state 
was the order of the day. Even the Soweto uprising, while it led to a slight hardening of 
attitudes in the US, did not aid the cause for liberation in the USA. If anything this 
period of the 1980s were clearly the most distressing for the movement. Yet I have 
demonstrated, there were more contacts between US officials and apartheid leaders and 
ministers and investment in South Africa increased in the post Soweto period, thus 
signifying a strengthening of the USA/South Africa relationship.  
 
Although one may credit the ANC for its strategy of leveraging its relationship with the 
Soviet Union in a manner that could help facilitate recognition from Washington, even 
this proved difficult in the 1980s after Gorbachev took the reins of power, thus turning a 
former and loyal ally of the ANC into a „cool‟ partner. Back home in South Africa, 
                                                 
78 See Publication entitled 50:  Golden Jubilee Alumni Directory. Obtained from the USA Embassy 
(Pretoria) in March 2008.  







apartheid repression reached unprecedented levels. Even within its ranks, the ANC faced 
challenges. It would have been difficult to accept that barely five years to a decade later 
the ANC would be unbanned in South Africa and Mandela released after 27 years in 
prison, thus paving the way for freedom.   
 
In spite of depressing developments which appeared to drive the ANC into a corner, I 
would conclude that the 1980s were also a time of opportunity and hope for the ANC as 
demonstrated by the first high level meeting between the USA and the ANC, the passing 
of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, the increased opportunity for US/ANC 
interaction provided through mechanisms such as the educational exchanges and the 
meeting in Dakar. These were the signs that support my view that the ANC was close to 
achieving its goal of securing recognition for legitimacy.  
 
But the conundrum disappears when one explores the reasons for the changing mood in 
Washington and the role, not only of the ANC, but of other agents such as the American 
solidarity organisations who were critical to forcing a change of mood in Washington. 
Here I have argued that for the USA, the writing was clearly on the wall. Apartheid had 
to be dismantled. This is evidenced by the series of events such as the Shultz/Tambo 
meeting and many diplomatic manoeuvres such as the formation of the Corporate 
Council, the warnings to the apartheid state and the increased involvement in educational 
investment in South African/USA. All of these also serve to demonstrate that Carter and 
Young failed miserably to exploit opportunities to make the necessary contact with the 
ANC.  The only „liberal‟ US administration in the period of my study and in the period of 
the South Africa‟s freedom struggle, will go down in history as being the most 
hypocritical one in terms of its African diplomacy initiatives.    
 









C h a p t e r  F i v e  
________________________________________________ 
 





In presenting my main arguments, I have arranged this chapter to focus on three periods; the first up to the 
1950s, the second being from the late 1950s-1970s and the final period being the 1980s. This strategy 
allows me to demonstrate how early relationships between the ANC and individuals and organizations in the 
USA, including those of a personal nature, were brought to bear on campaigns.  These grew to reach a level 
of such power in the 1980s that they eventually proved instrumental in influencing US policy towards the 
apartheid state as well as US views on liberation movements and South African activists or those considered 
to be ‘terrorists’. Events that unfolded in South Africa facilitated the process. A combination of factors which 
included the work of the US solidarity network together with the turbulence pervading South Africa helped 
guide Washington’s decision to become involved in dismantling apartheid as argued in the previous chapter. 
How the work of the network helped achieve such a momentous goal forms the main component of this 
chapter. While the focus of this chapter is on the US Solidarity network, it must be noted that solidarity with 
the South African freedom struggle was reaching unprecedented levels in other countries of the world.  This 
was particularly the case in countries like India where by 1987 the International Conference of Youth 
Against Apartheid was convened and the call for South Africa’s isolation was strong.1 Even in Canada, 
activist groups began to lobby the government in their country with much vigour.2 But my aims in this chapter 
will also substantiate my view that the ANC could not have accomplished its goal of establishing a 
relationship with the US state without the work of the activists in that country. Considerable attention will be 
devoted to the Reagan administration with the intention of demonstrating the role played by certain groups in 
                                                 
1 India was a supporter of the struggle efforts in South Africa since 1946.  This continued throughout the 
struggle history with the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi calling rather vociferously in 1985 for a total 
isolation of South Africa.  See Enuga Reddy. India and South Africa: A Collection of Papers (Durban. 
University of Durban Westville, 1991).  
2 Linda Freeman.  The Ambigious Champion:  Canada and South Africa in the Mulroney Years (Toronto. 
University of Toronto Press, 1997). 69. 








exposing the sinister relationship that existed between the apartheid state and this administration, especially 











Image 4: Nelson Mandela, Sylvia Hill and Gay McDougall at a reception for Nelson Mandela in 1990. 
They were invited by Mandela to visit South Africa as part of the 'Democracy Now' Tour.3 
 
 
                                                 
3 Picture furnished Courtesy of Sylvia Hill. 








Reflecting on his first visit to the USA after his release in 1990, Mandela poignantly 
described the feeling he experienced on the New York leg of his journey. 
 
I had read about New York City since I was a young man, and finally to see it from the 
bottom of its great glass and concrete canyons while millions and millions of pieces of ticker 
tape came floating down was a breathtaking experience. It was reported that as many as a 
million people personally witnessed our procession through the city, and to see the support 
and enthusiasm they gave to the anti-apartheid struggle was truly humbling. I had always 
read that New York was a hard hearted place, but I felt the very opposite of that on my first 
full day in the city.4   
 
This single reflection by the icon of South Africa‟s freedom struggle is evidence of the role 
of US civil society in changing the course of the USA/ANC relationship in the period under 
review. How the work and activities of this segment of the USA infiltrated mainstream USA 
politics and forced phenomenal changes in national policymaking, forms a crucial and 
remarkable component not only in the narrative of the USA/ANC relationship, but also in 
that of the South African freedom struggle. In line with this recognition, I therefore contend 
that no study of this relationship can be undertaken without a scrutiny of role of the 
solidarity movement.5 This would include an assessment of the effectiveness of the latter in 
raising the profile of the ANC in the USA and of advancing the struggle in the international 
arena. In this regards I would point out that there has been a tendency in recent years to 
minimize or underestimate the key role played by such groups in the struggle against 
apartheid.   
 
A unique feature of the Solidarity Movement in the USA was its diversity. There were 
numerous groups, organizations and individuals who comprised this movement over 
different periods. Unlike the British Anti-apartheid or Irish Anti-Apartheid movements, the 
US movement was comprised of hundreds of different organizations and groups who 
                                                 
4 Nelson Rolihlahla  Mandela. The Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Neslon Mandela (Boston. 
Little Brown and Company, 1995). 507. 
5 For an understanding of the diverse nature of the US solidarity movement, see Richard Knight. 
“Documenting the US Solidarity Movement-With the reflections on the Sanctions and Divestment 
campaigns.” Paper presented at the Conference A Decade of Freedom. University of KwaZulu-Natal. October 
2004. Richard Knight was a US activist who was involved in the activities of the American Committee on 
Africa and is currently Project Director of the African Activist Archive project. 








worked independently but closely with many national organizations in the USA and focused 
on a broad range of anti-apartheid activities. Hence my reference to civil society, solidarity 
groups and anti-apartheid organizations takes cognizance of this diversity in structure. 6 
   
 By the 1980s, it was clear that the apartheid state had the most powerful global player on its 
side. Yet by 1986 the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was passed in the USA, effectively 
repudiating Reagan‟s policy of constructive engagement in South Africa, in 1987 Shultz had 
met with Tambo and by 1990, the death knell of apartheid was sounded with the unbanning 
of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela7. This was not accomplished purely through 
the efforts of a single entity such as the African National Congress or US civil society -a 
claim that has resulted in some tension between the liberation organization and the groups in 
the USA. While I do not intend to minimize the role of either segment, I will demonstrate 
that the successes generated required energies of both the ANC and civil society in what 
came to symbolize a symbiotic relationship. These developments must be viewed against the 
background of events in South Africa and the escalating pressure within the United States 
for stronger action against South Africa.  The latter stemmed from the work of the Solidarity 
groups as well as pressure from Reagan‟s own establishment, which became increasingly 
embarrassed by their leader‟s recalcitrance on the issue of South Africa.  
 
 
A History not well Documented 
My research has indicated that the examination of the role of the South African Liberation 
Solidarity movement in the USA is critical in understanding how the work of this group was 
                                                 
6 This was evident from conversations with activists from the USA and the Nordic countries. Hence when 
writing this chapter, I considered it necessary to allude to such views and tensions.  
7 The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was passed in 1986. The importance of this Act was that in the 
process of its passage, the US Congress overrode President Ronald Reagan‟s veto. This marked the first 
instance of the 20th century where a President‟s foreign policy veto in the USA had been overridden. This Act 
introduced a package which included wide ranging sanctions against South Africa and a timeline for the 
ending of apartheid in South Africa. Another important component of the legislative package was an 
amendment that was included to pacify the conservative element in Washington. This stipulated that in the 
event of the apartheid state indicating a willingness to negotiate a democratic settlement and that should the 
ANC display reluctance or any unwillingness to participate or even renounce violence as a strategy, the US 
State may provide unqualified support for such a process-even without the ANC. Thomas J. Redden, Jr. “The 
US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986:  Anti-Apartheid of Anti-African National Congress.” African 
Affairs. 238.      








linked to the struggles for justice throughout the world. This emanates from my conclusion 
that this is a history that is not well known nor well documented. Nor are its global 
dimensions understood except by those that were involved. According to William Minter, 
one of the more vocal members of this network, the history of the movement is one  
 
that includes the world wide anti-apartheid movement, arguably one of the most significant 
transnational social movements of the 20th century…a history that also reaches beyond 
South Africa, linking those involved in successive struggles against injustice on the African 
continent with others around the world who saw those struggles as integrally tied to their 
own.8  
 
As very little has been written about the work of this movement much of the evidence for 
this study of the anti-apartheid network has been drawn from the secondary works s of Janet 
Love, Robert Kinloch Massie, Francis Njubi Nesbitt, George Houser, Donald Culverson, 
Randall Robinson and the most recent work edited by William Minter, Gail Hovey and 
Charles Cobb Jr.. While Nesbitt in his study focused specifically on the role of African 
Americans in the anti-apartheid movement from 1946-1994, Massie provided an overview 
with some emphasis on the states in the Northeast. But in her study, Love, an activist, 
delineates case studies of activity at state or local level. Culver adopted a theoretical  
approach, applying the work of social movements to US anti-apartheid activism. He argued 
that since international developments guided US policy and interaction with the African 
continent, including South Africa, these engagements stimulated local action that found 
commonality between apartheid and US domestic challenges.  
 
Randall Robinson, the President of Transafrica, used his memoir to highlight the 
relationship between racism and the structures of power in Washington, while at the same 
time allowing scholars a rare glimpse into the dynamics of anti-apartheid activism and the 
reasons for the success enjoyed in ending apartheid. Finally in contrast to the preceding 
works, the recent publication of Minter, Hovey and Cobb resorted to innovative 
methodology to tell the untold story of the national movement. They concentrated on the 
                                                 
8 William Minter, a veteran of anti-apartheid activity in the US, at a meeting of the American Friends Services 
Committee. 7 December 2002. 








voices of those who were involved in the different activities. This focus on the slow 
agonizing process involved in forcing change in the US State Department, provides for a 
riveting study. But the strength of this study emerges in its arguments which illustrate the 
long connection” between African liberation and US activism,” which “preceded and shaped 
the anti-apartheid movement.”9   
 
While this body of literature, through its varying area of foci, makes a significant 
contribution to the study of US solidarity, many gaps remain and clearly merit further 
scrutiny. But such a scrutiny cannot be undertaken in my study. However I have examined 
other data extracted from primary sources which included the various interviews with AAM 
and ANC activists, documents of Transafrica, documents of the Liberation Committee, and 
documents of the AAM conference hosted by the University of KwaZulu-Natal and media 
coverage.10 
 
I would put forth the view that the anti-apartheid movement was important for the ANC in 
its attempts to advance the struggle on the international stage and to achieve recognition of 
being the legitimate liberation organization, harbouring the hopes of the oppressed majority. 
At the same time, I find it important to emphasize that it is not my intention in this chapter 
to undertake a study of AAM activities in the USA in the period under review. This would 
be rather short-sighted as mere chapter would certainly not allow me to do justice to such a 
                                                 
9 Janet Love. The US Anti-Apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics (New York. Praeger, 1985); 
Robert Kinloch Massie. Loosing the Bonds:  The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years 
(New York. Doubleday, 1997); George Houser. No One Can Stop the Rain (New York. The Pilgrim Press, 
1989); Donald Culverson. Contesting Apartheid: US Activism, 1960-1987 (Colorado. Westview Press, 1999); 
Randall Robinson. Defending the Spirit:  A Black Life in America (New York. Plume,1999); William Minter, 
Gail Hovey, Charles Cobb Jr.. No Easy Victories:  African Liberation and American Activists over Half a 
Century:  1950-2000 (Africa World Press. New Jersey, 2008); Francis Njubi Nesbitt. Race for Sanctions:  
African Americans against Apartheid (Indiana. Indiana University Press, 2004).     
10 South Africa celebrated her decade of Freedom in 2004. As part of the National Celebrations, the 
Documentation Centre of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, of which I was the Director, hosted a 
Conference in October 2004, which I Chaired, entitled A Decade of Freedom: Celebrating the role of the International 
Anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa’s Liberation Struggle. The aim of this conference, which brought together 
activists from 24 countries, represented an effort to generate discourse on the liberation struggle, through the 
conference discussions, oral history interviews, book launches and publications. Given the role of the 
International Solidarity Movement in South Africa‟s freedom struggle, very little research has been made 
available on the phenomenal work of this movement. This was due to the non-availability of research material 
or data required for an aggressive publication drive. Hence one of the aims of the conference was to generate 
such research which could make it possible for the role of the movement to be documented. For papers of 
the conference and other related data, see http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/doc/AAMwebsite. These papers were 
acquired by the Documentation Centre between October and December 2004. 








vital endeavour. My strategy instead would include a focus on examples of activity 
particularly on the East Coast, and in different periods to illustrate the commitment and 
effectiveness of such solidarity and to support my arguments.     
 
 
The Importance of the Early Networks 
Looking at the early years, sources suggest that the American solidarity network was the 
successor of the number of domestic African American networks which assisted in the early 
years in placing the activities of the ANC on the USA‟s platform. These networks can be 
traced to the 19th century back to Africa movements, the Council on African Affairs, 
founded in 1937 as the International Committee on African Affairs, the African Methodist 
Episcopalian (AME) Church with its programmes of transatlantic exchanges and the 
American Committee on Africa founded in 1953 under George Houser. The work of the 
AME resulted in an interesting phenomenon where three of the ANC‟s leaders who held 
positions before 1960 were trained in the USA.11    
  
 But from the mid 1950s to about the time of the Sharpeville uprisings, these informal 
contacts between the ANC and US groups and individuals began to decline. Evidence for 
this came from the very founder of the ACOA himself- George Houser. He attributed the 
decline to two factors: the failure of the ANC to prove that it had the potential to succeed; 
secondly the split in the ANC in 1957 forced such groups to choose the factions that they 
were going to support.12 But Tom Karis and Gail Gerhart have argued that regardless of 
these factors, anti-apartheid activists and African-Americans had very little affect on official 
state policy up to the 1970s. It was only towards the end of the decade, they argue, that 
African-American leaders began to exert any significant influence on their country‟s 
policies.13 While I would agree with these views, I would further argue that evidence exists to 
                                                 
11 They were John Dube, Pixley Seme and AB Xuma. 
12 John Douglas Nelson. “Some Aspects of Internal Conflict within South Africa: A Study of the Place of 
International Activities in the Development of the African National Congress.” Ph.D dissertation (George 
Washington University, 1975). 181. 
13 Thomas Karis and Gail Gerhart. From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in 
South Africa, 1882-1990. Vol 5. Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979 (Pretoria. UNISA Press, 1997). Amongst 
others Karis and Gerhart based their conclusions on the fact that African-Americans comprised only 12% of 








support the view that while US activists may not have been successful in swaying US state 
policy in the 1970s, they were effective in creating awareness of the South African cause and 
of the African National Congress. For example, strategies such as pressure on banks, proved 
highly successful.    
 
 
US Activism in the 1970s 
Considered by many to be the authorities or progressives on ANC/SA linkages at this time, 
Karis and Gerhart have argued in 1997 that African-American support for the anti-apartheid 
movement was very low, basing their conclusions on the fact that African-Americans 
comprised only 12% of the population.  Hence given this percentage, on their own, this 
segment of US society could not be given credit for any effective action until the end of the 
decade.  However evidence unearthed does not support their conclusions.  I argue that by 
the 1970s the infrastructure was already in place for anti-apartheid activity on the part of 
different entities which included the churches, unions, state and local authorities and the 
United Nations. The success of these movements also depended on their reaction to South 
African events and on their abilities to draw more supporters for their work.66 Evidence 
provided through actions which saw 10 000 black people march in Washington on Africa 
Liberation Day, 27 May 1972, to express solidarity with South African liberation movements 
clearly demonstrates this. Such actions were received with enthusiasm by activists involved 
with the ACOA and others such as Cecelie Counts especially since this brought African-
Americans into the solidarity fold.14    
 
This view was also echoed by Claude Lightfoot, the African–American leader and 
representative to the World Peace Council Commission on the struggle against racism in the 
USA. In the same year he sent a message to Sechaba, in which he admitted that while there 
was not much understanding in the past, on the part of African-Americans, of the liberation 
                                                                                                                                                 
the population. Hence given this percentage, on their own they could not be given credit for any effective 
action until the end of the decade.  
14 This emerged in the interview undertaken with Cecelie Counts, founding member of the Southern Africa 
Summer Project, 30 November 2002. Washington DC. See also Thomas Karis. “United States Policy towards 
South Africa,” in Gwendolen Carter and Patrick O‟ Meara(eds.). Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis 
(Bloomington. Indiana University Press, 1979). 337.  








struggle, by 1972 there was a more focused interest in the South African struggle. He 
attributed this interest and understanding to, among others, the work of the Congressional 
Black Caucus.15  
 
This comment allows me to a pause briefly at this juncture to reflect on why activists should 
be encouraged by this. From the research gathered from interviews in Washington and New 
York, it would appear that such attitudes were associated with the issue of racial balances of 
solidarity groups. During these interviews which were conducted with activists from both 
sides of the racial spectrum, one interviewee candidly spoke out on the related tensions that 
arose through this issue.16 It may have also been the source of some discord after Nelson 
Mandela‟s release from prison in 1990 when both white and African-Americans activists 
each claimed greater participation. A further example of this was provided by Nelson 
Mandela‟s first visit to the USA in 1990 when it was claimed that „white‟ activists had easier 
access to him than did „African-American‟ activists. On the other hand, „white‟ activists 
complained that a post apartheid South Africa failed to recognize their work while giving 
more credit to „African-Americans‟17. At the invitation of Nelson Mandela in 1991, a group 
of activists undertook a tour to South Africa. The group consisted of 33 African-American 
activists led by Randall Robinson of Transafrica.18 This aggravated the situation. Upon trying 
to ascertain whether most activists would share similar views, I was unsuccessful because 
they were reluctant to comment on this. 
 
                                                 
15 Sechaba. Vol.6. No. 8, 8 August 1972. In 1972, the Caucus held a conference in Washington-which was the 
result of the Black political Convention held at Gary, Indiana-where an overwhelming majority of African 
Americans was represented. Here Lightfoot assured the ANC that “the struggle waged by our black brothers 
and sisters in the Southern part of the African continent is directly connected with the mainstream of the 
battle of the Afro-American people for liberation” 
16 These interviewees included those interviewed in December 2002 on the East Coast. This particular 
interviewee informed me that this part of the interview should be off the record and that if I alluded to it in 
my study, then he should be listed as an anonymous interviewee. This strategy was offered to prevent his 
views creating a schism in the work of the movement.  
17 This was also shared with me by the late Beryl Baker who was the PA of then ANC President, Nelson 
Mandela in the offices of the ANC. Notes of conversations of 1997. She indicated that she often received 
letters of complaint from activists and organizations who shared these concerns. 
18 William Minter and Sylvia Hill. “Anti-Apartheid Solidarity in United States-South Africa Relations:  From the 
Margins to the Mainstream” in Greg Houston(ed.). The Road to Democracy. Vol 3. International Solidarity 
Part 1 and Part 2 (Pretoria. UNISA, 2008). 820. 








William Minter, a veteran of anti-apartheid solidarity work, in a recent interview provided an 
informed and candid perspective of this issue. He explained that no one group was more 
prominent or visible than the other, but factors such as the period, roles, media presence and 
representation and „ideological regions‟ may have influenced visibility and activity.19 In fact in 
a chapter contribution made by both himself and Sylvia Hill to the most recent SADET 
volume, they tried to provide some perspective on the racial balance.20 Also Minter drew my 
attention to the selection of interviews conducted for his recent publication, No Easy 
Victories, pointing out rather eloquently that “we did this not just out of some „political 
correctness‟ of racial balance but because in fact the history was that way.”21 
                                                 
19 Although William Minter was interviewed by me in 2002, this interview was undertaken via e-mail on 21 
August 2008. I put forward questions to him n this regard and he sent through written response outlining his 
thoughts. 
20 See Greg Houston. Road to Democracy Vol 3. 
21 See Minter. Hovey and Cobb. No Easy Victories.    










Table 1:  Major Area of Focus for work of Solidarity Movements.22 










Entertainers and artists; 
Academic Associations and 
Scholars. 
Lobbying:  Letters to and 
negotiations/discussions 
with decision makers;  
Press Conferences and 
other media work; public 
release of confidential 
documents; attendance at 
key events such as 
shareholder meetings; 
demonstrations, picketing; 









specifically for local and 
national anti-apartheid 
work.  
DIRECT AID Governmental 
Organisations-national and 
international; 
NGOs and individuals. 
Lobbying; Letters and calls 
to decision makers; 
Demonstrations; Fund 
raising benefits; Assisting 
political refugees; Direct 





EDUCATION Leaders of campaigns;  
Decision makers in targeted 
organisations. 
Use of film; 
Provision of speakers for 
lobbying events; 




publications, leaflets and 








Those being mobilised into 
anti-apartheid campaigns;   
Leaders of campaigns; 
Decision makers in some of 
the targeted organisations. 
Publication of pamphlets, 
newsletters, books;  
Production of film and 
records; 
Research on economic, 
military, political, social 
conditions in Southern 
Africa; business relations 
between Southern Africa 
and the West; other types 
of relationships between 
SA and West; anti-







                                                 
22 This table was produced by Janet Love for her study The US Anti-Apartheid Movement. It was a useful 
summary of the work and strategy of the movements which I have used for this study as well. 









In regard to universities which were most often sites of struggle and played leading roles in 
the divestment campaigns, I drew Minter‟s attention to the predominantly white 
composition of those groups. While he agreed, he provided a simple rationale for this. White 
students rather than African-American students comprised the larger segment of university 
population in the USA.. Drawing on my own experience at USA universities in the 1980s I 
could concur with this view. 
  
A very effective yet unusual source of civil society activity could be discerned from the work 
of the Churches who enjoyed considerable success in their campaigns particularly against 
banks in the USA. I traced evidence of their role back to the 1960s, beginning with 1966 
when Protestant denominations withdrew about $23 million in deposits from 10 banks, 
including Citibank. This was done in protest at American banks enthusiasm to make loans 
available to South Africa. In view of the negative publicity surrounding such protest action, 
American banks did not renew loan agreements with South Africa, pointing out that South 
Africa no longer needed the funds. But such success was of a temporary nature for it was 
soon discovered that the banks began to make secret agreements with South Africa. These 
secret loans were uncovered in 1973 through the vigilance of ant-apartheid activists who 
learned through the “Frankfurt Documents” sent to ICCR, that American banks were 
making loans available to South Africa through the European-American Banking 
Corporation23. Given this discovery, campaigns against the Banks were renewed. 
 
The role of the World Council of Churches (WCC), which had a number of branches in the 
USA merits particular scrutiny because it played a decisive role in boosting the support and 
recognition that the ANC began to draw in this period. According to W. P. Estehuyse, the 
WCC, “more than any other non-governmental organisation, contributed to legitimizing the 
ANC as a liberation organisation, by justifying its use of violence.”24 Beside moral support, 
the WCC provided financial assistance to the ANC. In 1987, R300 000 was furnished as aid 
                                                 
23 Love. US Anti-Apartheid Movement. 29. 
24 W. P. Esterhuyse, “The International Political Status of the African National Congress,” in Africa Insight. 
Vol 19. No.1, 1989. 32. In many debates on the issue of the use of violence, the WCC argued that it was the 
apartheid state  which should shoulder blame for the use of violence, for “violence is an in-built quality of the 
South African state against which the oppressed have no other option than to defend themselves”.   








to the ANC. The WCC's support and recognition of the ANC as well as its use of violence, 
contributed towards world churches adopting a more sympathetic attitude towards the 
liberation movement-this again further enhanced the status of the ANC in the eyes of the 
international community.   
   
That the power of the Churches to influence public opinion was great was even recognised 
by the apartheid protagonists themselves. In a confidential dossier of anti-South Africa 
activities, compiled by the then South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. J. van 
Dalsen, it was pointed out that the churches played an “opinion forming role” in the United 
States and that the churches “are still active in their animosity towards South Africa” The 
dossier provided vital evidence on the power of the churches, their strategies and their 
partners. From this dossier, one learned that the prime goal of these Churches was to 
concentrate their efforts on influencing the investment policy of US firms in South Africa. 
Specific reference was made to letters of protest received by the South African embassy in 
the US from the United Presbyterian Church and the United Congregational Church at the 
expropriation of the Seminary at Fort Hare.25 According to Dalsen, those churches 
concerned with interfering with investments in South Africa included eleven of those with a 
total membership of 53 646 200 individuals.26 
 
Evidence also provided that window of understanding how Churches worked with other 
bodies in protest against apartheid policies. Those organisations identified as having links 
with the Church activities and of subsequently interfering with the internal affairs of South 
Africa included the African-American Institute, The American Committee on Africa, the Washington 
Office on Africa, the Apartheid Committee of the United Nations and The House of Representatives Sub-
Committee on Food Resources and Energy and the African Studies Association.27 
 
                                                 
25 Report of Secretary of Foreign Affairs entitled “Anti-South African Activities:  United States of America”, 
June 1976, Foreign Affairs Files, 1/33/3, 109/5. 
26 These Churches included the National Council of the Churches of Christ, The National Baptist Convention 
of the USA, The American Baptists Convention, The United Methodist Church, The Lutheran Church, The 
United Presbyterian Church, The Protestant Episcopal Church, The International Convention of the 
Disciples of Christ, The Reformed Church in America, The United Church of Christ and The Zion Baptist 
Church. 
27 “Anti-South African Activities,” Foreign Affairs Files. 








Other sectors that were targeted by and became part of the solidarity network in the 1970s 
included state and local governments. But it was only in the 1980s that they were successful 
in pressurizing these institutions to withdraw funds from businesses operating in South 
Africa. In cases such as those of Washington DC and Gary, Indiana, their actions were 
significant. Janet Love has identified these councils as being the first to adopt anti-apartheid 
resolutions.  The latter included calls for the boycott of purchases of city services and  
supplies from specific companies doing business with South Africa.28 Similar action was 
followed by the cities of Madison (1976), Berkeley (1979), and Davis (1978). By the early 
1980s, of the 27 local councils „entertaining‟ anti-apartheid policies, 22 passed one or more 
pieces of anti-apartheid legislation.29   
 
In 1971 the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Union (P.R.W.M) embarked on a struggle to 
pressure the Polaroid Corporation to end all trade with South Africa. They went to great 
lengths to point out that that they “see the South African apartheid system as the symbol of 
the many inhumanities in the United States…and we cannot begin to deal with racism in 
Polaroid or the US until Polaroid and the US cease to uphold and support apartheid.”30 
While the final outcomes of their actions were not significant for African employees of the 
South African subsidiary, such actions spurred other organizations to act. Following this, 
General Motors came under attack from anti-apartheid lobbyists and Automobile Union 
officials. In February the Rand Daily Mail reported on the visit to South Africa of a Senior 
GM executive to work out a “Polaroid type” deal to respond to calls that it should cease 
business activities with the apartheid state.31  
 
It was not unusual to also discover the existence of US organisations that were positioned on 
the right and that failed to even have an unexpected impact.  An example of this was the 
African-American  Institute (AAI) whose name emerged in many of the interviews 
undertaken with solidarity activists as being a front organisation for the CIA. In an interview 
with Frank Ferrari in 2002, the Vice-President and Acting President of the Institute, he 
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explained that the organisation was the oldest and largest private body that focused on 
Africa in the USA since the 1950‟s, with specific emphasis on education for Africans in the 
US at the time.32  A key feature of this interview was that, while Ferrari generously made his 
time available, he dwelt at some length on extolling the virtues of AAI without reflecting 
critically on whether the organisation was effective. While Ferrari alluded to CIA funding 
before 1962, he was emphatic that such a situation changed after 1962.  But activist groups 
and organsations were not convinced.  This was clear in the conversations undertaken.  By 
the 1980s groups such as churches, which were severely underfunded, had a huge impact on 
solidarity activity whereas front organisations such as the AAI which received massive 
funding boosts failed to do so nor was their leadership considered credible enough by the 
activist community.         
     
While it would appear that the anti-apartheid movement enjoyed recognisable success in the 
early 1970s, their work was not easy. This was clear from the ACOA‟s difficult call upon its 
own staff as well as members of other organizations to be “travelling evangelists,” to address 
legislatures, city councils and education events organized by activists, and to distribute 
newsletters nationally. But as I learned from my interviews with grassroots activists, a 
common complaint from this quarter was that they did not get enough assistance or support 
from national organizations, allowing me to conclude that tensions between the different 
segments, whether local or national, did exist.33 This was confirmed at the Conference held 
at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in 2004.34    
 
While the UN general Assembly remained sympathetic to the liberation movements‟ cause, I 
would argue that in the Security Council this was not possible. This was due to a legacy 
where major Western nations such as the US, Britain and France enjoyed the powers of veto 
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and as such made it difficult to expect any significant action from this quarter against South 
Africa. But on its own, in 1973, the General Assembly denounced apartheid as a “crime 
against humanity,” and in so doing, prevented South Africa from participating in plenary 
sessions since 1974.35 So I would join Janet Love in cautioning scholars against being too 
critical of the UN. Moreso since this body has been an important source of funds and other 
aid for guerrilla movements in Southern Africa. Reference has been made to the different 
programmes established in the 1960s as a result of pressure from African and Asian 
governments. These included the Trust Fund for South Africa, the Educational Programme 
for Southern Africa and the Fund for Namibia. It has been found that from 1965 to 1980; 
the Trust Fund for Southern Africa distributed 95 grants with a value of $10.47 million. 
 
In 1974, the United Nations passed Resolution 3411 G (xxx), recognizing “the liberation 
movements as the authentic representatives of the South African people.”36 Clearly such 
official recognition represented a political and diplomatic breakthrough for an organisation 
determined to succeed in drawing the attention of the international arena to its dilemmas. 
The significance of this resolution has spurred scholars such as William Steyn to undertake 
an intense analysis of such actions. Steyn has been helpful in clarifying that this recognition 
did not mean official government recognition by member states. Also, by making specific 
reference to liberation movements, it demonstrated acceptance of the ANC as well as of 
other South African liberation movements such as the PAC. The UN was careful not to 
recognize the ANC as the only liberation movement representing the political aspirations of 
South African blacks. This meant then that the ANC was in a different and weaker position 
than SWAPO.37 But Steyn has provided evidence to indicate that the status accorded to the 
ANC was very high. The fact that it was given observer status in the General Assembly and 
Security Council implied that that it was provided not only with a favourable chance to 
participate in discussions on South Africa, but also with the opportunity to play an active 
role in resolutions passed by the United Nations on the apartheid state. 
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US Media in the Aftermath of Soweto  
My study of US media coverage of South Africa in the post 1976 period has proved to be a 
valuable exercise as it has yielded some interesting evidence on how interest in South Africa 
outside of the State department could be gauged. It has also served to strengthen my view 
that activists and other anti-apartheid entities were successful, through their activities, in 
creating awareness in the USA of the plight of South Africa‟s majority and of the work of 
major liberation movements such as the ANC. 
 
Aside from focusing on South Africa after major events such as Sharpeville, from the 1960s 
to the early 1970s, it was common practice for all articles about Africa to be relegated to the 
least desirable sections of newspapers and magazines. But after 1976, a change occurred and 
there appeared to be a growing interest in South Africa on the part of the American media, 
but it did not mean that uprisings such as SOWETO played a critical role in swaying state 
policy towards the ANC, as I have previously argued.38 For example in 1980, South Africa 
found itself in the midst of disturbances, which resulted through the commemoration of the 
fourth anniversary of the Soweto uprisings of 1976. Time magazine and Newsweek, both 
carried lead stories about South Africa in their international sections. In the report presented 
by the former, focus was devoted to the spread of violence to various urban centers and 
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The new outbreak came after increasing protest and turmoil in recent months. The 
government‟s promised reforms, ranging from a gradual phasing out of the hated passbook 
system to a plan for enabling blacks to buy their own homes, have either not materialized or 
largely failed. Organisers of the African National Congress, the outlawed Black political 
movement, operate with increasing ease.39 
 
Newsweek provided the title of “Shooting to Kill in South Africa” to its report. In trying to 
uncover the reasons for the school boycott by Coloured students, the magazine pointed out 
that “the new surge of unrest was a dose of particularly unpleasant medicine” for Prime 
Minister PW Botha. “He had been seeking to humanize the face of apartheid,” but the 
boycotts were clearly warning that black and Coloured South Africans wanted more than he 
was ready to give.40 In other related stories, Time interviewed Gerrit Viljoen, the Head of the 
Broederbond and Newsweek provided a profile on Joe Slovo.41  
 
Looking at coverage provided by the US daily newspapers of such events, I found that when 
these demonstrations occurred in 1980, correspondents from most newspapers were present 
to file extensive reports. Front page articles and in many instances, headline stories appeared 
in The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times. Most 
reports painted a picture of a crisis situation afflicting the country. The story in the 
Washington Post was written, with much of the information coming from the South African 
Press Association. This indicated that for the first time South African police tried to stop 
foreign correspondents from accessing the sites of these disturbances to provide firsthand 
accounts.42 
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The handling of the South African problems by commercial television networks was difficult 
to gauge. But according to Sanford Ungar who conducted a survey of South Africa in the 
American media, it was found through a computer check at ABC that during the first eleven 
months of 1980, there had been 27 references to South Africa on “the World News 
Tonight.”43 But the picture was different in public broadcasting coverage where South Africa 
featured prominently in the in-depth discussions of foreign policy on the nightly “McNeil 
Lehrer Report.” Records of National Public Radio (NPR) reveal that from October 1978-
March 1980, there were about 86 pieces about South Africa. This brought the monthly 
average to about five. Reports consisted of pieces from a part-time correspondent based in 
Johannesburg or an interview with an observer of events for about five minutes. Since 
March 1980, the coverage by NPR on South Africa increased further. 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from this assessment of the coverage provided by the American 
media is that correspondents, through their respective newspapers, provided a very negative 
view of the apartheid state. Their views demonstrated their intense hostility to apartheid and 
their impatience for a time when all South Africans may enjoy the process of one-man-one-
vote. However it is vital to recognise that while the media establishment remained highly 
critical of the intolerable racial problems in South Africa, it remained resolute in its rejection 
of violence as a means to achieving majority rule in South Africa. For Ungar, on the question 
of whether Americans could get an accurate analysis of the South African dilemma, one 
thing was certain-it was “far easier to learn about South African from the American media 
than to learn about any other country or issues in sub-Saharan Africa.”44 
 
 
Opportunities for US Activism in the 1980s 
While these different sectors helped advance the ANC‟s struggle in the ANC, I contend that 
it was events in the USA between 1981 and 1984 that moved the ANC‟s attempts to 
establish a relationship with the US and the work of the activists to a whole new level. In this 
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regards I would focus on May 1981 which proved to be critical for this process. It also acted 
as a catalyst that was needed by the USA anti-apartheid activists to legitimize their actions 
within the ambit of mainstream American politics. In that month, Randall Robinson of 
Transafrica received a phone call from a US State Department official who wished to remain 
anonymous, but who offered to drop off classified state department documents that 
described the framework for a new alliance between the USA and South Africa.  The 
significance of this framework which will be elaborated upon later in this chapter. That this 
phone call changed the tide of developments was undeniable. Suffice at this point to add that 
the following points in these documents leaked to Robinson encapsulated the trend of US 
policy towards South Africa on the one hand and the African National Congress on the 
other.  
 
We want to open a new chapter in relations with South Africa---We will not allow others to 
dictate what our relations with South Africa will be –we may continue to differ on apartheid-
--but we can cooperate ---our cooperative relationship would also recognize the key 
economic role played by South Africa in the region….45 
 
Barely three years later on 21 November 1984, Randall Robinson, Mary Frances Berry, a 
member of the US Civil Rights Commission, Congressman Walter Fauntroy, and Elinor 
Holmes Norton, a Georgetown University Law Professor, entered the South African 
embassy in Washington on the pretext of keeping a meeting with the Ambassador. Their 
true intention was to stage a sit in and court arrest.46 They were successful in this endeavour. 
Following their release from prison on thanksgiving morning, they announced the founding 
of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) whose principle objective was to secure the 
passage of the comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa. 
 
What happened between these two events is critical in understanding firstly how the 
different relationships evolved and secondly the issues that galvanized the anti-apartheid 
movement into action. Reagan was inaugurated as President of the United States in January 
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1981. Only four months later on 27 May 1981, Randall Robinson received that visit from the 
anonymous state department official(alluded to earlier on) who urged the Transafrica leader 
to “use them[the documents] as you see fit” as “this is a terrible and indefensible thing the 
administration is doing here…”47 “Mindful that the disclosure of sensitive policy materials is 
not a matter to be taken lightly,” Robinson felt it necessary to “encourage broad public 
debate” by making the documents available to the Washington Post the very next morning.  
Within two days the papers were authenticated by the State Department and the Post ran the 
story a day later.48 A week later the story made its way into international newspapers. At this 
point it might be pertinent to raise the question of why the release of such documentation 
was considered vital to advancing the cause of the struggle in South Africa. 
 
I would argue that while the documents themselves contained texts of classified State 
Department memoranda which described discussions and preparations for talks between 
American and South African foreign policy officials, their importance could be discerned 
from the evidence they provided on why South Africa continued with its belligerent 
behaviour and wanton debauchery. They also provided evidence of how the interests of the 
country‟s oppressed majority were sacrificed for the goal of restoring South Africa to 
“international respectability and a role in the western alliance.”49   
 
 
The Unholy Partnership 
The documents provided vital proof of discussions held at a meeting which took place in 
Pretoria between 15-16 April 1981, at which the South African foreign Minister, Pik Botha, 
South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan, US Assistant Secretary-designate Chester 
Crocker and State Department official Alan Keyes were present. From the Memorandum of 
the conversation that took place, it was apparent that three issues dominated the discussions. 
They were the issue of „trust‟ between the two countries, the Soviet problem and Namibia. 
Botha raised the first issue within the context of the press reports which had appeared since 
the November election in the US and to which Crocker referred to as „misinformation and 
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disinformation” on the part of the media.50 Crocker was of the view that South African 
distrust of the US grew out of the “1975-1976 experience and the Carter period.”51 
 
In an attempt to alleviate further suspicion of American intentions, the Assistant Secretary of 
State provided assurances by alluding to a change in American public opinion on foreign 
policy since the Reagan victory-thus reversing the trend of the post Vietnam years- pointing 
to the possibility of improved relations between the US and SA. Botha‟s response to this was 
to request that there be no repeat of Walter Mondale‟s “one-man-one vote” statement.52 
South Africa‟s assistance was sought in combating Soviet influence in the region and 
cooperation in resolving the Namibian dilemma. The meeting was concluded with an 
invitation to Botha to visit the US. 
 
From the briefing documents for the proposed meeting to be held in May 1981 at the State 
Department in Washington, it was apparent that Secretary of State Alexander Haig would sit 
with Pik Botha to continue the discussions began by Crocker in Pretoria a month before, on 
the new era of friendship between the USA and South Africa. It was expected that Haig 
would offer US assistance to “work to end South Africa‟s polecat status in the world and 
seek to restore its place as a legitimate and important regional actor with whom we can 
cooperate.”53 Drafted by the new Assistant Secretary of State, the new strategy was adopted 
as a mechanism to draw the US away from “confrontation” and into a “watershed 
relationship of „constructive engagement.”54         
 
At the same time I would contend that this new strategy was a significant point in guiding 
the strategies of the ANC and of the Solidarity groups. For the anti-apartheid groups, “each 
time the US and South African governments did something, it created new opportunities for 
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us to do something new and to expand our coalition.”55 This statement is important in 
understanding the strategy of US Solidarity groups and the success they finally secured. It 
also allows me to reflect on a remark made by a Reagan Campaign assistant during the 
campaign year with regard to the Reagan‟s knowledge of Southern Africa. “The problem 
with Reagan,” he added, “is that all he knows about Southern Africa is that he‟s on the side 
of the whites.”56 With the benefit of hindsight, one can only argue for the profound 
significance of this observation which perhaps encapsulates the policy of “constructive 
engagement” towards the apartheid regime.  
 
In a nationally televised interview with Walter Cronkite on CBS, undertaken six weeks after 
his inauguration, Reagan described South Africa as a “friendly nation, a country of strategic 
consequence to the free world and a wartime ally.”57 On the issue of her being a “friendly 
nation,” comment is unnecessary. His reference to her “strategic consequence” was perhaps 
not unusual as this area remained the guiding factor in determining the parameters of the 
US-SA relationship over the years. Perceptions of South Africa‟s strategic value emerged at 
different fora and in numerous discussions. For example, in 1977, the influential news 
bulletin, Dines Letter, reported that “South Africa is emerging as a new and unpredictable 
giant, and will inevitably become a superpower.”58 This deduction was based on the fact that 
the country controlled 40 percent of the world‟s uranium reserves, which the publication 
considered to be “the fuel of the future” and 70 percent of the world‟s gold reserves which it 
identified as the “money of the future.”59 In addition, the news bulletin pointed to the 
availability of an abundance of land, cheap labour and a combination of “British and Dutch 
brainpower which it argued were all the vital ingredients of an “economic explosion.”60 As 
for being a “wartime” ally, the presidential aides should have briefed him on the pro-Nazi 
sentiment displayed by Afrikaners. 
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Constructive Engagement and its Impact on US Activism and the ANC  
Reagan‟s „constructive engagement‟ policy which was  used as a framework for US policy 
towards the Third World, had its roots in the Kissinger years, and was clearly expounded by 
Kissinger during his testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee in 1975, during which he 
explained the shift in US policy.61 For the new administration, the events unfolding on the 
African continent caused much consternation. The collapse of Portuguese rule in 
Mozambique and Angola had serious repercussions for the Rhodesian dilemma. The pace of 
resistance activity in South Africa was spurred on by these events as well as by those 
victories secured through armed struggle in Algeria, Cuba, China and Vietnam. All of these 
developments, together with the events in Iran still fresh in the minds of the new 
administration, it was not surprising to learn that the events in Africa were looked upon as 
being urgent and loaded with global repercussions.62   
  
Making the apartheid state a partner in its quest to direct the course of events and 
developments in the Southern African region proved to be dangerous to the African states in 
the region, to the activities for resistance movements such as the African National Congress 
and to the Solidarity movements within the United States. Equally dangerous was the team 
which Reagan selected to assist him in the pursuit of his strategic plan for the continent. The 
team included staunch anti-communists such as the First Foreign Secretary, General Haig 
whose views on race “put him in the same clubroom with the South African military” and 
who “would quietly pretend to beat drums on the table” when African Affairs were brought 
up for discussion.63   
 
Even more pertinent to this discussion on the unholy partnership was the influence of the 
“Reagan Doctrine.” While „Constructive Engagement‟ has been used as a framework for the 
understanding of Reagan‟s policy towards Africa, it was the “Reagan Doctrine” that shaped 
US policy towards all parts of the globe, including Southern Africa. This policy which was 
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developed when the new administration took office in 1981, and which went further than 
the traditional confines of „containment‟ of the Soviet Union, remained secret until the 
spring of 1985. For Sean Gervasi and Sybil Wong, who undertook a critical analysis of this 
„Doctrine‟, it was under the terms of this policy that the US in the 1980s “became involved 
in covert operations, proxy wars, counter insurgencies and „stability operations‟ around the 
world.”64 And it was this policy that led the US in a secret alliance with the apartheid state to 
“wage unconventional warfare against the front line states” of the region.65 It was within the 
context of this framework that Reagan decided on a position that would be supportive of 
South Africa, while encouraging the latter to move towards “non-racial liberal democracy” 
through the introduction of moderate reforms. He also pledged to assist in the process of 
resisting all attempts, including that by the United Nations, to isolate South Africa. In 
relation to activities in the region, the President decided that it would be in both their 
interests to maintain strict secrecy about “active collaboration” in support of South Africa 
and about certain actions taken against the frontline states.66  
 
What emerges from these statements is that Reagan, throughout his terms of office, was 
consistently out of touch with political realities. As late as March 1985 he claimed that the 
violence in South Africa resulted from “blacks fighting against blacks, because there‟s still a 
tribal situation involved there in that community.”67 This was not lost on influential senators 
in his administration, and this included Richard Lugar, Nancy Kassebaum and Robert Dole 
who cautioned Reagan on many occasions on the effect of his South African views on the 
domestic front. The latter did finally recognize the need for a new foreign policy decision on 
this issue, acknowledging that “there‟s a lot of politics involved. This has now become a 
domestic civil rights issue.”68 
  
All of these developments as well as the public pronouncements on policy coming out of the 
USA, such as those elucidated by the President in his interview, clearly sent positive signals 
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to the South Africans in Pretoria. This was heightened by the many instances of contact 
between state officials in Washington and government officials in SA-as indicated by the 
leaked state department documents.   
 
On 9 March 1981, five senior members of the South African military intelligence met with 
officials of the National Security Council and Defence Intelligence agency in Washington. 
The South African delegation included Lt. General P. van der Westhuizen, the Chief of 
South African military intelligence and Commander Willem du Plesies, the Chief of Naval 
intelligence. Such meetings caused some embarrassment as they violated the ban on 
meetings with South African military personnel by state officials. 
 
These meetings which were arranged by John Sears who was a registered agent for South 
Africa and Reagan‟s former campaign manager, demonstrated that a decision had been taken 
by the new administration to restore military intelligence links between the US and South 
Africa that were severed by the Carter administration.69 But evidence has demonstrated 
through the events of January 1981 that military intelligence links had already been 
established. 
 
On January 1981, South African commandos stormed an ANC house in a Maputo suburb, 
killing several members of the ANC. A few hours earlier, Haig declared that the “war against 
international terrorism” was a priority of the new administration‟s foreign policy.70 The 
government of Samora Machel accused US intelligence of providing information to the 
South Africans on the details of their proposed target. Joaquim Chissano, the Mozambican 
Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to evidence linking the CIA to the raid.71   
 
From such evidence it was learned that the CIA had been gathering information amongst 
others, in the area of ANC activity in Maputo. A month before the raid, the CIA sought and 
obtained information related to the location of the ANC houses. The Reagan 
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administration‟s response to this accusation from Mozambique was to stop food aid to the 
country at that catastrophic time of severe natural disasters.72 Yet again, the strengthening of 
military intelligence links between the USA and SA became a key feature of the USA-SA 
relationship in the 1980s. Hence the report by the New York Times, on 23 July 1986, that the 
US and British intelligence had been exchanging information with their South African 
counterparts about the activities of the ANC over a period of time, appeared as no major 
revelation. According to the report, the exchange was “systematic and regular.”73 On the 
issue of the kind of information that was exchanged, it was disclosed that these included data 
such as “political activities, ANC bombing targets and the movement of leaders like Oliver 
Tambo, in return for South African data on Soviet and Cuban military and political 
involvement throughout Southern Africa.”74    
 
In September 1982, William Casey, Director of the CIA, met with military and government 
leaders in South Africa. The purpose of this meeting, it was learned, was to propose a US 
backed strategy to secure South Africa‟s borders. This issue was vital to South Africa‟s 
interests as she feared that if neighbouring states increased their support for the African 
National Congress, the country would be subjected to increasing sabotage and cross border 
raids.  
 
Two months before Casey‟s visit, Randall Robinson again made available to the Press in 
Washington another leaked State department classified document which provided vital 
evidence of South Africa‟s intention to apply for a new loan from the International 
Monetary fund.75 In view of the public disclosure, Secretary of State Alexander Haig advised 
South Africa on the adoption of a new strategy which would see her delaying her application 
until after the World Bank meetings took place in Washington in the fall. The scheduled 
meeting of the International Monetary fund was scheduled for Nov. 4, immediately 
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following after the World Bank meetings. With US support, Haig assured South Africa that 
the IMF would approve a loan in the amount of $1.1 billion.76 
 
Within a week of the intelligence group‟s visit to Washington, South African air-force jets 
destroyed a SWAPO base in Lubango, Angola which lay almost 200km north of the 
Angolan-Namibian border. This raid was South Africa‟s deepest invasion into Angola in six 
years. A month later, on April 30 1981, the Reagan state together with Britain and France 
vetoed four UN Resolutions calling for sanctions against Pretoria. Evidence of such support 
in the early period of Reagan‟s tenure, was enough to encourage brutality and oppression on 
the part of the apartheid state.          
 
Support for the South Africa minority also implied the necessity of ensuring that the African 
National Congress remained isolated and impeded in its attempts to advance the struggle for 
freedom. I would contend that this need drove US involvement in the development of the 
Nkomati Accord with Mozambique and the Disengagement Agreement with Angola.77 In 
fact the Reagan administration not only collaborated with the apartheid regime, but it also 
attempted to jeopardize the ANC image as the legitimate liberation organization of the 
freedom struggle. Justification for this strategy was provided by the US Deputy Ambassador 
to the UN, Mr. Liechtenstein, who pointed out that: 
 
We do not perceive South Africa to constitute an external imperialistic threat to even its 
close neighbours. Destabilisation will remain in force until Angola and Mozambique do not 
permit their territory to be used by terrorists to attack South Africa. We do not regard the 
ANC as engaged in a legitimate quest for power. Nine out of ten deaths inflicted by ANC 
terrorist‟s action in South Africa are blacks. And the Pretoria government is certainly a more 
legitimate government than the Soviet government.78 
    
Further evidence of US attempts to paralyse the activities of the ANC could be found even 
in statements coming directly from the White House. On 22 July 1986, the US President 
accused the ANC of “calculated terror” and expressed the view that the “South African 
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government is under no obligation to negotiate the future of the country with any 
organization that proclaims a goal of creating a communist state and uses terrorist tactics to 
achieve it.”79 I would again emphasise that events and the pressure exerted by civil society 
compelled the administration into a meeting with Tambo, a „terrorist‟ no doubt.80 But official 
views on terrorism and meetings with those considered to be hostile to the US and hence 
inappropriately labelled as „terrorists, continued to pervade successive US administrations to 
the present time. This was evident during the 2008 US Presidential primaries.81   
 
Attempts to destroy the legitimacy of the ANC continued unabatedly during the first term of 
Reagan‟s presidency. An example of such a strategy was the 1982 hearings organized by the 
sub-committee of the US Senate on Security and Terrorism. Under the Chairmanship of 
Jeremiah Denton, the mandate of the sub-committee was to investigate the role of the Soviet 
Union in “fermenting and supporting terrorism in Southern Africa.”82 Through the 
testimony of „witnesses‟, it sought to establish the extent through which the USSR had 
successfully penetrated and „taken over‟ the ANC and SWAPO.83 Essentially what the 
committee was expected to do was to justify the administration‟s perception of the ANC 
being a „terrorist‟ movement‟ that was supported by the Soviet Union. Alfred Nzo, the 
Secretary-General of the ANC was bemused by the futility of this exercise, pointing out that 
the ANC and the Soviet Union made no secret of the fact that the latter as well as the 
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Challenges for the Solidarity Groups and the ANC 
1984 was a particularly bleak year in all respects for the ANC and the Solidarity movement. 
Events on both sides of the Atlantic did not bode well for advancing the struggle locally as 
well as internationally. In that year Reagan won a second term of office through a landslide 
victory. This victory was a startling revelation that the American public accepted the status 
quo in relations to the US administration and its foreign policy direction. According to 
sources within the movement, who had direct links with those based in Lusaka at the time, 
the possibility of winning the support of the US state department and the American public 
seemed doomed.85 Given the hostility that pervaded Washington, it was apparent that the 
ANC could not leverage any support nor shape the debates that took place over South 
Africa. They therefore appealed to the anti-apartheid lobby to take on that Herculean role of 
turning the tide of support in Washington. But even for the solidarity groups, this was a 
crippling time for their activities as evidenced by their failure to position the horrors of 
apartheid into the spotlight of the election arena. Cecelie Counts, recalled hearing from 
Black South Africans that “when Reagan was re-elected, whites were dancing in the streets” 
and reassuring themselves that “they were safe for another four years.”86 
 
For any scholar studying this period, the writing was on the wall. The international tide was 
not turning against South Africa. For PW Botha, the events recounted earlier served to 
strengthen his notion that the position of South Africa was favoured. This was reinforced by 
developments arising out of his introduction a year before, of his new constitutional 
proposals or „moderate reforms‟. These proposals, which made provision for a Tricameral 
Parliament with limited representation for South Africa‟s Indian and Coloured population, 
excluded the country‟s Black population from representation. On Wednesday, 2 November 
1983, two million white voters, comprising about seventy five percent of all eligible white 
voters, went to the polls and through a referendum, granted Botha their approval for his 
new constitutional proposals. Reaction from those allied to the apartheid state was not 
unusual. The US State Department welcomed the results of the referendum as did a large 
segment of the South African and American business community. For a euphoric PW Botha, 
                                                 
85 Conversations with struggle veteran Phyllis Naidoo in Durban, April 2000; Dr. Lucky Mabasa, student 
activist n the 1970‟s and later General Manager of the ANC, Luthuli House, October 2002.  
86 Counts Interview, 30 November 2002.  








the results vindicated him and strengthened his resolved “to go ahead with proper and 
evolutionary reform” without bringing Blacks into the central government in any meaningful 
way. 
 
Reactions from opposition groups within South Africa were predictable. The United 
Democratic Front (UDF) dismissed the results of the referendum held for the purposes of 
setting up what it considered to be “a bogus parliament.”87 The activities of this movement, 
which was launched as a national organization at a rally of seven thousand people in Cape 
Town on 20 August 1983, would eventually prove crucial to the solidarity groups in the 
USA, the ANC and to the despondent South African majority. Writing on the 20th 
anniversary of the organisation‟s birth, Frank Chikane, former General Secretary of the 
South African Council of Churches, explained that the UDF represented but one pillar of a 
four pronged strategy to bring the apartheid regime to its knees.88 The implementation of 
Botha‟s new constitution in 1984 resulted in organizations such as the UDF moving beyond 
strategies of protest to those aimed at causing situations of “ungovernability.”89 As such 
notions of mass resistance took root in South Africa, evidence suggests that the apartheid 
state apparatus not only rapidly lost control of the situations in the Black townships but it 
found itself unable to monitor the activities of the UDF.90      
  
On September 3, a few months after the launch of the UDF and just before Reagan‟s re-
election, Prime Minister PW Botha implemented his set of moderate reforms. This resulted 
in protest action in Black townships throughout the country.91 Within a few weeks, Botha 
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ordered the arrest of the country‟s Black trade union leadership. These events were not lost 
to the international community who were taken by surprise. In the UN, the General 
Assembly voted on a nonbinding resolution that condemned the arrests. The resolution was 
passed with an overwhelming majority, but the United States of America had abstained.    
 
Given the brutality of the South African state and the increasing numbers of deaths, torture, 
detention and harassment of activists in the country, it was considered unacceptable by many 
that the US should abstain. In trying to explore the mood of the time, I have found that the 
US abstention proved crucial to the work of the Washington network. It was a critical time 
that marked a turning point in the history of the movement‟s work. For Randall Robinson, 
as with many other US activists, this was the last straw. Such action was considered a blatant 
betrayal by their country which was described as a “two-faced democracy‟ and a “peacock 
that would not see itself.”92 Barely two months before this, Thabo Mbeki had visited the US. 
During his stay in there, he met with Robinson and addressed groups such as Transafrica 
imploring them to make “American officials listen” to the voices of South Africa‟s 
oppressed.93 Yet the existence of a toxic cocktail of apartheid brutality and US support 
created much embarrassment and disappointment for these activists who recognized their 
failure to respond to Mbeki‟s appeal. After many discussions and meetings of the group, they 
reached an agreement on the need for an aggressive course of action. It was at this point that 
Robinson and his colleagues at Transafrica hatched the plan to enter the embassy in 
Washington and to stage a sit in as a strategy aimed at drawing the attention of the US public 
and State Department to the real plight of South Africa‟s oppressed.  
 
For many activists such as Cecelie Counts, this situation together with the television images 
of police brutality being beamed from South Africa on local TV stations, made them realize 
“that they had to do something different.”94 Hence Robinson was able to draw support from 
such quarters. Relying on the support network in Washington,  Counts succeeded in 
lobbying support from the Churches, student groups and community organizations-all of 
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whom stood by to lend their support to Robinson and his group as they left the embassy 
under escort by six uniformed US Secret Service Officers for their journey to prison. It was 
this group again that was there to welcome them upon their release from prison on 
Thanksgiving morning. The next day marked the birth of the Free South Africa movement. 
 
The formation of this movement proved to be an effective strategy to alert the Washington 
community as well as others to the plight of South Africa‟s disenfranchised majority. Counts 
recalled the daily demonstrations that were held for almost a year outside the South African 
embassy, with arrests taking place every weekend. She also provided a vivid account of the 
commitment of demonstrators to the South African cause, by explaining how, on some days, 
Massachusetts Avenue would be lined with up to five thousand demonstrators, in spite of 
the cold and snow. 
 
Randall Robinson‟s recollection of those that came to Washington to participate in 
demonstrations is evidence not only of the commitment alluded to by Counts, but also the 
growing strength of the solidarity network. Gay MacDougall of the Lawyers for Civil Rights, 
brought thousands of lawyers to demonstrate; John Jacob brought the Urban National 
League; a clergyman drove a bus load of supporters from the mid-west; Mayors like 
Coleman Young from Detroit were arrested; Coretta Scott King was taken away with her 
children; Rory Kennedy and her brother Douglas were arrested; Senator Edward Kennedy 
came to address the crowds;  every member of the Congressional Black Caucus, except two, 
were arrested; Stevie Wonder was handcuffed at the embassy;  Jesse Jackson was arrested; 
Lowell Weicker, a Republican from Connecticut became the first and only US Senator ever 
arrested in an act of Civil Disobedience.95 
 
While the list of those arrested reads like the „Who‟s Who” of the celebrity group of society, 
the majority of those who participated in these demonstrations as well as those that took 
place throughout the country were purely volunteers, people who “cared a lot but had been 
involved in their own work as well.”96 Much their time was made available in the evenings or 
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on weekends. But the involvement of „celebrity‟ activists was effective in drawing the 
attention of the American media to the work of the anti-apartheid group. Muzwai Muntali‟s 
description of the American media carried a tone of sharp cynicism, referring to them as 
being “fickle and crisis driven.” But as I later learned, such cynicism was not unjustified. 
Drawing the interest of the media required creativity and effort on the part of the 
movement. If that meant glamorizing the work of the movement, it had to be done. To hold 
their interest, demonstrations had to comprise of large gatherings of activists involved in 
„innovative activity.‟97 
 
One example of such „innovative activity‟ took place in August 1985, just after South Africa 
imposed a state of emergency and banned public funerals. Paul Newman, Jesse Jackson, 
major civil rights and labour leaders joined 10 000 people in a „funeral march‟ to the State 
Department to protest the Reagan administration‟s policy of “constructive engagement.” 
They carried black cardboard coffins in memory of those killed in South Africa in the 
previous eleven months of unrest.98 Munthali recalled the situation where US activists began 
building and spray painting coffins in their home-much to the horror of their neighbours- 
for a mock funeral to draw attention in the US to this form of police brutality. This march 
was a successful „gimmick‟ which kept the press and television enthralled and eager to 
capture this event. 
 
 
How the US Media saw US Anti-Apartheid Activism 
An interesting assessment of the USA mainstream media to all of this was provided by a 
fellow journalist, Roger Wilkins in an interview which he gave to Transafrica in 1985. This 
interview was useful in understanding the dynamics that pervaded the media sector at the 
time. According to Wilkins, since the implementation of Botha‟s new constitutional 
dispensation, mainstream American press coverage of South Africa “has been steady.”99 But 
he conveyed his dissatisfaction with the quality of the media coverage especially during the 
1984-1985 years. Using the birth of the FSAM as an example, he pointed out that that event 
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was the “most important initiative undertaken by black private citizens since Martin Luther 
King died and the most successful.”  
 
Yet the media did not perceive it in that light. He drew attention to coverage provided by 
columnists such as Joseph Kraft and Richard Cohen who wrote “that [the FSAM] was “just 
a bunch of civil rights people who should stick to [protesting] budget cuts in domestic 
programmes.”100 But when the movement‟s influence succeeded in pervading 28 cities, 
articles in major magazines like Newsweek and People conveyed a perception of  a spontaneous 
movement that “sprang full grown from the consciousness of white America” when in fact 
“black Americans created it, started it and kept it alive.” For him it was easy for editors to 
initially dismiss South Africa issue because it involved the oppression of people “who are 
not like you and who do not look like you.”101 
 
 
US Activism Spreads 
While the anti-apartheid movement spread throughout the country with demonstrations 
taking place in California, New York, Boston, Houston, Chicago and Pittsburgh, for activists 
in South Africa all of this activity taking place across the Atlantic appeared to be glamorous 
and exciting.102 This was not so. While there may have been many high moments, activists 
also referred to the many low moments. Counts, who was at the embassy every day, 
explained the lows when the turnout on the coldest days would “shrink beyond our ability to 
form a small circle of pickets” and that by month nine, symptoms of „picketitis‟ set in.103 
 
In the meanwhile, another related movement-the Divestment Movement- began to grow at a 
rapid rate in response to developments in South Africa as well as in response to pressure 
from local anti-apartheid groups. In the state of Connecticut, several divestment protests 
occurred at university campuses which in turn led to the formation of the Connecticut Anti-
Apartheid Committee (CAAC). Comprising a core group of about 6-10 people who worked 
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from their homes on a very low budget, the CAAC group worked for almost two years to 
educate people of the state about the evils of apartheid and to build a state-wide network. 
This was done through the distribution of printed material, speaking opportunities, 
newspaper articles and conferences and social events. For example, in June 1980, the CAAC 
held a dinner for about 200 people to mark the fourth anniversary of the Soweto uprising. 
Dumisani Khumalo, a South African who worked for the American Committee on Africa 
was invited to address guests. Khumalo used this opportunity to urge guests to pressurize 
American companies to divest from South Africa.104 
 
A simultaneous development was the introduction in 1981 of two bills by anti-apartheid 
legislators in the state legislature calling for the sale of all state investments in corporations 
or banks conducting business with the apartheid institutions in South Africa. The CAAC 
played a critical role in this initiative by organizing a lobbying campaign which saw leaders of 
community groups, labour unions, religious groups and black organisations being brought to 
the state capitol. In spite of shock expressed by the business community, the bill passed 
through both houses with more than the two thirds majority. For the CAAC this was a 
victory, but it was to be a short lived one as only two weeks later the Divestment Bill 
suffered a veto by Governor O‟ Neill.105 A year later, on June 9 1982, an amended version of 
the bill passed again through both houses and was finally signed into law by O‟Neill. But the 
passing of this bill into law would not have been possible without the work of the CAAC 
which was galvanized into action by the 1981 veto.106  The Divestment issue in Connecticut 
and the work of the CAAC drew the attention of state representatives in other parts of the 
country. With the result, by the end of 1982, cities such as Philadelphia, Wilmington and 
Grand Rapids and states such as Connecticut, Massachusetts and Michigan had approved 
the divestment of $250 million in public money.107 
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The Work of the ACOA 
While much of this chapter focuses on the Washington based lobby groups, the work of the 
American Committee on Africa(ACOA), the oldest anti-apartheid organization in the United 
States, also merits scrutiny for it contributed greatly to the developments in Washington and 
the rest of the country, in driving action against South Africa. In 1981, Jennifer Davis 
succeeded George Houser as executive Director of ACOA. In that year, Davis together with 
Dumisani Khumalo and other activists spent much of that year organizing the public 
investment conference, which was funded by various churches and individuals. The 
conference was attended by nearly 200 union leaders, anti-apartheid activists, city officials, 
financial experts and state legislators on June 12, 1981.108 In a speech at the Church Centre, 
Julian Bond from Georgia levelled criticism at the Reagan administration and appealed to the 
conference participants to “end American investment in evil.”109 This speech, together with 
workshops which were held on the following day and the final plenary session which was 
critical in eliciting the commitment of participants to act, proved effective. According to 
Davis and other activists like Richard Knight, the legislators were so “fired up” by the 
conference resolutions and discussions that when they returned home, every one filed a 
divestment bill.110 
 
The work of the ACOA continued on the East Coast of the USA and was evident in their 
work in the formation of MassDivest, an anti-apartheid coalition which comprised 
organizations such as the Black Ecumenical Council, the Catholic archdiocese of Boston, the 
Massachusetts Council of Churches, the Massachusetts Teachers Association, the local 
chapter of Transafrica, the American Federation of State County and Municipal employees 
and other sympathetic groups and which was devoted to seeking a policy of total 
divestment.111 Employing the same strategies as their colleagues in Connecticut, and applying 
the necessary pressure on State House through Representative Mel King of Boston and Jack 
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Backman, a white liberal senator, Mass Divest was successful in ensuring that the full 
divestment bill affecting $91 million in state investments, became law in January 1983.112 
 
With the support of the new Governor of Massachusetts, Michael Dukakis, the law was 
rapidly implemented and within nine months. Massie pointed out that $68 million dollars in 
investments in companies doing business in South Africa had been sold off. 
 
Events in Boston had been so heartening for Davis and the ACOA that they decided to hold 
the second national conference on Public Investment and South Africa in that city. The 
conference took place in April 1983 and brought together the same constituency that was 
present at the first conference. Seizing the opportunities created by the mood of this 
conference Davis and Khumalo and other staff members of ACOA, criss-crossed the United 
States to spread the work about divestment. For example in 1983, Khumalo travelled to the 
three states of Nebraska, Rhode Island and Nevada while Davis addressed the National 
Association of State Treasurers and Gail Hovey testified before the Illinois House of 
Representatives.113 They also initiated a newsletter called Public Investment and South Africa.114 
 
Using the euphoric mood that seemed to pervade efforts to heighten awareness of the South 
African situation, ACOA focused on corporate ethics and constructive engagement. Writing  
for the Washington Post on 21 May 1983, Davis pointed out: 
 
Whatever the original intention of Leon Sullivan, the author of the principles, the principles 
have been an extremely useful tool for the South African government and the 
corporations…Instead of discussing the role that the corporations play in supplying the 
government with vital products and technology, the debate focuses on the working  
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conditions…of workers who represent fewer than one percent of the black labour 
force…what the state fears is not a code of conduct that makes it easier for foreign 
corporations to stay , but pressure on them to pull out.115 
 
 
The Realisation of Goals 
The activities of the Free South Africa Movement and the other anti-apartheid lobby groups 
heightened awareness in the United States of the plight of South African Blacks with the 
result that the apartheid became a broad based concern in the US. According to the 
Washington-based Investor Responsibility Research Centre, five American Companies, 
including General Electric and the VF Corporation, which made Lee blue jeans, pulled out 
of South Africa since January 1986. In 1985, thirty eight American Companies stopped 
doing business with South Africa. In 1984, only six stopped doing business. A spokesman 
for the centre said 267 were continuing with their South African operations. AT the end of 
1984, American companies had $1.8 billion tied up in South African interests, but by, 1985, 
he added, the figure had dropped considerably. But for Catherine Hargrove, a Free South 
Africa campaigner, “corporate campaigns were not traditionally short…people understand 
what kind of struggle it‟s going to be…we‟re prepared to go the distance with it.”116 
 
 
The ANC and US Solidarity:  The Relationship Grows 
The ANC has often taken the credit for winning the battle on the international battleground 
and in so doing, continued to play down the role of the anti-apartheid groups. But evidence 
has yielding the following finding-that the anti-apartheid lobby created the right climate for 
the ANC in the US especially in Washington.  By doing this, they succeeded in driving a 
wedge between the apartheid state and the State Department. This was clear from the 
preceding discussion which demonstrated the effectiveness of this group in raising awareness 
in the US of the ANC‟s plight and of clearing the way for the organisation‟s recognition as a 
legitimate liberation movement. This was done by facilitating more contact between ANC 
leaders and officials in Washington and corporate representatives.   
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It also needs to be emphasized that in spite of the anti-west rhetoric, the ANC realized the 
importance of winning over official support from Washington and of using civil society to 
reach the US state authorities.  Just after Reagan‟s election, Secretary-General Alfred Nzo 
visited the USA in November of 1980. Addressing a banquet in Oakland he appealed for the 
support of “progressive forces” in the US by persuading those present that this was critical 
for the process of applying “concerted pressure” for the imposition of mandatory economic 
sanctions” on the apartheid regime.117 
 
As a result, the 1980s were characterised by more frequent visits of ANC leaders. In view of  
changing attitudes people were willing to meet with leaders such as Oliver Tambo and 
Thabo Mbeki who made visits to between 1980 and 1987. But this was not the case with the 
State Department and the White House-until September 1986 when Crocker met with 
Tambo in London. At the invitation of Transafrica and the Southern Africa Support group, 
Tambo visited the US in June 1981 to attend a conference of Black leaders in Washington, 
convened as a response to Reagan‟s policies on Southern Africa.118 While in Washington, 
Transafrica arranged for Tambo to hold separate meetings with representatives of Congress, 
the House of Representatives and the Senate Sub-committees on Africa. A meeting was also 
held with The Washington Post at its editorial offices.119 
 
Activists such as Cecelie Counts, Muzwai Munthali and William Minter recalled meeting with 
Tambo where issues such as the strengthening of links between the liberation organizations 
and the Solidarity movements was discussed. After the Washington meetings, Tambo, 
accompanied by Randall Robinson, travelled to Atlanta for meetings with Mayor Lowery, 
Senator Julian Bond, Coretta Scott King and Andrew Young. The visit was concluded with 
an address delivered to a session of the UN Special Committee on Apartheid, which was 
chaired by Ambassador Akpokorode Clark, the Nigerian Ambassador to the UN and the 
Chair of the Special Committee. After his visits, Tambo agreed on the effectiveness and 
strength of “our firm and dedicated allies in the United States” and on the need to maintain 
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the “consistent fights on both sides” to guarantee that plots hatched by Pretoria can be 
defeated.120   
 
In October of the same year a conference was held by the Churches in New York City  in 
co-sponsorship with the ANC and SWAPO  to assess the impact of the links between the 
SA  state and the US government.. Alfred Nzo led the ANC delegation to the conference.  
An important aspect of the Conference was the crafting of the historic New York 
declaration which stated that: 
 
We have a special responsibility to play…it is our government that keeps apartheid alive, 
feds it, oils it and arms it. The heroics people of the ANC and SWAPO are destroying 
apartheid from within, but we can end our government‟s pact with racism, which if not 
obliterated, will destroy us all. This conference proudly takes up this fight and joins the 
peoples of the world.121 
 
In 1983 Tambo again visited the US as a guest of Transafrica. For activists, the visits by 
ANC leaders was considered an effective strategy in drawing the interest of American civil 
society which was image driven. Hence calls such as “Oliver Tambo is coming. Come and 
see a real liberation leader” provided the crowds needed to fill the halls. Tambo remained the 
favourite of the US public, but as argued earlier on, he was still not the favourite of the State 
Department, which preferred contact with the UDF and COSATU. The reason for this was 
driven by their understanding that these organizations were moderate and less militant than 
the ANC. They failed to realise that the UDF was formed in response to the ANC‟s call and 
that there was a strong bond between these two organisations, which had to be denied, for 
obvious reasons, at the time. 
 
Of the many visits undertaken by the ANC leadership to the USA, perhaps the most 
significant one was that undertaken by Tambo in 1987 in response to the first invitation 
from the White House to meet, not with Reagan but with Secretary of State George 
                                                 
120 Sechaba. July 1981. 
121 Sechaba. January 1982. 








Shultz.122 This meeting has been extensively analysed in my previous chapter, but I would 
still add that it was unrivalled in significance. 
  
During a press conference held at the conclusion of the Kabwe Conference in June 1985, 
the ANC claimed that the process of isolating South Africa was rapidly gaining pace. It was 
even closer than ever before to fulfilling its main foreign policy objectives to mobilize the 
support of the international community for South Africa‟s isolation and to gain international 
recognition as the only legitimate representative of the country‟s oppressed. This was 
reiterated at the ANC‟s International Conference held in Arusha, Tanzania in December 
1987.123 In fact by 1986, with the passing of the CAAA and with increased official state 
contacts being made between the ANC and the US government, I would contend that the 
situation was already in place, with the battle for the American turf already secured by the 
ANC.  But at the same time, I would reiterate my view that this was not possible without the 
work undertaken by the solidarity groups in the US who succeeded, through their activities 
and strategies in moving the ANC from the fringe of American politics to the mainstream. I 
have demonstrated through data presented that on its own, the ANC was unable to shape 
the political debates in Washington. This was a common view shared by all activists 
interviewed for the purposes of this study. Many went further to claim that the ANC had no 
voice in Washington and that Transafrica was the voice of the ANC. It was also their view 
that the ANC would not have been able to push through the CAAA without its 
collaboration with the solidarity groups. 
 
These views conveyed a certain degree of dissatisfaction with attempts by the ANC to 
downplay the role the anti-apartheid groups in the freedom struggle and certainly resulted in 
the tension which seems to characterize the relationship between these two movements in a 
post apartheid environment. A further contribution to this tension has been the criticism 
                                                 
122 There are virtually no details available of what transpired at the meeting or of the logistical arrangements for 
this meeting. But it has been confirmed by many sources that Chester Crocker was present. 
123 See Documents of the ANC conference, “Peoples of the World United against Apartheid for a Democratic 
South Africa,” 1-4 December 1987. Hosted by Tanzania, this was the ANC‟s first International conference 
and attracted over 500 delegates from all continents. This conference was also part of ANC‟s 75th anniversary 
celebrations. The aim of the conference was to bring together supporters of the ANC to collectively develop 
an international strategy for pushing the agenda for change inside South Africa and to map thoughts for a 
post apartheid society.   








levelled by activists on the political direction pursued by a post apartheid ANC government 
especially in areas of delivery of basic services, HIV Aids and Zimbabwe. This was 
evidenced by views shared at the AAM Conference at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in 
2004 and the ANC”s reaction to the convening of this meeting.. 
 
As Chair of the Conference as a member of the ANC, I was subjected to intense pressure 
from Senior ANC Officials to cancel the conference. Although authority to host and 
participate in such a conference was furnished by the Secretary-General of the Party a year 
prior to the conference being held, two months before the conference was due to be held 
immense pressure was applied to stop the conference. As this was an academic endeavour 
under the auspices of a University, the Conference Committee refused to relent under 
pressure from the ANC.  They took a collective decision to proceed with the conference as 
scheduled.  The ruling party‟s response to this was to prevent participation by leaders such as 
Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, with the result that the only senior level participation 
came from Ministers Kader Asmal, Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad and Mr. Ebrahim Ebrahim 
(representing the Presidency). South Africa and particularly the ANC‟s opportunity to 
personally thank the International Solidarity Movement during their presence here in the 




While my chapter may have provided the solidarity groups with a rather high profile in the 
struggle history, I would argue that given the work of the movement and its successes in 
pushing the South African agenda to the forefront of US politics, this was unavoidable. Also 
any attempt to understand the liberation struggle during this period must take into account 
the limitations and difficulties of the movement during this period, which have been alluded 
to in previous chapters of my work. It would be appropriate to therefore conclude this 
chapter with the regular plea which Walter Sisulu made to USA activists during the struggle 
years-- Ningadinwe Nangomso.  Translated it means, Please do not tire of supporting us, even tomorrow. 
                                                 
124 See also media reports on the conference in The Daily News (12 October 2004); The Natal Witness (21 
October 2004); Pretoria News (13 October 2004).        








This plea was well heeded and contributed in a phenomenal manner to the freedom we 
South Africans enjoy today.125 
 
                                                 
 125 Sunday Times (11 May 2003). “Sisulu‟s Heroic Struggles will be warmly remembered, even in the USA.”  












The African National Congress of South Africa has remained faithful to the cause of 
freedom. It leads the national struggle for all oppressed and exploited black people. It 
stands for a new order in South Africa where racism shall be a thing of the past and 
human dignity and equality shall prevail in the life of our country. But before that new 
order shall be born, many lives will be lost. We are ready to meet the challenge...1 
 
Indeed they were ready. Having analysed the dynamics which characterised the attempts 
of the African National Congress to forge a relationship with the United States of 
America, my thesis has shown that the ANC‟s success in this area and others was derived 
from this commitment to always “meet the challenges.” The view that it may not always 
have done so adequately is not a fair assessment given my argument that the ANC was 
working on a blank canvas, in a hostile domestic environment and in a global vacuum. 
This view makes my findings all the more satisfying. 
 
Looking at the history of the movement from 1945-1987 has allowed me to conclude 
that a relationship with the world‟s most powerful player enabled certain types of 
developments at particular points, making the ANC‟s continued existence a certainty. 
Moving its struggle to the international battleground signified a strategic intervention on 
the part of the ANC to ensure its survival. But this history has been characterised by 
prioritisations, reassessments and repositioning, indicating that South Africa‟s liberation 
protagonist would not allow itself to be undermined. From the crafting of documents 
and memoranda such as Our Foreign Policy Objectives, Strategy and Tactics and the Thabo 
Mbeki Memorandum, the ANC demonstrated that it was determined to navigate the 
numerous challenges in its path in a bid to secure the freedom of South Africa‟s 
oppressed majority.            
 
                                                 
1 Oliver Tambo. Speech at the 70th Anniversary of the African National Congress. Unity in Action: A Short 
History of the ANC(South Africa) 1912-1982 (London, African National Congress). 71. 







Starting out as an unknown and unrecognised entity within the US State structures, the 
African National Congress was strained to the limits as it confronted the narrow and 
obdurate stance of US administrations from John F. Kennedy to Ronald Reagan. These 
administrations positioned their international policies including their Africa policies, 
within the context of international global developments such as the Cold War. It was this 
factor, together with strategic and economic considerations that drove the USA‟s 
decision to close ranks with the apartheid state against the ANC, hence refusing to 
accord the ANC any recognition until the latter half of the 1980s. Documents such as the 
National Study Security Memorandum 39(NSSM 39), and the role of individuals such as 
Henry Kissinger complicated the ANC‟s attempts to swing US State support for its 
cause. 
 
Further complexities in the ANC‟s attempts to successfully position itself within the US 
state were presented by the challenges experienced on the African continent. These 
included the ANC‟s failure to influence African diplomacy or to even secure the support 
of the continent‟s most influential body, the Organisation of African Unity. The production 
of strategy documents such as the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa and African Strategy 
on Southern Africa clearly demonstrated that the major players on the continent treated the 
ANC with indifference. The conclusion of agreements such as the Nkomati Accord meant 
that the ANC‟s efforts to win over the African players would not see any encouraging 
results until the adoption of the Harare Declaration in August 1989.     
 
This thesis has been concerned with showing that the entire period under analysis was 
one of protracted struggle for the ANC. But the 1980s were the toughest years. These 
years have particular resonance for me as they represented my time in the USA from 
where I observed events in South Africa. Given the fact that political oppression had 
reached unprecedented levels in my country and that many of my comrades were 
disappearing, suffering arrest, torture, detention or seeking refuge in exile. Like others 
who had left loved ones behind, I retreated into a shell of despair. As I have argued in 
Chapter Four, even perestroika had dashed our hopes as we saw long and loyal friends like 
the Soviet Union, begin to cut ties with our movement.       
  
But unbeknown to us, for the USA, by the late 1980s, the writing was on the wall.  
Apartheid had to be dismantled. Events unfolding in South Africa, the efforts of the US 







and international anti-apartheid solidarity groups and international condemnation of the 
apartheid state, created intense pressure on Washington to reposition its South Africa 
policy.  The US State clearly did not want to seen, through its actions, as trailing behind 
or sitting on the sidelines. As was the usual strategy in relation to its international 
policies, the USA did not merely want a slice of the action, it wanted to be the main actor 
leading the process. From the moment of the passing of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act, the process commenced and continued with a series of diplomatic 
manoeuvres such as the formation of the Corporate Council, the implementation of 
Educational linkages and creation of educational opportunities and the convening of 
official meetings with the ANC. But it was the Shultz Commission Report of 1986 that acted 
as the saving grace for the ANC in the USA. By declaring Constructive Engagement a 
failure, this document sounded the death knell of Reagan‟s infamous policy and in so 
doing, stood in stark comparison to other documents such as NSSM 39. A meeting 
between George Shultz and Oliver Tambo in January 1987 was followed in June 1989 by 
a series of other high level meeting undertaken by Reagan‟s successor George Bush with 
South African activists. 
 
In May 1989, George Bush Senior met with Desmond Tutu who led a delegation of 
South African clerics to Washington.2 The significance of my conclusion that 
Washington wanted to play a leading role in the dismantling of apartheid was well 
captured here by Tutu‟s recollection of the meeting. In a post meeting briefing, he 
pointed out that Bush explained that “he did not want to give the impression of benign 
indifference…that he wanted to be a catalyst for change…” Bush‟s view encapsulates US 
strategy of playing a leading role in global developments. But more significantly, as Bush 
was determined to be seen as pushing serious change in policy, he issued an invitation to 
Albertina Sisulu to a meeting with him at the White House.3  
 
                                                 
2 This meeting was the culmination of a high level meeting that took place in Washington. The latter, was 
arranged by Transafrica and included clerics from South Africa, US government officials, captains of US 
corporations and leaders of civic organisations. Describing these meetings Muntali of Transafrica explained 
that at that time while the Tutu/Bush meeting did not accomplish much, the meeting of different 
stakeholders was in itself an achievement because it was able to bring so many stakeholders together-all 
with a common interest in South Africa-to meet with the South Africans. Muntali Interview. (4 
December 2002).     
3 Washington Post (19 May 1981). Albertina Sisulu was a prominent and respected activist. She was the wife 
of Walter Sisulu who was incarcerated at this time in a South African jail. She was also the co-Chair of the 
United Democratic Front. 







Such impressive and positive developments allowed me to conclude that considerable 
credit should be apportioned to US civil society. Through their solidarity work, 
organisations such as the American Committee on Africa, Free South Africa Movement, 
Transafrica and the thousands of individuals in the USA succeeded in creating an 
awareness of the plight of South Africa‟s oppressed majority, alerting the people of the 
USA  and the US media to the many clandestine operations and liaisons that existed 
between Washington and Pretoria. As a result they positioned their work to apply 
relentless pressure on the US State to change policy and to move support away from the 
apartheid apparatus to the ANC. Without the work of these groups, the ANC‟s work of 
gaining recognition from the US authorities would have been extremely burdensome. 
These collective efforts contributed to the ANC‟s attempts in successfully winning the 
international battleground. That they were a people denied no longer was obvious. For 
the African National Congress of South Africa, Africa‟s oldest liberation movement had 
won the soul of the USA. 
 
Recent studies by scholars such as Raymond Suttner have sought to concentrate on the 
value of the domestic scene in furthering the goals of the movement, thus challenging 
positions I have taken in this study on the importance of the foreign domain for the 
struggle.4   But I would take issue with his views by concluding that regardless of the 
nature of Oliver Tambo‟s defects, he understood fully that his movement could not 
operate in isolation to the international scene.  The struggle and the ANC had to be 
interconnected with global developments.  Positioning themselves globally made the 
maximisation of their revolution in that terrain, a certainty. 
 
While I respect the approach of scholars such as Suttner or other internationally based 
scholars who support similar views, my approach does not deny the power of youth or 
other clandestine domestic South African networks in the freedom struggle.  But the 
Suttner theory can perhaps be considered parochial especially since the struggle is 
contextualised as one against colonial rule.  This begs comparison with the Barack 
                                                 
4
 Raymond Suttner is an academic and former ANC activist.    Drawing on extensive oral  
testimonies of underground activists, he convincingly argued that such activists who were 
 based within South Africa were successful in rebuilding domestic networks after the ANC was banned.     
Suttner pointed out that the focus on the role of the underground segment within South Africa has been 
neglected.  Given this shortcoming in the historiography of the struggle, he sought a redress in this study. 
See Raymond Suttner. The ANC Underground in South Africa (Auckland Park. Jacana Media, 2008).    







Obama era that is characterised by a compelling anti-imperialist global vision, which is 
refreshing.  Barack Obama was not a child of the civil rights era. Coming from a swirling 
set of identities, Obama‟s political consciousness emerged during the era of South 
African consciousness.  Like Martin Luther King Jr.,  his understanding of the 
significance of  internationalism took root during these formative years.  Hence his 
understanding of his African identity would perhaps make him the first global leader to 
acknowledge this.  This consciousness was evident when he became involved as an 
undergraduate student at Berkeley University with the divestment campaign.  While he 
acknowledged that his involvement began “as something of a lark….part of the radical 
pose my friends and I sought to maintain” it eventually grew into a larger role where 
people “began to listen to my opinion.”  This he pointed out was a “discovery”.  
Addressing students at a rally planned to coincide with the trustees meeting at Berkeley, 
he expounded the importance of supporting global struggles as follows: 
 
I say there is a struggle going on….Its happening an ocean away. But it‟s a struggle that touches 
each and every one of us.  Whether we know it or not.  Whether we want it or not.  A struggle 
that demands we choose sides.  Not between black and white.  Not between rich and poor…. Its 
a choice between dignity and servitude ….A choice between right and wrong.5 
 
This address serves to strengthen my contention of his political consciousness  which 
was driven by a recognition of the value of internationalism.  My purpose in alluding to 
Obama and his era in this concluding segment of my dissertation is derived from an 
intention to contribute towards the production of a perspective that creates a balance 
between the views of Raymond Suttner who presents a strong case for  the importance 
of the domestic networks and my study which sought to highlight the value of global 
interconnectedness and internationalism for the freedom struggle.6   
 
Concluding this thesis in another time creates an enigma for me especially as I think 
about the Conference on The Future of the Past. Five to ten years ago I could not have 
written much of what I have done over the last few years as I was in a different space. 
                                                 
5
 Barack Hussein Obama is currently the 44th President of the USA and the first African-American to hold 
such office in that country.  See Barack Obama. Dreams from my Father. A Story of Race and Inheritance  
(Edinburgh. Canongate, 2004). 105, 106. 
6 The reader needs to be reminded of the views of Michael Sachs, an ANC, NEC member who in July 
2007 wrote about the pitfalls of divorcing domestic political developments from global developments.  In 
regard to political consciousness derived from the King emphasis on the need to cast global visions across 
the oceans. This was discussed at some length in Chapter One.  







The dilemmas I have experienced and continue to experience find comparison with 
academics who at the conference alluded to their predicament at producing history in a 
post apartheid South Africa. Cohen‟s reference to the complexities created by “time and 
temporalities,” continues to create turmoil for me. While I began my study in a post-
apartheid period, I am now concluding this thesis at a contentious time in South Africa‟s 
history as its citizens have just witnessed the turbulent exit from office of President 
Thabo Mbeki-the son of an icon of struggle and a contemporary of Nelson Mandela, 
Govan Mbeki. I will revisit this issue before concluding this final stage of my review.  
 
While I started out to write about the ANC at a time when the work of the movement 
was hardly documented, in the last five years the documentary trail has increased by leaps 
and bounds with the result that I can now acknowledge that the world has moved. With 
the burst of scholarship over the last five years on South Africa and its freedom struggle, 
we can rest assured that our democracy has moved in the eyes of scholars in this country 
and globally. The catalyst for such historical scholarship has been the increased 
availability of research data  In South Africa, they include archival collections of the 
ANC, PAC, Black Consciousness Movement, United Democratic Front and Trade 
Unions;  personal papers of  freedom fighters and struggle icons such as Nelson 
Mandela, Kader Asmal, Frene Ginwala, Oliver Tambo, Ahmed Kathrada, Mac Maharaj, 
Phyllis Naidoo, Lionel Forman; apartheid state records such as those of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs, Safety and Security and the South African Defense Force; rare 
journals of liberation and resistance organisations and various oral histories. In the USA 
archival material from the Department of State, including those released through the 
different Presidential Executive Orders; Presidential Papers; papers of solidarity 
organisations such as Transafrica and The American Committee on Africa, The Liberation 
Committee, The Washington Office on Africa and The Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights; material 
obtained by the National Security Archive at George Washington University through 
FOIA(Freedom of Information Act)  and finally the personal papers of US activists such 
as Enuga Reddy, Jennifer Davis, George Houser and Randall Robinson are accessible. 
 
I refer to the above because it begs comparison with the challenges I experienced in 
respect of access to data at the time I commenced this study. Further, given the 
availability of sources relating to the ANC today, I would expect that the parameters of 
my modest study will be pushed further by scholars in the future. That the future will be 







characterised by a dynamic flow of further historical scholarship is undeniable, but what 
is perhaps more notable is that the past will inevitably continue to change in scholars‟ 
estimations. My work or those of my contemporaries does not mark any closure on the 
subject of USA/ANC relations or on the ANC itself, but marks the beginning of a whole 
new chapter of historical debate and interrogation.  A further stimulant for such 
interrogation will be provided by the new administration and polices of the first Black US 
President, Barack Obama.7      
 
The process has already commenced with the production of a number of scholarly 
works. These include among others, those by scholars such as Mark Gevisser, Ronald 
Suresh Roberts, Richard Calland and Sean Jacobs, William Mervin Gumede, Andrew 
Feinstein, and the SADET Volumes.8 Consistent with this growth of literature is the 
historiographical trend which sees the ANC‟s work and leadership undergoing critical 
scrutiny as was the case at the 2004 Conference in Durban, its post apartheid policies and 
actions being challenged and its difficulties of leadership, including personal and political 
tensions, being interrogated. Perhaps the most striking feature of this trend is the focus 
on political contradictions and challenges, including those of party betrayal and party 
failure to respond to the needs of millions of South Africans in a post apartheid order, 
rather than on the freedom struggle itself.9    
 
In essence then I could justifiably point out that in respect of current historical 
scholarship, studies focusing on the state of the nation or those which demonstrate 
evidence of intensive political analysis, are in vogue. According to South Africa‟s Mail and 
Guardian, “People are suddenly more interested in the political state of South Africa and 
with the elections coming up, want to know more about the past and their 
                                                 
7 The required changes by the external examiners of this dissertation were undertaken during the early 
months of Barack Obama‟s presidency.  
8 Mark Gevisser. Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred (Jeppestown. Jonathan Ball, 2007); Ronald Suresh 
Roberts. Fit to Govern:  The Native Intelligence (Johannesburg. STE Publishers, 2006); Richard Calland 
and Sean Jacobs. Thabo Mbeki‟s World: The Politics and Ideology of the South African President 
(London. ZED Books, 2003); William Mervin Gumede. Thabo Mbeki and the Battle For the Soul of the 
ANC (London. ZED Books, 2006); Andrew Feinstein. After the Party:  A Personal and Political Journey 
Inside the ANC (Johannesburg. Jonathan Ball, 2007); SADET (South African Democracy Education 
Trust). At the intervention of former President Thabo Mbeki, SADET was launched in 2004, as a Project 
Trust to address the issue of the lack of adequate research available on South African‟s freedom Struggle. 
SADET. The Road to Democracy in South Africa. Vol. 2 (Pretoria. UNISA, 2006), SADET. The Road 
to Democracy in South Africa. International Solidarity Part 1 and Part 2 Vol. 3 (Pretoria. UNISA, 2008).        
9 This trend excludes those such as Ronald Suresh Roberts who have instead taken to the strategy of 
defending and not interrogating subjects as he does with Thabo Mbeki. 







leaders…people are looking for answers, people have a need to know what‟s going on.”10 
This is consistence with my view that the country‟s citizens are looking for accountability 
from its ruling party, the African National Congress.         
 
Writing fourteen years into a new democracy has necessitated a shifting historiographical 
focus guided by the access to information in the current political climate. But again I 
need to reiterate how writing about the ANC in a different time and a different political 
space has created tensions for me as well as for others. From my early involvement with 
the ANC as a student to my work for Nelson Mandela, through the presidential projects, 
I have been privileged to be part of a process which witnessed the movement transform 
itself from a liberation organisation to one governing a free nation 
 
But starting out to write about the ANC in the midst of the post apartheid euphoria and 
then completing the study during the time of deep political crisis for the movement, has 
presented notable challenges resulting in a sense of regret and despair. The former years 
witnessed strategic interventions led by those such as Frene Ginwala and Nelson 
Mandela to use the ANC Archive to account to their people for their time in exile and to 
push for the realisation of that cherished ideal of free and fair access to information. 
Precedence was given to transparency over secrecy. But as I look back, I can now 
acknowledge with a great degree of certainty that in the current political climate, the 
Ginwala and Mandela moments have been lost. 
 
In the Thabo Mbeki era, and specifically during his second term of office, it has become 
abundantly clear that the process of free and open access to data and my contribution in 
this area was being threatened by political intervention in the form of proposed 
intelligence legislation such as the Protection of Information Bill. What this demonstrates is 
that our Bill of Rights, a vital component of our Constitution, the premier example of our 
triumph over previous human rights violations, has come under threat. But before 
engaging with the latter, I find it pertinent to peruse the parameters of and reactions to 
the Intelligence legislation. 
 
                                                 
10 Mail and Guardian (8-14 August 2008). 5. 







The South African state though its drafting team under Advocate Howard Varney argued 
that the bill aimed to “limit unnecessary secrecy while at the same time trying to achieve 
proper protection‟ while the former Director-general of Intelligence, Mr. Barry Gilder  
premised its value on its ability  to protect this country from its “adversaries.” In his 
ludicrous submission to the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Committee on Intelligence on the 
Protection of Information Bill, Gilder provided an explanation on those who could be 
described as “adversaries.” Included in this category were criminals, organised crime 
syndicates, extremists, foreign governments and countries who may resort to espionage.11 
As a country which received the support of almost every country of the globe in its fight 
for freedom, I find Gilder‟s arguments on espionage not convincing enough.  
 
In contrast to these submissions, the views of the South African National Editor’s Forum 
(SANEF) also merit consideration. As a body devoted to championing freedom of 
expression in South Africa, the views of SANEF clearly assist the process of 
contextualising the prevailing political climate. In a verbal submission to the same Ad 
Hoc Committee on Intelligence, SANEF crafted its presentation to focus on how 
freedom of expression rights in the Constitution could be eroded by the proposed bill.12 
In his presentation to the Committee, Raymond Louw, a representative of SANEF 
pointed out that: 
 
This legislation is crucial in enabling the legislature to make a decision restriction 
whether this country is going to remain a democracy with all the elements of the free 
flow of information, access to information, informed citizenry able to make  
a choice, or start on the dangerous road to becoming an authoritarian state where 
officials become the gatekeepers preventing citizens from knowing what is going on let 
alone the extent of what is really going on.13 
 
                                                 
11 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080611-protection-imformation-bill-briefing. Set up in 1996, this is 
the website of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group which monitors South African Parliamentary 
committees. This legislation was dealt with by the Intelligence Committee at its 11 June 2008 meeting. 
The full text of this meeting together with the State‟s scope and purpose of the bill can be viewed here. 
Barry Gilder‟s submission to this committee on 29 July 2008 is also available here.    
12 Conversation with Raymond Louw, Editor and Publisher of Southern Africa Report and a representative of 
SANEF. Offices of the Ifa Lethu Foundation. 22 August 2008. SANEF was formed in October 1996 to 
protect media freedom and to overcome, through a programme of action, “past injustices in the media.” 
It comprises senior journalists and editors from all sectors of the media industry in the country. 
http://www.sanef.org.za.    
13 „Submission by South African National Editor‟s Forum (SANEF) to the Parliamentary Ad Hoc 
Committee on Intelligence on the Protection of Information Bill‟. (29 July 2008). 4. A copy of this 
submission was furnished by Raymond Louw. Copy in possession of author. Folder 3.   







These views find synergy with my argument that the conception of bills such as the 
Protection of Information Bill, far from advancing the principles of a true democracy, are 
intended to consolidate power of state structures with a view to developing an 
authoritarian state.. The Mandela era of transparency, openness and free access to 
information and the Ginwala emphasis on accountability are in danger of being replaced 
by warped and devastating ideologies. One of our constitutional rights, the Freedom of 
Access to Information, needs to be guarded well into our future.. 
 
This observation allows me move back in time to reflect on our early days of freedom 
which accorded priority to issues such as human rights, our Constitution and our Bill of 
Rights. As South Africans we have always been proud of our Bill of Rights. Enshrined in 
our Constitution, this Bill provided the necessary attestation of basic human rights, which 
formed the cornerstone of the ANC‟s struggle. With regard to human rights, during its 
repressive regime, the apartheid state demonstrated little consideration for this ideal. As a 
result few South Africans knew anything about the meaning and importance of the rights 
declared in the Universal declaration of Human Rights and other documents. This justifiably 
led to accusations of South Africa‟s lack of a „human rights culture.‟ It was precisely for 
this reason that victims of apartheid violence have always viewed the state as a violator of 
their basic rights. And so it was that the ANC, as a liberation movement in the 1950s and 
1960s, initiated a blueprint on how people should live and on their entitlements. This was 
evident in the Freedom Charter which paved the way for the demise of apartheid, the Bill of 
Rights and the new Constitution-and today stands out internationally as a human rights 
document. But what I consider pertinent at this junction in my reflections is how 
freedom of access to information was positioned as a Human Right. 
 
Included in the post apartheid Constitution was the constitutional right of access to 
information. The significance of the inclusion of this right has been appropriately 
captured by Iain Currie and Dale McKinley. According to Iain Currie, this inclusion “was 
motivated by a desire not to repeat the mistakes of the past”; while for McKinley “public 
access to information is the life-blood of any meaningful democratic participation.”14 As 
                                                 
14 Iain Curry. “South Africa‟s Promotion of Access to Information Act”. European Public Law. (9), (1). 60. 
Dale T. McKinley. Draft report on “The State of Access to Information in South Africa.”(July 2003). 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Johannesburg. 2.  







an archivist and historical scholar who experienced the effects of information control 
and secrecy, I could fully identify with these views.   
 
To enable the process of constitutional access, legislation in the form of the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act (PAIA) was passed in 2000 and again this represented a notable 
step in the realisation of a key democratic principle. For former struggle activist and then 
Minster of Justice and Constitutional Development, Penuell Maduna, PAIA meant “we 
are turning on the light to bring an end to the secrecy and silence that characterised 
decades of apartheid rule and administration.”15 Given South Africans‟ experiences of 
apartheid era closure and denial of access to information, the value apportioned to this 
critical piece of legislation was enthusiastically echoed by all sectors of society, including 
the archival sector. Being a relatively drastic piece of legislation, Archivist and then 
Director of the South African History Archive, Verne Harries described it as “the golden 
standard.”16    
 
Precisely how important this discussion is in my analysis may be a matter of deep 
controversy. But what it demonstrates is that barely eight years after the passing of a 
remarkable piece of legislation, that intrinsic element of democracy is in danger of being 
eroded through intervention on the part of government as alluded to in my discussion of 
the proposed Protection of Information Bill. The TRC records still remain inaccessible on the 
grounds of their security classification through PAIA, with the shocking effect of having 
silenced the voices of ordinary South Africans who comprise the country‟s previously 
disadvantaged and aggrieved sector of the population. The irony of this can be discerned 
from the fact that the testimonies presented to the TRC by the victims of gross human 
rights violations still remain concealed from the South African public, thirteen years later. 
That such a massive archive was generated from a process designed to ensure that the 
citizens of this country never forget a past riddled with trauma and pain finds resonance 
with Jacques Derrida‟s pronouncements on the “exercise in forgetting.”17  
 
                                                 
15 In McKinley. “The State of Access to Information in South Africa.” 3 While PAIA was a step in the 
right direction, it failed to fulfil its function of ending secrecy and of providing public access to 
information. This is evident in the case of the TRC records, records of certain political parties and 
records of inherited state structures such as the South African National Defence Force, Military 
Intelligence and the Department of Safety and Security.  
16 This was communicated in an interview undertaken by McKinley. 
17 Harris. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission:  An Exercise in Forgetting. September 2002,  
Online, 1.  







What appears vexing is that the South African democratic state would prefer that South 
Africans forget about the TRC and its Archive, reinforcing the Derrida consideration and 
displaying the ironies and vulnerabilities of a post apartheid political order devoted to 
closing the lines to free and fair access to information. But the French Philosopher‟s 
warning on how what is forgotten may return in a number of unforeseen ways must be 
heeded. For this warning has relevance as demonstrated through the dilemmas 
experienced by the recent Thabo Mbeki administration as it moved rapidly through a 
process of solidifying its power.         
     
As I commenced with this concluding chapter for my study of ANC/USA Relations, a 
major shift has just pervaded South Africa‟s political landscape. President Thabo Mbeki, 
South Africa‟s second democratic President, was recalled by his party, the ANC, and 
subsequently asked to resign.18 Kgalema Motlanthe, the former Secretary-General of the 
ANC, replaced him as the third democratic President until South Africa‟s next general 
election in 2009. 
 
The current situation in South Africa is illustrative of things falling apart for a regime that 
has lost touch with the principles of a National Democratic Revolution. While actions 
such as that of President Mbeki‟s axing by his own party, may justifiably be cause for 
alarm, it is also a very uplifting sign for the direction of South Africa‟s new democracy. 
While such positive developments may not be visible immediately, this is a sign of the 
importance of the need for the re-implementation of a value system originally 
implemented by the Mandela Presidency years. These included integrity and commitment 
to the country‟s new Constitution and the principles enshrined in that document, 
including the internationally recognised and respected South African Bill of Rights.  
 
The relationship between Mr. Mbeki‟s axing by his party and my work is significant. 
Starting out as the ANC‟s Archivist, I believe that I contributed to the material being 
preserved and made accessible to all South Africans. Subsequently upon undertaking this 
study, I took on the role of producer of history by interpreting the material I have helped 
to collect and preserve, specifically in relation to the ANC‟s attempts to develop a 
relationship with the USA. Hence President‟s Mbeki‟s actions over the last eight years 
                                                 
18 Trying to manipulate judicial proceeding against his successor Jacob Zuma, Mbeki was accused of 
abusing state power. This led to the ANC‟s call for him to resign. Pretoria News (25 September 2008) 







have clearly threatened my work in both respects. As I have contended and 
demonstrated in my opening chapter, the ANC in setting up its Archive from 1993, 
emphasised the need for transparency and public access. By the time of the 
implementation of its Oral History Project in 2000, the influence of newly elected 
President Mbeki‟s leadership style began to take root and this was evidenced by greater 
control of the Archives Unit and Archives Sub-Committee. Since 2000, this leadership 
style began to infiltrate even state structures, as seen by efforts such as the Protection of 
Information Bill, all culminating in his devastating attempts to compromise the 
independence of South Africa‟s judiciary. That the decay had set in was obvious and that 
South Africans would not take too kindly to the leader of one of the African continent‟s 
greatest liberation movements abusing their human rights was obvious. For historical 
scholarship his actions created a climate of despondency which contrasts sharply with the 
optimism associated with the Mandela years. Mbeki had failed millions of South Africans. 
The ANC, recognising his attempts to force a metamorphosis of the movement, took the 
bold and courageous step of recalling the country‟s President from his post, thus 
preventing an erosion of the foundations of a strong democratic order. 
 
In spite of the shocking trend of South Africa‟s political leadership our dreams are still 
too romantic. Recognising that there is more openness in USA access legislation, all 
South Africans like myself, having emerged from the shackles of an oppressive apartheid 
regime need to take ownership though our scholarship, of efforts to aggressively protect 
the value of information. For this information can be free only for as long as a political 
regime will allow this. Drawing on the legacy inherited from Africa‟s oldest liberation 
organisation, the African National Congress, we can again become agencies of change 
and not victims of oppression.        
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